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PREFACE
The study and/or investigation of Judaism, Zionism,
and the state of Israel is one of general interest to the
modern world,

for more reasons than its place in contemporary

world affairs; it is also closely connected with a high
degree of emotionalism.

The primary reason for this

emotional interest is. that Israel— the old Palestine— is
i

^

the natal land of three major religious sects:
Christianity,

Judaism,

and Islam.

The period of time covered by this thesis— -191419 22~=»is of significance tp the investigation of modern
Israel in that the Twentieth Century state was born during
this brief span of time.
istic movement,
nationalism,

The success of a late national

late in comparison to the emergence of

can be seen in the natal stages.

than a nationalistic movement,

Perhaps more

the Zionist movement was a

nativistic attack on Europe in that Zionism fulfills the
terms of a defined nativistic movement,
your group is being submerged,

i.e.,

a belief that

and that everything— real and

idealogical— is being taken from you.

Just as Wivoka of the

Paiute appeared at a propitipus time in his cultural hiptory,
so did*Theodore Herzl and Chaim Weizmann appear in the Jew's.
Whereas most of these movements do not ultimately succeed,

the Zionists did.

They accomplished their goal of universal

recognition as a group,

and as a nation.

Whereas this thesis covers a vital period in the
history of Zionism,

it is not a systematic and complete

analysis of the subject.

The emphasis,

rather,

is on the

evolutionary political/diplomatic process which created the
Jewish state, from whence sprang many of the current and
contemporary problems of

the world.

The use and spelling of

Arabic and Turkish terms

and names created some problem,

that different sources-used different spellings.

in

With the

exception of direct quotations I have adopted a consistent
system of spelling for this enterprise.
differ from contemporary spellings,

Although it might

the forms used,

did tend

to appear in sources more frequently than others.
In an attempt such as this, full acknowledgement of
h elp— scholastic and other— can only be barely touched upon.The careful and considerate advice and direction of my
advisor, Dr. A. Stanley Trickett,

should be duly noted,

much thanks given for his patience.
Dr. Roy M. Robbins,

and

To Dr. Ert Gum,

and the other members of the graduate

faculty at the University of
appreciation is felt for

Nebraska at Omaha, greatful

the course work and also for the

opportunity to complete my Master of Arts program through
the aid of a iGraduate assistantship, without which this
degree could not have been completed.

To Marian Nelson

special thanks are offered for the constant "prod," the

needed and necessary criticism,

and the welcome friendship.

t

Although only indirectly connected with this thesis,

the.

faculty and' my students of John F. Kennedy High School,
Bloomington, Minnesota,

in

should be mentioned as a catalytic

agent in my completion of the requirements for this degree.
The time and work of my typist, Mrs. Henry Pinkerton,

is

also recorded with, great appreciation, but is also deeply
felt,

in that she took on the job when I was desperate,

and

did so with no complaint.
Last, but definitely not least,

this thesis could

not have been completed without the loving consideration and
encouragement of my family.

My mother, who aided in portions

of the preliminary typing; my father for his interest and
willingness to discuss problems and theories;
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and to my
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their understanding,

in the enterprise.

To my family,

if not
then,

I deeply and lovingly offer my thanks for the constant query:
"How's the thesis coming?"

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
Chapter
INTRODUCTION
Nineteenth Century Zionism
Theodore Her.zl and the Idea of a
Jewish State
Zionist Congress
Early Moves Towards British Sponsorship
SECRET TREATIES AND ABORTIVE PROMISES
Outbreak of World War I
DeBunsen Committee
Secret Treaties— McMahon-Husain
Correspondence, Sykes-Picot Treaty
III.

BRITISH ALLIANCE WITH ZIONISM— A DIPLOMATIC
NECESSITY
. . . ....................
Zionist Activities— 1916-1917
Prelude to Balfour Declaration
Split in Jewish Community—
Assimilationist vs. Zionist
Balfour Declaration— November 2, 1917
MOTIVATIONS AND REACTIONS
Reactions & Interpretations of Declaration
War in the Middle East and Conquest
of Palestine
Reassurance of Arabs
Hogarth Message, Basset Letter, Declaration
to the Seven, Anglo-French Declaration
A FAILURE AT PARIS
Role of Lloyd George and Clemenccau
in the Middle East
Arab and Zionist Delegations at Paris
Provisional Drafts of the Mandate

THE CREATION OF CONFLICT

122

Final Preparation of the Mandate
for Palestine
British and French Agreements Over
Military Occupation
Creation of the British Administration
in Palestine
Confusion Over Official Policy in the
Middle East
Churchill White Paper of 19 2.2
CONCLUSIONS

144

APPENDIX

153

BIBLIOGRAPHY

165

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Let the sovereignty be granted us over
a portion of the globe large enough to
satisfy the rightful requirements of a
nation; the rest we shall manage ourselves.^
— Theodore Herzl
The issuance of the Balfour Declaration of
November 2, 1917 was not a spontaneous action on: the part of
Great Britain.

Rather it was an effort to support- common

British and Zionist interests in the Middle East, primarily
in Palestine,

and represented the culmination of joint

British and Jewish activities in the nineteenth and early
twentieth* centuries.
needs of Zionism,

It appeared that world events,

and the

"embraced each other at the most propitious

moment as if the two Were "on a divinely pre-arranged planned
parenthood."

2

Zionist philosophy,
Jewish quest for a homeland,

a new interpretation of the
sprang from the reactionary

pressures exerted by nineteenth century Eastern Europe,

and

■^Theodore Herzl, The Jewish State:
An Attempt at a
Modern Solution of the Jewish Question (New York:
American
Zionist Council, 1946) , pT 28.
Hereafter cited as, Herzl. f
Jewish State.
2
Max I. Dimont, Jews, God and History (New York:
Signet Books, 1962), p. 395.
Hereafter cited as Dimont, Jews

an increasingly antir-semitic Western Europe.

The basic aim

of Zionism was the preservation of Jewish culture in spite
of growing forces aimed at its destruction.

Despite

opposition*, the Jews developed a blueprint for. their state;
and a concept for survival was, by the late nineteenth
century, being forged into an actual strategy for survival.

3

British affairs in the Middle East were grounded in
nineteenth century imperialistic interests,

and the need to

protect the lifeline to India and the Far East.
less importantly and less obviously,

Although

there also appears to

have been- a strong desire,to rectify the wrongs that had been
committed against the Jews.

The factors contributing to the

eventual creation of a Jewish state, however, would evolve
from political and diplomatic motivations, rather than
religious idealism.
While the British interest in the Middle East was
relatively recent, the restoration of the Holy Land to the
Jews was not a new idea, nor was Great Britain the only
nation interested in the plan.

With the decline of the

Turkish Empire during the nineteenth century, there was a
growing interest on the part of European powers to establish
a better basis for influencing,
in the area.
3

and controlling,

developments

The three dominant contestants in this battle

Dimont, J e w s , p. 395.
cf. Ben Halpern, The Idea of
the Jewish State (2nd e d . ; Cambridge:
Harvard University
Press, 1 9 b 9 ), pp. 55 ff.
Hereafter cited as Halpern, State.

for influence and supremacy were France, Russia and Great
Britain,

and after the completion of the Suez Canal this

contest increased.
were:

The significant questions to be answered

How’ did the modern Jewish program for autonomous

Jewish statehood come into being?

And, what nation .could

best sponsor the drive for the establishment of a Jewish
state in Palestine?
As the contest for imperialistic supremacy between
France, Russia and Great Britain' developed in the Middle East,
a movement among Eastern EuropeansJews occurred simul
taneously.

The transformation of a nebulous idea, or theory,

regarding a Jewish state into an actual plan for such a state
began to take place

about 1860,

At that time the messianic

idea of a return to

Zion was converted” into a hard political

reality for a return to Palestine.

4

The general attitude

among Jews appeared to be that a peaceful life could not be
achieved by simply moving to another country,

or another

city, but only through the establishment of an independent
Jewish state.
4

According to Judah Pinsker,

an early Zionist,

S.W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the
Jews (12 vols. ; New York:
Columbia University Press, 1937),
II, 329.
Hereafter cited as Baron, H is tory. The motivating
factor in this change in philosophy appears to be when the
anti-Jewishness of the Middle Ages changed to the anti
semitism of Modern History; the old feelings being one of
religious prejudice and the new one of racial prejudice.
Dimont, J e w s , p. 395.
cf„ Esco Foundation for Palestine,
I nc., Palestine:
A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British
Policies (2 vols.; New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1947),
II, 1. Hereafter cited as Esco, Palestine.

anti-semitism was a problem that could onot be solved byexchanging a mingrity status in one country, for minority
status in another.

Anti-semitism,

according to Pi.nsker, was

a permanent, psycho-pathological phenomenon which could only
be eliminated through the creation of a separate Jewish
4 4 - 5
state.
-

Through the authors of a series of books and pamphlets
published between 1860 and 1890, the route from the Diaspora
to Palestine was "paved with a succession of i d e a s . T h e
authors of these tracts were primarily East European J e w s y
and it was through their writings that the way was prepared
for the man who would be the epitomy of the militant Jew-^Theodore Herzl.
The result of the nineteenth century drive to achieve
the "Jewish ideal" was the World Zionist Organization,
largely the work of Theodore Herzl.

The creation of an

independent state in Palestine became the goal of that group.
Political sovereignty, however, was n ob an absolute and
immediate goal of the movement.

Whereas in other nationalist

movements of the nineteenth century,

sovereignty was an

5

Leo W. Schwarz, e d . , Great Ages and Ideas of the
Jewish People {New York:
Random House, Inc., 1956) , pi 435.
Hereafter cited as Schwarz, Ideas.
^Among these nationalist authors can be found such
names as Moses Hess, Peretz Smolenskin, Samuel Mohilever,
and .Judah Pinsker, whose Auto-Emancipation was; definitely
anti-assimilationist in its outlook, and became a dominant
theme with Herzl.
Dimont, J e w s , p. 396.

urgent demand,

the Zionists first desired a land in which to

concentrate their efforts; sovereignty was., therefore,

of

It was the search for a homeland that

secondary importance.

dominated Zionist activities in the early stages of develop
ment. ^
H e r z l 's interest in the Jewish problem was not
dominant in his life until 1882, when he discovered Eugen
Duhring's The Jewish Problem as a Problem of Race, Morals
Q
and Culture.
Prior to the reading of this book, Herzl felt
that assimilation was the solution for the problem confront
ing tjie Jews of Europe.

After reading Duhring, however, with

its dominant theme of the need for reinstitution of the
9
Medieval ghetto, Herzl amended h i s ■philosophy.
Where he had
previously thought that assimilation through any means— even
apparently impractical ones,

such as mass baptism, or a

romantic confrontation between Gentile and Jew in a public
duel— were desirable,

there was one train of thought common

to, all of his proposals:

the firm conviction that' the Jewish

question had to. come to the attention of the. public,
to be openly discussed, by both Jew and Gentile,

and had

if a

^Halpern, S t a t e , pp. 22-23.
Q
This work, published in 1881, represented an: early
attempt to give a scientific basis for’ anti-semitism.
9

Alex Bein, Theodore Herzl:
A Biography;, trans. by
Maurice Samuel (Philadelphia:
Jewish Publishing Society,
1940), p. 35.
Hereafter cited as Bein, H e r z l .

workable solution was to be found.

10

The Dreyfus Affair in France acted as the catalytic
agent that drastically changed H e r z l 1s philosophy,

for in.

this trial he recognized the complete failure of his earlier
theories of emancipation and assimilation.
ified the assimilated Jew,

.Dreyfus person

and in the treatment received by

him, Herzl saw the emancipated-assimilated Jew forced back
into the ghetto and role of scape-goat.

To him the entire

affair embodied more than a judicial error,

it embodied

the desire of a vast majority of the French to condemn
a Jew, and to comdemn all Jews in this one Jew.""^

It was

only after he had accepted this revelation of the basic
fallacy in hi-s previous theories, that the, idea of a Jewish
state began to dominate his philosophy.

Only after he

realized that anti-semitism stemmed from a characteristic of
the social structure— and not a religious difference— did
Theodore Herzl become a Zionist.

12

Realizing that the primary problem confronting widely
separated Jews was the absence of political leadership, Herzl
formulated a theory to rectify the difficulty.

With the

initiation of the publication Per Judenstat, the messianic
Josephine Kamm, The Hebrew People:
A History of
the Jews (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 177.
Hereafter
cited as Kamm,;. Heb re w. At this time Herzl was not aware of
Hess and Pinsker, and thought .of his philosophy as a unique
one.
"^Herzl,
12

Jewish Sta te , p. 34

Dimont, J e w s , p. 398.

desire for a return to Zion became an active and cohesive
political force.

The philosophy of the Zionist movement was

simply stated in the preface of H e r z l 1s book:

"The idea

which I have developed in this pamphlet is a very"old one:
it is the restoration of the Jewish State." 13

In giving

definite expression to the idea of an independents Jewish
state, Herzl verbalized the- old ideal of the Jewish people—
"Next year in Jerusalem!"

14

At no place in the pamphlet did

he specifically mention a preferred .territory, although two
areas referred to were Argentina and Palestine— one was
fertile with a good climate and small population; while the
other was the historic homeland of the Jewish people.

The

ultimate choice of location, determined by Jewish public
opinion, would make the resultant move a voluntary exodus to
a selected and defined area possessing potential for the
evolution of an autonomous Jewish state.

15

In an effort to

aid colonization by Jewish settlers in the proposed terri
tories,

the Jewish Colonization Association was established

in 1891, with a founding capital of 4^2,000,000 .^

The

■^Bein, Herzl »■ pp. 160-61.
14

D. R. Elston, Israel:
The Making of a Nation
(London:
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 11.
Hereafter
cited as Elston, Israel.
15

Dimont,

Jews, p. 398.

"^Nahum Sokolow, History of Zionism:
16QQ-1918
(2 vols.; London:
Longmans and Gr ee n e , 1919) , if] 258.
Hereafter cited as Sokolow, Zionism. Memorandum of
association:
"To assist and promote the emigration of Jews

initial plan was to seek the financial aid of wealthy Jewish
bankers and philanthropists,

and acquire a charter from the

Ottoman Sultan which would permit Jewish colonization in
Palestine,

for it was felt that the Jewish immigrant could

not love the Argentine as he loved the "Promised Land" and
the "historic home" of Jerusalem,

17

despite the geographic

advantages offered by the Argentine.
During the convocation of the first Zionist Congress
in Basle,

1897,

the Zionist Organization firmly stated its

basic purpose:
The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people
a home in Palestine secured by public law . . . CandJ
preparatory steps towards obtaining government cojgent
. . . to the attainment of Lthis] aim of Zionism.
After the establishment of the Zionist Organization
and the formal statement of its philosophy,
to find a sponsor.

steps were taken

It was not surprising that Herzl's native

state, Germany, was the first choice.

The bulk of the

Zionists held German or East European heritage, but negoti
ations with the Kaiser's government deteriorated into a
from any part of Europe or Asia— and primarily from countries
in which they Cmay be persecuted or discriminated against]—
to any parts of the world, and to form and establish colonies
in various parts of North and South America and other
countries for agricultural, commercial and other purposes.
"To purchase and acquire . . . any territories, lands,
or other property . . . for developing - . - the same for
colonization."
Ibid., I, 253.
■^Sokolow, Z i o ni sm , I, 259.
18

Ibid., I, pp.
Appendix A, p. 15 2.

268-69.

cf. Basle Program,

frustrating discussion of conflicting interests and claims.
Discouraged by Germany's response to the suggestion of
establishing a protectorate,

the Jews began the search for

another s p o n s o r . ^
In 1901 Herzl attempted to convince the Sul/tan that
Jewish industrial and intellectual awareness could be of
great assistance in the reorganization and modernization of
the Turkish economy.

The Sultan expressed interest in the

idea, however, he appeared to be more interested in having the
Zionist Organization fund the national debt of the Ottoman
Empire.

20

The following year a final attempt was made to

obtain the p e r mi s si on 'of the Ottoman government to establish
a Jewish land commission for Palestine.

Hopefully,

such a

commission would be allowed to plan for unlimited Jewish
settlement, with local autonomy for the settlements.

The

Sultan, however, refused to accede to the requests for
autonomy, but offered instead, permission to settle,
parts of the empire— with the exclusion of Palestine,

in all
as

19

The reversal in Germany's original interest in the
proposal was probably the result of her fear of upsetting
Turkey, who disfavored the plan; and out of the apparent
possibility of creating trouble with the Triple Entente—
each of which had a very real interest in the Middle East,
cf. Bein, H e r z l p. 30 7.

20 Howard Morley Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish
History (New York:
Dell Publishing House, 1958"), p. 273.
Hereafter cited as Sachar, Modern Jewish H is to ry ,
cf. Schwarz, Ideas, p. 437, and Leonard Stein, The Balfour
Declaration (London:
Vallentine-Mitchell, 196l"F] p7 23.
Hereafter cited as Stein, Balfour.

citizens of the Ottoman Empire.

21

Another bid for sponsorship, made to the Vatican,
proved to be unsuccessful also.
Val, of the Papal court,

Through Cardinal Merry del

the Church refused sponsorship to

the Zionists as long as they remained unconverted to
Catholicism.

The Pope, more outspoken than his representa-

tive, stated simply:

"We cannot favor this movement."

22

Desperately turning to Russia for sponsorship,
Zionists pointed out to von Plehve,
Tsar,

the

the representative of the

that support of their program would bring an end to

much of the religious turmoil in Russia.

Von Plehve,

to rid Russia of the troublesome Jewish element,
interested in the scheme,

anxious

appeared

only to reverse his opinion when

diplomatic negotiations- revealed that other members of the
evolving Triple Entente were not in favor of such a move.
The dire political situation in Russia also necessitated
immediate attention,

to the abandonment of the Zionist pro

gram' and its possible support by the Tsar.
The Jews were finally forced to turn to Great Britain
for the support necessary to allow the implementation of their
plans for the founding of a Jewish state— a program which had
gained the endorsement of the World Zionist Conference.

23

was in England that Herzl saw possible* success because "of
21

23

Schwarz,

Ide a s, p. 439.

Bern, H e r z l . p. 379.

22

Ibid.

It

the general situation there

it was the Archimedian

point where the lever could be applied
tively.

"

24

most effec

The Zionists felt that England seemed more willing

to recognize the significance of their movement and with the
convocation of their Fourth Congress in London

(1901), th©

English publicly issued comments favoring the drive for a
Jewish state.

25

The Zionist hierarchy entered into negotiations with
Great Britain for an area of land in the Sinai Peninsula—
El-Arish— an enterprise eventually .doomed to failure because
of British affairs in Egypt,

and the arid conditions of the

area whiph were not favorable to agrarian enterprise.

In

the summer of 190 3, however, Herzl was notified by Joseph
Chamberlain that an ideal location had been found for Zionist
settlement— in Uganda,

a portion of British East Africa.

The

terms of the, Uganda Project were stated in a letter to
L. J. Greenberg, which included a proposal for a Jewish
Colonial Trust to support the settlement in East Africa and
to initiate the colonization process'.

26

Herzl reluctantly

accepted the Uganda offer as offering temporary Jewish
asylum,

and prepared to present the British offer to the

Sixth World Congress

(1903) for ratification.

During the Jewish-Turkish negotiations the onceuniled Zionist front had suffered an internal breach which
24Sokolow, Z i o n i s m . I, 295.
26I b id . . I, pp.

296-97.

25Ibid. , I, 29,6.

continued to expand and which became openly apparent at the
Fifth Zionist Congress

(1901).

The difficulty centered on

internal opposition to Herzl and his leadership*

The

Congress split between those loyal to Herzl and his belief
that persistent diplomacy would win the fight for a Jewish
state; and the "Politicals"

(The Democratic Zionist Fraction)

— the activists— who felt that since diplomacy, had failed,
violence and weapons must be employed to decide the question
of statehood.

27

The latter segment included, primarily,

Russian Jews who, because of the severity of the pogroms of
1903-1904,

felt an almost fanatical need to reach Palestine,

and, thus, expressed open dissatisfaction with the -slowness
of the diplomatic methods of Herzl.

It was to these Eastern

Jews— the Democratic Zionist Fraction— that the ultimate
leadership of the movement would pass.

This group, while

not ignoring the political character of Zionism, tended to
emphasize the cultural aspects of Judaism,

and aimed for an

expression of nationalism which was- based on a common
cultural heritage of world Jewry.

28

The dissension in the Zionist Organization became
openly evident in 1903, when Herzl presented the alternate
British proposal of a Jewish settlement in Uganda.

In spite

of the fact that he stressed that it was to be used as a
Nachtasyl— a temporary home— and a preparatory step towards
^Dimont,
28

Jews, p. 399.

Halpern, Jewish S t a t e , p. 1

the eventual colonization of Palestine,
received with mixed emotions.

the proposal was

H e r z l 1s opponents felt that

the basic policies of Zionism had been betrayed.

As a result,

Menahem Mende Ussishkin, head of the Russian delegation,
presented a resolution to the meeting that Herzl not be
allowed to continue the negotiations for territorial recog
nition in the name of the Conference, unless the territory
involved was Palestine or Syria.

Nothing but Palestine,

"the land of the Book," would be acceptable to the eastern
faction of the Congress.

29

The faction that supported Herzli,

on the other hand— the western or aristocratic faction—
tended to agree with Herzl,

that a quick political settlement,

even though temporary, was the best possible action to take.

30

A committee sent to investigate Uganda as a possible
area for settlement, reported in 19'05 that the proposed terri
tory was unsuitable for agricultural settlement.

After the

majority of the Congress voted against Uganda as a stepping
stone to Palestine,

or as an end in itself,

the project was

shelved.^
The East African offer
not only precipitated a crisis within Zionism, but
also— and here-in lies its significance— raised
Zionism to the rank of a political movement of
international importance, and demonstrated the
29
30

Elston,

Israel, p. 12.

Sacher, Modern Jewish Hi st o r y , p. 278.

^Esco,

Palestine, I, 49.

interest of the B r i ^ s h Government in a solution of
the Jewish problem.
Even though H e r z l 1s one political success,
failed,

the Uganda scheme,

it established a very important precedent for future

negotiations between the two parties.

It set the stage for

the Zionist's shift from Germany and Turkey and concentration
of all her efforts on England1
.

In the future,

the door that

had been carefully opened by Ch am berlain’s African offer
permitted "an easier access to the England of Balfour
and, eventually,

."

to the recognition of a Jewish state.

The refusal of the Eastern Jews to follow Herzl
resulted in their calling a separate convention in Kharkov,
Russia, where they committed themselves "permanently and
exclusively to the idea of Palestine"
Jewish colonization.

34

as the sole site for

It was the idealogical conflict within

the Jewish movement that revealed,

to the Herzl faction,

the

strength of the eastern faction's desire for Palestine.
It was then, too, that Herzl grasped an inescapable
portent:
it was only a matter of time before the
potent reservoir of Ostjuden ^Eastggn Jews] would
take over the movement altogether.
With the death of Herzl and the election of David
Wolffsohn as President,
^Sokolow,
33
34
35

in 1907,

a fusion of the "practical"

Z i o n is m, I, 297-98.

Herzl, Jewish S t a t e , p. 16.
Sachar, Modern Jewish H i s t o r y , p. 278.
Ibid.

33

and the "political" elements occurred,

and this united group

pledged itself to seek Palestine as the area for settlemen/t,
as the only area that would satisfactorily solve the problem
of persecution in Eastern Europe.

It was generally conceded

that all agricultural settlements in areas other than
Palestine had failed,

and it was

not far from Russia Hand Central Europe], and £was]
unquestionably so adapted to cultivation that as
soon as the soil [was] prepared the main s^geam of
* - . migration Ewould) be directed - . there.

The Congress of 190 7 created the Palestine Department

to aid in the colonization of Palestine.

The next decade

would witness the bulk of the major developments in the
Zionist movement taking place in Palestine,

and on the eve

of World War I, the World Zionist Organization of the GermanJewish "politicals," came under the control of the "more
numerous and infinitely more passionate folk-Zionists of the
Pale"

37
— the Eastern Jew.
While negotiations for recognition and support had

been going on, Jewish settlement in Palestine had been
slowly, but steadily,

taking place.

In 1905 a new wave of

immigrants began to arrive in Palestine— the second A l i y a h ,
(the first having been in 1882 by the "lovers of Zion .1')
Small, but consistent,

and primarily agrarian based pre-

World War I colonization occurred,
36
37

so that by the outbreak

Sokolow, Z i o n i s m . II, lii.
Sachar, Modern Jewish H i s t o r y , p. 283.

of the war approximately forty Jewish settlements in
Palestine existed, with a total population estimated at
twelve thousand on farms and an estimated fifty thousand
Jewish settlers in towns or cities.

38

The language problem,

resulting from the varied nationalities of the settlers,
resulted in the encouragement of Hebrew as a national
language— a development which aided in' the formulation of a
national identity and unp-ty.
As a result.of the activities of the Zionist Congress
and its subsidiaries,

the foundation of a Jewish home in

Palestine had already effectively been started by 1.914.
Political recognition of the Zionist cause had received
tentative approval by both German and English governments,
but public recognition and acceptance was still required if
a Jewish state were to become a reality.
The "moral-legal" foundation for establishing a
Jewish state in Palestine was built during the first World
War,

the resultant Peace Conference at Paris,

of the League of Nations.
came about, primarily,

and creation

The accomplishment of this fact

as the result of two documents:

Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917,

and the Mandate for

Palestine, which implemented the Balfour Declaration,
38

the

issued

Arthur Ruppfn, The Jewish Modern World (New York:
Macmillan, 1934), p. 368.
Hereafter cited as Ruppin, Jewish
W o r l d . The Israel State Handbook, Facts About Israel
(Jerusalem, 1966), gives the total Jewish population in the
area as being 85,000.

on July 24, 1922.

Thpee main groups or factions were

connected with these documents,

and, therefore, with the

resolution of the problem of political recognition of a
Jewish state.

The desires of the Jews to have a homeland

was the first,

and foremost,

second,

concern of the Jewish element"

the desire of the Arabs to obtain independence from

the Turks must be met; and the imperialistic interests of
England and* France,
be reconciled.

in reference to the Middle East, had to

The solution to the problem of the Jewish

state was inextricably tied up with all three,

and the

creation of the Mandate for Palestine evolved out of a
comedy of errors resulting in attempts to solve all three
problems without regard'for the future consequences of the
multiple promises made during the course'of the negotiations.

CHAPTER II
SECRET TREATIES' AND ABORTIVE PROMISES
. . . andj whosoever considers that the nature of
men, especially of men in^authority,{is inclined
rather to commit two errors than to retract one,
will not marvel that from this root:Lof unadVisedness, so many and tall branches of mischief have
proceeded.
^
-— Clarendon, History of the Rebellion
The a s s a s s i n a t i o n xof ArchduKe Franz Ferdinand at
Sarajevo and^ the- world -war which followed, ^ reshaped many
states in Europe and -the' Middle East,

and instituted a marked

change in the world Jewish community.

Despite the fact that

during thp same period a new wave of anti-Semitism swept the
continent/ the Zionists gained additional support for th^ir
program and finally achieved their goal of reaching
Palestine— the British would conquer the Middle East,
the Zionist dream Qwould^ become a reality."

"and

It is doubtfult

if this goal could have b ee n realized, had it*not been for
the violent transformation ^in diplomacy which evolyed as a
result of the all-encompassing conflict of the Great War.
Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other
Middle-Eastern Studies (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1970),
p e 82.
Hereafter citfed as Kedourie, Chatham H o u s e .
2
Abr,am Leoni Sachar, A History of the Jews (5th ed. ;
New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1 9 7Q), p. 362.
Hereafter cited
as Sachar, J e w s .

18-

The dichotomy of Great Britain's foreign policy was part of
this process.

England had to shelve long-term goals in the

interest of relatively short-term goals; goals that were'
necessary for "securing immediate tactical advantage over
the en emy."

3

Between early August and the end of October,

1914,

Great Britain tensely waited for a move by the Turkish Empire
to end its neutral status and, because of the immediacy of
the situation, England was forced to make a "number of
4

contradictory commitments

"

among them the Husain-

McMahon Agreement and the Sykes-Picot Treaty— negotiations
dictated by need and expediency.

Should the Turks enter the

war on the side of Germany,. England would be faced not only
with a two-front war, but also with the possibility of losing
access to natural resources and supplies from the East.
Because of this great threat,

the War Office worried about

the defense of the route to India, while the Admiralty was
equally concerned over the safety of English oil resources in
Persia,

5

for the
3

George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East:
From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times (New York:
Frederick
A. Praeger, 1960), p. 129.
Hereafter cited as Kirk, History
of the Middle E a s t .
^ Ibid., p. 124.
5
Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East
and North Africa (London!
M ac M i l l a n , 1968) , pi 9~. Hereafter
cited as Williams, Britain and F r a n c e . For an explanation
of the impact of Persian oil c f ., Yahya Armajani, Middle
East:
Past and Present (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1970), pp. 228 ff.
Hereafter cited as Armajani, Middle
East.

. . . Turkish. Empire/., lay across the track by land
or water to CBritainlsj great possessions in the
East . . . .
It was vital for . . . ^ E n g l a n d 's
interests that once the Turks "declared war against
- - . {]"her~j , £they~j should defeat
- them.
Prior to the outbreak of the;war in 1914,

the Foreign

Office gave onl„y >slight attention to ‘relations with the Arab
people^, primarily because of it's traditional poligy towards
the Ottoman Empire— a policy dictated by- the nepessityi to
protect routes to the Middle East,

and the Far East.

Any

independent contact with the Arabs would directly violate
this policy and would question the supremacy- and sovereignty
of the Ottoman government in this area.

England could not-

risk antagonizing the Porte in any-way so long as it remained
neutral.
Egypt,

7

Lord Kitchener,
however,

British Agent|and-Consul-General in

.
toyed with the idea of British sponsorship

of the establishment of .an Arab state to offset an^ imperial

loss of influence, which might resultvfrom the' growing
friendliness between the Sultan and Germany.
February,

8

As earlyi as

1 9 1 4 / the Arabs had approached Kitchener,

their representative Abdullah,

through

one of the sons of the* Sharif

^David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (6 vols.; London:
1933-36), IV, 1802-03.
7
Sir Llewellyn Woodward, Great Britain and the War
of 1914-1918 (London;
Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 114.
Hereafter cited as Woodward, Great Britain.
8

H. W. V. Temperley, e d . , A History of the Peace
Conference of Paris (6 v o l s . ; London:
Henry Frowde and
Hodder & Stoughton, 1924), VI, 120.
Hereafter cited as
Temperley, Peace Conference.

of Mecca; regarding the possibility of British aid, or
support for an Arab revolt against the Turkish Empire.
Consul-General refused the representative's request,
denied a request for partial aid.

The

and even

Great Britain felt she

could not support a rebellion against a country with which
she had friendly diplomatic relations.

However,

to ascertain

the exact wishes and position of Husain, Ronald Storrs,
Oriental Secretary to the British Agency in Egypt, was sent
to Abdullah shortly after this initial contact had been made.
Storrs was asked "categorically whether Great Britain would
present the Grand Sharif with a dozen

machine guns"

to be used by the Arabs against thp Turks.

9

This request was

refused by Storrs, who once again reiterated that Great
Britain could not support a rebellion against aicountry with
which she had a working diplomatic arrangement.*^

Although

nothing came of these early Anglo-Arab conversations,

a*

foundation had been, established for future contacts between
the two parties,

should the need arise.

From August through October,

1914, the Turkish govern

ment continued to maintain a neutral position,} at lea^t theo
retically.

However, when it became apparent that Turkey was

^Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London:
Ivor Nicholson
and Wasson, 1937), p. 143.
cf. G. P. Gooch and H. W. V.
Temperely, e d s . , British Documents on ‘the Origin of the War
(10 v o l s . ; London:
His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1926-38)
X, 827.
Hereafter cited as Gooch and Temperley, D o c um e nt s.
"^Storrs,

Orientations, p. 143.

moving towards a German alliance, Great Britain rapidly
revised her policies toward the Arabs.

New arrangements

were necessary to fill the vacuum which would result from a
German-Turkish alliance.

After Turkey entered the war on

November 5, 1914, England prepared to exploit the mutual
antagonism that existed between the Arabs and the Ottoman
Empire.

Generally,

it was the attitude of the British repre

sentatives in Khartoum and at Cairo,

that successful military

campaigns against the Turks required Arab support for the
allied effort.

Should the Ottoman Sultan declare a Jihad

11

against the allied countries, by claiming the war to be antiMuslim in its orientation,

the possibility of countering such

a program in the Arab world,

as well as among Moslem troops

of the Indian Army, could only be found in some form of
Anglo-Arab alliance.

12

Lord Kitchener directed Storrs,

in September,

1914-,

to approach Husain on the possibility of an alliance between
England and the Arabs.

In return for Arab support, Kitchener

proposed to supply and support an Arab revolution, which he
had previously refused to do.

The Sharif,

ambiguous and noncommittal statement,

in a rather

replied that he would

be willing to negotiate such an agreement with England, but
11

Jihad is Arabic for "holy w a r . " To participate in
Jihad was one of the metriods to achieve Paradijse, according
to Islamic doctrine.

12 Kedourie, Chatham H o u s e , p. 16.
Peace Co nference, VI, 120.

c f . , Temperley;

indicated that immediate- military action o n Lhis part was not
possible because of the lack of preparedness among the
Arabs.

13

He offered cooperation in non-violent ways, however,

by agreeing to refuse the Jihad to be proclaimed in any of
the mosques under his control.
Initiation of formal negotiations between Husain and
Great Britain can be dated with the cable which Kitchener
sent to Cairo on November 1, 1914:

14

If Arab nation assist England in this war England will
guarantee that no intervention,takes place in Arabia
and will give Arabs^gvery assistance against external
foreign aggression.
Husain,

repeating his earlier message’, informed the Fqreign

Office in ^Cairo that he favored supporting England and
desired British aid in any revolution,

but stipulated that

overt actipn against Turkey could not come from the Arabs
without extensive preparation.
lacked sufficient*strength,

He mainati.ned that the Arabs

at that time,

to wage an all-out

rebellion against T u r k e y . ^
Great Britain declared war* on Turkey,;, November 5

Storrs,

13 Gooch and Temperley,
Orientations', p. 175.

D o c u m e n t s , X, 831-32.

c f .,

■^Temperley, Peace Con fe re nc e, VI, 120.
The Ottoman
Empire had joined Germany on October 31, 1914, and the
British telegram was sent the following day.
15

Storrs,

O rientations; p. 176.

"^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening in the Story of
the Arab National Movement (Philadelphia: Lippinc ot t, 1939),
pp. 132 ff.
Hereafter cited as Antpnius, Arab Aw akening.

1914, thus abandoning her traditional Eastern policy and
included the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as one of her
war aims.
Government

According to Grey,
who rang

dominion not only m

Europe,

England and her allies.

it was "

the Ottoman

the death-knell of Ottoman
but in Asia

,"

17

not

In The T i m e s . November 16, 1914,

the British Foreign Office,

now convinced of the importance

of an Arab revolt against the Turks,

stated that England had

no plans to conduct military operations in the Near East

unless it became absolutely necessary to protect Arab
interests "against Turkish

aggression,

or

to

support

attempts by Arabs to free themselves from Turkish rule."
Hoping to expedite Husain's actions,

Governor-General of the Sudan,

18

Sir Reginald Wingate,

received instructions to

encourage the Arabs to break with the Ottoman Empire, by

19 and
issuing "liberal promises of future aggrandisement,"
to let it be known that should the Turks be defeated, Great
Britain would make it one of the peace conditions that the
Arabian Peninsula .and the Holy Cities of the Hejaz be left
17

The Times

(London), November 10, 1914.

18

Wingate wanted to back the Arabs and was openly
sympathetic towards their cause.
He also felt that an AngloArab alliance would greatly increase Great Britain's position
in the area, for the " . . . historic position of the Arabs
within Islam made them the only effective counterpoise to the
anglophobia of the Ottomans, which . . . would increase after
the war."
Kedourie, Chatham H o u s e , p. 17.
19

Ibid., p. 14.

in the control of an independent Moslem state.

Husain still

delayed in talcing any military action against the Turks, but
did fulfill his promise of refusing the Sultan's request to
preach Jihad against the allies, which had been declared orl
November 23, 1914.
While the fighting had just begun in the East*

the

diplomats of the Western powers already assumed "the death
21
of the Turkish Empire and were planning its obsequies."
These movements and activities involved the completion of
viable agreements with the Arabs, England, France,
Russia,

and

and also included plans for the dissolution of the

Ottoman Empire.
Great Britain sought an Arab alliance with full
awareness of Arab animosity towards the fulfillment of French
imperialistic desires in Syria and Palestine.
strengthened position in the area,

Working for a

the British viewed the

mobilization of Arab and Bedouin troops along the southern
border of Palestine as a definite threat to the security of
her position in this area.

The unsuccessful Turkish attack

on the Suez Canal in February,

1915, brought the strategic

importance and location of Palestine as a possible sight for
future Turkish-German attacks on the canal, forcibly to the
attention of the British War Office.

20

Armajani, Middle E a s t , p. 291.

21Will iams, Britain and F r a n c e , p. 11

In the early spring of 1915,

the Foreign Office

appointed a committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Maurice
de Bunsen^, to study the problem of the future of the Ottoman
Empire.

22

Instructions to this committee directed them to'

pay special attention to British desiderata in the Middle
East,

and more specifically to Palestine.
In accordance with British interests in the area,

the committee reported to the War Council on June 30, 1915,
that,

in their opinion,

annex Palestine,

the French should not be allowed to

for a" French Palestine might pose a future

threat to British security in the Suez region.
British annexation, however,
wide enough already and
possessions [theyj

for the ".

[the]
_

Empire Iwas]

task £was)

already ^held]

,

They opposed

to consolidate the •
23
, 11
not to increase

r

the imperial confines.
for Turkish partition,

They proposed,
and,

rather,

a new formula

in anticipation of the eventual

defeat of Turkey, nine specific areas of interest were
22

The Committee was composed of:
Mr. G. R. Clerk,
Foreign Office; Sir J. W. Holderness, India Office; Admiral
Sir H. B. Jackson, Admiralty; Major-General C. E. Callwell,
War Office; Sir Mark Sykes and Sir T.i H. Smith, Board of
Trade.
A copy of the committee's report can be found in the
Austen Chamberlain P a p e r s , (Box AC 19), University of
Birmingham, Birmingham, England.
23

Great Britain, Cabinet, Ad Hoc Committees (secret),
"Report, Proceedings and Appendices of a Committee Appointed
by the Prime Minister.
1915.
British Desiderata in Turkeyin-Asia, 11 Cabinet Meetings 27/1, p. 4.
Hereafter cited as
Cabinet, Ad H o c ., as cited by Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations
of British Policy in the Arab World:
The Cairo- Conference
of 19 21 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 5.
Hereafter cited as Klieman, British P o l ic y.

proposed or identified.

The committee recommended official

"recognition and consolidation" of England's position in the
Persian Gulf,

for the exploitation of the oil production in

this area; the "exploitation of Mesopotamia as a granary"
and a possible area for future Indian immigration;

apd the

solidification of England's position in the Eastern Mediter
ranean and Persian Gulf through a "minimum increase of naval
expenditure and responsibility."

The de Bunsen Committee

also gave specific recommendations concerning the Arabs, by
recommending the enforcement of the "assurances" that had
already been given tp Husain and any that might be made in
the future.

The retention of the Moslem Holy Places "under

independent Moslem rule" should be guaranteed.

24

Lastly,

Palestine had to be recognized as a country whose destiny was
the concern of both belligerent and neutral,

and, therefore,

should be the subject of special negotiation aftpr the conelusion of the war.

25

The consensus of the committee was

that partition of the area was the answer to the Eastern
question,

but with retention of a substantially intact Empire

with a decentralized administration,
24

Klieman,

26

which, besides being

British P o l i c y , p. 5.
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Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (House of
Commons and Command), 1939, Vol. XIV (R e p o r t s , vol. 83),
’ Citind. 59 74, "Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain
Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of
Mecca in 1915 and 1916," p. 51*
Hereafter cited as Great
Britain, R e p o r t .
26

Kedourie,

Chatham H o u s e , p. 15

of vital interest to England, would "give Turkey in Asia some
prospect of a permanent existence," and yet free Anatolia,
Armenia,

Iraq and *Palestine from Ottoman domination,

thereby

allowing "them a chance t a foster and develop their own
resources

" and destinies.

27

The members of the* committee thought that their
recommendations would satisfy England's allies who were
insisting "upon an alteration of the status quo ante bellum
and an end to Ottoman independence. "

28

The tone of the d e

Bunsen findings was detached and simplyhadvisedi Great Britain
to abandon any idea of claiming Palestine,

for the committee

was certain that the French would not be successful in their
attempts to claim the area,

and, therefore,

Britain would not

have* to be overly worried about its disposal.
Bunsen proposal, however,
by the government,

29

The de

never received official endorsement

and it soon became evident^that only the

complete dissolution .of the- Ottoman Empiore would satisfy the
various interests of the Entente.

Evenithough the modest

recommendations of the de Bunsen committee failed to receive
government endorsement,

its basic frameworkj was used in the

future negotiations -with the Arabs, French and the Zionists.
2 7*
'Cabinet, A d H o c , p. 6.
28

29

Klieman,
Stein,

British P o l i c y , p. 6

B a l f o u r , p. 247.

The dei,Bunsen statement became), the pivotal point for. the
ensuing British diplomatic relations with regard to the
Middle East.

The Commiftee report provided for

any future policy at a time when the exigencies of
war, the effects of uncoordinated decision-making,
and the* excesses of secret diplomatic bargaining
had ngg yet cpmpligated Great Britain's position
in the Middle East.
In th^ early months of 1915, Great Britain..was still
free of any- obligations to supports an Arab revolution,
she- I^ad made a commitment to recognize an Arab state.
July> 14, 1915,

but

31

On)

the first move towards actiye Anglo-Arab

collaboration was made when Husain.,, who had been tentatively
accepted a^; Arab spokesman by the Arabs,

after he had agreed

to accept the terms of the Damascus Protocol,
first of many letters to Sir Henry McMahon.i

33

32

sent, jthe'*

In* -this letter

the Sharif asked for England's approval of several

"funda

mental proposition^, 11 if-a revolt against the Turks was to
become a reality.

The proposals requested British recog

nition of Arab independence in ithe Arabian Peninsula and all
30

Klieman,

British P o l i c y , p. 5.

31i
'Temperley,

Peace Conference, VI,

123.

32
The Damascus Protocol stated that if the Arabs
revolted against the Ottoman Empire, England would have to
recognize an independent* Arab state in Arabia, Palestine,
Syria and Iraq,
Kirk, Higtory of the Middle E a s t , pp, 125 t:
26.
-

33

Antpnius, Arab A w a k e n i n g , p. 157.

of Syria, Trans-Jordan*,

Iraq,

and Palestine.

Aden was

excluded from the demands and was to be left as it wa s— under
the control of the British.

The area proposed as Arab was to

be bounded to the east by Persia,

on the west by the Mediter

ranean up to Mersina and Adana, on an anqle where the Syrian
coast joined Asia Minor.

34

In return for British acceptance

of these terms, Husain promised to give preferential economic
treatment to Great Britain in the newly created Arab
cou nt ri es .
McMahon,
expect,

not authorized to accept, nor prepared to

such definitive territorial demands, replied to Husain

on August 30, that Great Britain would be willing to’ stipulate
that the Arab Caliphate for the creation of an independent
Arabia was the desire of the British government, providing a
Moslem majority desired thi-s.

The territorial demands of

Husain's letter were left unanswered, McMahon basing dismis
sal of the boundary question on the premise that it was too
34 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (House
/
of
Commons and Command), 19 39, Vol. XXVII (R e p o r t s , vol. 5 73,
misc. No. 3), Cmnd. 5957, "Correspondence between Sir Henry
McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, and the
Sharif Hussein of Mecca:
July, 1915— March, 1915," p. 3.
Hereafter cited as Great Britain, McMahon Correspondence.
'"England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab
countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to
the 3 7 of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa,
Mardin, M i d i a t , Jezirat, Amadia, up t o .the. boarder of Persiaon the east by the boarders of Persia up to- the Gulf of
Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception
of the position of Aden to remain as it- is; on the west by
the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to M er si na ." I b i d .

premature to consider such matters at that time.

35

Husain's

reply of September 9, offered no concessions to his original
territorial demands,

and he re-emphasized their importance

by stating that they were not merely based on personal desire,
but rather represented the wishes of all Arabs.

He inferred

that this territory was necessary for the creation of a workable Arab state.

36

These first letters, while not generally

accomplishing anything,

set the tone for future contacts by

revealing the divergent emphasis that would be placed on
territorial acquisition by the two parties.

37

McMahon had one immediate objective in conducting this
correspondence with the Arabs:

acquisition of Arab committal

to revolt against the Turkish Empire,
Islamic front in the East.

thereby allaying an

Because of the immediacy of the

situation, he wanted to avoid any long,

drawn-out1 negotiations

that might hinder direct and immediate action on the part of
the Arabs.
Husain,

His terms, therefore,

tended towards the abstract.

om the other hand', delt with specifics— the form of

military and financial aid required and what would have to
be supplied,

and specific territorial boundaries to delimit

future Arab states.

He wanted definite commitments before

any action on his part.

The British negotiations were

directed with short-term goals in mind, whiTe the Arabs worked
35I bid.
37

Klieman,

3^I b i d . , p. 5
British P o l i c y , p. 9.

for long-term goals.

On October 9, McMahon wired the Home

Office that immediate action was necessary if the Arabs were
to be. brought ;into the conflict as allies.
no longer be avoided.

Commitment could

38

Doubting that Husain was ip fact representing the
total Arab element, Great Britain contacted an. Arab who had
deserted from the Turkish Army— Muhammad al-Faruqi.

39

Al-Faruqi asserted that though the Arabs would like to obtaip
total independence— meaning independence of all Arab areas—
they were aware of French interests and concerns in Syria and !
the British interests ip. Iraq;

The Arabs,

accordingly then,

would undoubtedly*insist on the independence of Aleppo, Hama,
Horns, and Damascus in any negotiated agreement, but they would
understand and probably agree to "a general reservation of the
,s

areas I n which Great Britain was not free to act" because of
other arrangements and/or t r e a t i e s . ^
McMahon, with the* approval of the British government
and, with the knowledge of al-F ar uq i's statement,

sent Husain

the key-letter of the eight month correspondence on
October 24, 1915.
38

Kedourie,

In itihe stated that Great Britain,, with
Chatham H o u s e , p. 17.
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Al-Faruqi was a staff officer m the Ottoman Army
and had met with Faisal in April, 1915, at Aleppo.
He was
aware of Arab plans and was regarded by McMahon and Sykes as
being representative of the Arab leaders.
Elie Kedourie,
England and the Middle East (London:
Bowes( & Bowes, 1956),
pp. 36 ff.
Hereafter cited as Kedourie, Middle E a s t .
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certain reservations, would be willing to accept the terms of
Husain's letter dated July 14, 1915.

With special reference

to the territorial demands, however,

two areas would have to

be.excluded:

"the two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta

and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of
Damascus, Horns, Hama"and Aleppo."

41

These areas could not be

included because they were not purely Arab,

and portions of

the described territory were of special interest-to France,
therefore,

England could not make any conclusive^ promises or

guarantees concerning thgse areas.

42

Great Britain, also

stated that the vilayets of Bagdad and Basara, because of
their geographic position and EnglandJs interest in^them,
would require special administratiye arrangement^ to be
established in the* future.

43

. . .
Subject to,the modifications

lifted, McMahon stated that Great Britainj".

was prepared

to recognize anct support the independence of the Arabs in all
the regions within.\ the limits demanded by the Sherif of

44
Mecca."
Husain ireplied to this offer on November 5, agreeing
to the British provisions concerning Mersina and Adana, but
adamantly refusing to exclude the vilayets of Aleppo and
4 ^Great Britain*, R e p o r t , pp. 23-24.
cf. McMahon
C or respondence, pp< 7-8, and the Wingate P a p e r s , file 135/4,
dispatchifrom McMahon to Grey, October 26, 1915.
4 2 Ibid.
44
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Great Britain, R e p o r t , p. 24.

Beirut,

since they were a purely Arab population,

and also

withholding concession to the British demands concerning
Bagdad and Basara, which were historically Arab areas.
agreed, however,

He

to temporary military occupation by the

English after the w a r y provided a "suitable sum- £be"3 paid as
compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of occupa45
t i on ."

The Home Office appeared reluctant to accept

Husain's demands, but Wingate pushed for the acceptance on
the grounds that no harm could possibly come from the govern
mental approval of Husain's terms.
If the embryonic Arab state comes to nothing, all our
promises vanish and we are absolved . . * — if the
Arab state becomes a reality, we
quite sufficient
safeguards to control it - . . . 11
Further,

no matter which of these resulted, Great Britain

required the support of the Arabs as a counter-balance in the
Middle East.
Despite the necessity of acquiring Arab support,
Foreign Office,

the

through McMahon's letter of December 14,

flatly refused the Arab demands concerning Aleppo and Beirut
on the grounds that England could not give concessions involv
ing these areas because they were of interest to France.
Husain,

in a letter to McMahon dated January 1, 1916,

for the time being,
45
46

agreed,

to drop the question of the Syrian coast

Great Britain, McMahon Correspondence, p. 6.

Wingate Papers,
Chatham H o u s e , p. 19.

file 135/5,

as cited by Kedourie,

because of the Anglo-French negotiations.
right, however,

to reopen and pursue,

He reserved the

after the war,

the

Syrian question until Arab wishes had been satisfied.
was completely impossible fpr the Arabs,
"to allow any- derogation that
land in those regions."

47

gave

according to Husain,

France

a span of

The British were reluctant to

accept this temporary solution,
the series,

It

and in the eighth letter of

dated January 25, 1916, McMahon warned Husain

that the Anglo-French alliance would,

in all likelihood, be

stronger after the war than it was at the present,

and,

therefore, her position on Syria would undoubtedly remain the
same.

48
In a letter dated February 18, Husain accepted the

terms of the British as they had been stated by McMahon's
letter of October,

1915;

the Arab revolt would not become a

reality, however, until July,
the correspondence,

1916.

49

With the conclusion of

the Anglo-Sharifian negotiations emerged

framed in a manner consistent with any Anglo-French agreement
that might materialize m

the future.

50

To further deal with the situation of the Ottoman
Empire,

outside of the Arab situation;
47
48
49
50

two secret treaties

Great Britain, McMahon Correspondence, pp.
__
I b i d ., p. 15.
I n fr a. , chap.
Kedourie,

iv, p. 82.

Chatham H o u s e , p. 21.

13-14.

among the allies,

during an era of secret treaties and agree

ments, were directly concerned with the disposition of Turkey
and-, therefore, with Palestine;
and the Sykes-Pipot Treaty*.

the Constantinople-Agreement

51

The Constantinople Agreement consisted of a.-' series of
diplomatic exchanges between^Russia,

France,

and Great

Britain over a period of five weeks from March-4, to April 10,
1915.

Sergei Dmitrievich Sazanov,

Mipister,

the, Russian Foreign

initiated th,e formaL negotiations for the agreement

when he approached the French and British ambassadors at
Saint Petersburg.

He informed them that Russia was interested

in annexing Constantinople and the Dardenelles,
war effor-f proved successful.

52

if the. allied

. .
The British gave tentative

agreements to Russians wishes to control Constantinople and
the Straits,

if Russia would honor French and British| counter

claims in the area.

England was interested in certain sareas

of*Persia jwhiqh had previously been designatpd( as neutral in
the Anglo-Russian Agreementiof 1907,

and they also wanted an

51

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great
Britain and Palestine:
1915-1939 (London:
Oxford University
Press, ,1939) , p. 7.
The treaties and suggestions thjat were
concerned with th^ Ottoman Empire, in general, were:
The
Franco-British Treaty, Sazanov Agreement and the AngloItalian(Convention— 1914; the London Pact and the Anglo-Hejaz
Treaty— 1915; the Saxonby-Paleclogue Agreement and the SykesPicotfcTreaty-— 1916.
Sachar, J e w s . p. 365.
52
E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, e d s ., Documents on
British Foreign Policy:
1919-1939 (12 v o l s . ; London:
Her
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1952), 1st Series, IV, 634-36.
Hereafter citgd as Woodward and Butler, D o cu me nt s.

independent Moslem power to be created in Arabia which would
have complete control over the Moslem Holy Places.

53

France also agreed to the Anglo-Russian statement,
with the stipulation that her approval be contingent upon a
settlement which would insure her interests in the Middle
E ast— the annexation of Syria,

"

together with the

region of the Gulf of Alexandretta and Cilicia up to the
Taurus ^MountainJ

r a n g e . I t

was assumed,

on the part of

the French,,' that the term Syria included Palestine, but toassur.e that this was the case, Maurice Paleologue, French
Ambassador,

informed the Russian Foreign Minister that "the

French Government [referred] also to Palestine when speaking
55

of Syria."

The Tsar agreed to the French terms and France,

on April 10, 1915, gave formal approval to the Russian ^claims
to Constantinople and the Dardanelles.

56

No final statement as to the specific conditions or
demands, however,

appeared during the above series of diplo

matic encounters,

and the question of the disposition of the

Ottoman Empire remained open.
in the Middle East,

French and British interests

at this time,

conflicted with reference

5 3 I b i d . , pp. 636-38.
54

J. Polonsky, t r an s. , Documents diplomatiques
secrets russes 1914-1917 d 1apres les archives du ministere
des affairs etrangers a Petrograd (Paris, 1928), pi 288.
Hereafter cited as Polonskyi, Documents . . . Petrograd.
55
56

Polonsky, Documents

/
. . . Pet ro gr ad , pp.

Woodward and Butler, D o c u m e n t s , IV, 638.

636-38.

to portions of Syria— primarily Palestine.

Some- arrangement

or compromise had to be arranged between the two countries
before any definitive settlement v<?oul.d be finalized.
Fearing thq.t Britain would be denyipg therself the
spoils of a successful war,

"while her present allies— but

potential rivals— acquired new territory
opened formal negotiations with^Husain in July,

,"

57

England

1915,

and by

October these negotiations approachecj a ,satisfactory stage.
Sir Edward Grey,

anticipating a successful- conclusion of the

Husain-McMahon correspondence,

although originally opposing

the Pan-Arab movement— having agreed with Austen Chamberlain,
that such a scheme would be< a useless and embarrassing
58
liability and would make agreement witjh France impossible, "
thought it was time to inform the French of these negotiations.
The British-French accord over the Mi-ddle East was,

in fact,

initiated just prior to the end of the H u s a i p - M c M a h o n ,nego
tiations,

and the opening of the Anglo-French discussions

were definitely^related to the progress of this correspondence.

59

On October 21, therefore, Grey ngtffipd the French

Ambassador in London*, Paul Cambon,

of the Husain-McMahon

correspondence and of the conditionsjthat then existed.
57
Klieman,
58
59
60

Kedourie,
Stein,

60

British P o l i c y , p. 6.
Chatham H o u s e , p. 20.

B a l f o u r , p. 249.

Temperley states that. R. S. Baker believed .the
Frenph to be ignorant, of the Husain-McMahon»i Correspondence

He then proposed that the two governments meet to discuss'
the questions of their mutual interests in any- future par^
tition of the Ottoman Empire.

61

Great Britain appointed Sir Mark Sykes,
on Middle Eastern affairs,

an authority

to act ini. their behalf.

The

French appointed Charles Francois Georges-Picpot, formerly
the French Consul in Beirut,

as his counterpart.

In the

beginning of these negotiations,! France evidenced extreme
skepticism regarding any Arab movement,
bers p f the British government.

62

as did certain mem-

On November 23, Picot,

illustrating his country's skeptipism and self-interest,
stated that Mosul,
any Arab state,
the Holy Places,

Bagdad and Basra would be sufficient for

and claimed all of Syria and Palestine, minus
for France.

A compromise, between the two

countries was finally arranged where Syria
Aleppo,

(Horns, Hama,

and Damascus) would comprise an Ar.ab state under

French influence and guidance.

63

By February,

1916,

Sykes

and Picot agreed on a provisional formula for the future
until March| 1919, although this is not the generally
accepted interpretation of thje situation.
Temperley,
Peace Confer en ce , VI, 128.
rr -|

Balfour,

For the pre-arrangement situation See Stein,
pp. 240 ff.
62

The British Foreign Office was skeptical and the
India Office was definitely opposed to any support of an
Arab nationalist movement by Great Britain.
63

E. Marmostein, "A Note on Damascus , Horns p Hama,r
and Aleppo," St. Anthony's P a p e r s , no. XI, 1961.
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partition of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

The

principle terms of this joint effort subsequently received
endorsement by Cambon and Grey.
Basically the agreement stated that neither the
British nor the French would annex any -territory in the
Arabian Peninsula,

nor allow a third party to do so.

This

would .assure the creation of an independent Arab state in
Arabia.

The areas of Iraq and Syria— excluding Palestine—

were to be divided into four zones.
and

(B), and two color zones,

assigned to the two powers.
the interior of Syria,
Hama,

Aleppo,

(A)

Blue and Red, were created and
Zone

(A) was toi. be composed of

from and including the cities of Horns,

and Damascus to the west,

Mosul district in the east.
south of

Two letter zones,

Zone

to and including the

(B), that area lying to the

(A), was to be bounded on the west by a line running

from Gaza to Aqaba,

crossing the Trans-Jordan eastward to the

Red zpne, with a northern arm jutting into P e r s i a ‘and a
southern extension toward the Persian Gulf.

The Blue zone

was to be the province of Cilicia and all of coastal Syria.
west of (A) with the cities of Horns, Hama, Aleppo,
Damascus on the fringe of the border.

and

The Red zone was to

be composed of the provinces of Basra' and Bagdad.

Palestine,

which was west of the Jordan and south of Galilee, was to
comprise a fifth region designated as the Brown zone.
64

Woodward and Butler, D o c u m e n t s . IV, 245.
cf. Appendix. I, 163..
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The creation of this special.zone was the result'of the
strong interests of both countries in Palestine, both
desiring domination of the area.
In (A) and (B), Great Britain and France agreed to
recognize semi-independent Arab states, or a confederation
of Arab states under a single leader.

However,

the privilege

of appointing foreign advisors and the right of certain
economic considerations and privileges would be guaranteed
to the French in (A) and to the British in
zones, France

(Blue)

and England

(B).

In the color

(Red) were to "be allowed to

establish such direct or indirect administration or control
as they []desired]] and as they £might have thought]] fit to
arrange with the Arab State or Confederation

,"

65

and

that the Brown zone constituted an internationally adminis
tered area,
Russia,

the form to be created after consultation with

the other allied powers,

and the Sharif of Mecca.

66

In Palestine, Great Britain was to control the ports
of Haifa and Acre,
national zone,
65

thereby,forming an enclave in the inter

and Haifa was to become a free port for the

Woodward and Butler, D o c u m e n t s , IV, 245-46.

^ I b i d . , p. 246.
"That France and Great Britain are
prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State
or a Confederation of Arab States in the area (A) and (B)
marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab
Shiek.
That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great
Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local
loans.
That in area (A), and in area (B) Great Britain,
shall alone supply advisors or foreign functionaries at the
request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States."
I b i d , , p. 245.

British.

England also received assurance of control of the

proposed Haifa-Persian Gulf Railroad.
Sykes and Picot,

67

after reaching the above agreement,

presented the agreement to Sazonov and the Russian govern
ment,

in March.

Russia accepted the proposal, with the

condition that an agreement allowing it to annex certain
areas in Asia Minor be attached to any formal document.

The

area that Russia wanted was the southern area of the eastern
end of the Black Sea— Trebizond,
and the region of K u r d i s t a n . ^

Erzerum,

Van,

and Bitlis,

A Franco-Russian agreement

concerning these terms was negotiated in 'a series of corres
pondences in April,

1916,

of the Sykes-Picot Treaty.

in which Russia agreed to the terms
69

In spite of protests of Paleologue, who was still
desirous of a French Palestine,
of the terms,

and with Russia's acceptance

Grey and Cambon, believing the agreement to be

the most equitable agreement that could be arrived at, pushed
the treaty through for ratification on May 16, 1916.

70

This

agreement existed as a product of the times,
. . . a time when there was as yet no decided plan
formed of launching a definite campaign in the East,
when the prime necessity was some sort of agreeme^J,
since otherwise no progress would have been made.
^ I b i d . . p. 246.
68

Woodward and Butler,• -Documents,
—_— _ _ l

69I b i d . , pp. 241-43,
70

Ibid., pp.

245 ff.

IV,i 248.

and 249-51.
71

Sokolow,

Z i o ni sm , II, xxvi.

Therefore,

in May of 1916 the position of Palestine

was, one of proposed international control and administration.
At the same time, Great Britain accepted the Sykes-Picot
Treaty with a definite' understanding between the three signa
tories,

that Horns, Hama,

Aleppo,, and Damascus were tp qom-

prise an independent Arab state or confederation.

This

understanding was in complete harmony with the terms of the
Anglo-Arab agreement tbat had been arrived at by Husain and
McMahon.^
Had the situation remained as it was in May,

1916,

when the Paris Treaty was signed, many complications might
have been avoided.

This proved not to be the case, however.

Because of its concern and occupation with Arab
affairs and their diplomatic relations with other members of
the Entente, Great Britain had not carried on,any serious or
active negotiations with the Zionist movement.

However,

the

Zionist movement possessed active involvement in their Pales
tine program and certain prominent and influential members of
the British government were beginning to listen attentively
to Zionist positions and statements.

Though no true progress

was made on the part of the Zionists during the early years
72

The Sykes-Picot Treaty, as ratified, remained
one of the war's many secret treaties, until it was published
by the Bolsheviks in P r a v d a , on December 20, 1917; it also
formed the foundation for the Anglo-French talks concern^
ing the Middle East at the Paris Peace Conference.
Tempereley, Peace C o n fe re nc e , VI, 5.

of the war, definite advances appeared during 1916-1917,
in spite of the secret agreements arrived at between the
Entente.
The secret negotiations were systematically compli
cated and confusing enough,

and those countries involved in

them were engaged in
. . . back door intrigues in the attempt to
guarantee and advance . . . £their[3 own political
and economic interests.
And then in the midst of
all the conferences and negotiations, Britain.^
officially endorsed the Zionist program .
by issuing the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917.
What had previously been a muddled and complicated state of
affairs, became even more so when Great Britain issued this
statement.

^Sachar,

J e w s , p. 366.

CHAPTER III
BRITISH ALLIANCE WITH ZIONISM
A DIPLOMATIC NECESSITY
The Jews have always hoped— it was an article
of faith for the,religious and even non
religious Jews^-that a day might come when
they would be allowed to return to the land
of their ancestors.
^
— Chaim. Weizmann
The Zionist movement immediately prior to the out
break of the war was at an apparent^ political standstill.
fact recognized at the Eleventh Zionist Congress
when,

*

(1913),

cognizant that encouragement for their cause would not

come from the "Turkish nor from any<other Government*,"

2

Chaim Weizmann declared that the greatest hope for the reali
zation of the goals of the movement rested with the Jewish
3
people, not with any national power.
During the early weeks of World War I, when the Arabs
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great
Britain and Palestine:
1915-1945 (London:
Oxford University
P r e s s , 1946), pp. 17-18.
2
Stein, B a l f o u r , p. 65.
3

I b i d . p . 66.
"The greatest of the Great Powers we
have to deal with is the Jewish people.
From this Power we
expect everything; from the other powers very,.little. "
Zionist Congress, Report to the Xllth Zionist C o n g r e s s ,
Protocol, (London:
National Labour Press, 1921), p. 168.
Hereafter cited as Xllth Congress.

45

were striving for recognition and acceptance of their terri
torial claims in the Middle East,

the Zionists participated

in activities which they hoped would lead to the establish
ment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

However,

the war was

disruptive to the cohesiveness of the Zionist organization.
The division of Europe,

into two antagonistic camps made any

concerted effort on behalf of the O r g a ni za ti on 's goals difficult.

4

The primary problem facing the Organization was where

to relocate the central offices, which,
Berlin.

in 1914, were in

Selection of a site was complicated by the fact that

any choice would be regarded as an indication of the support
of the policies of one or the other combatants,

and the

alliance of Zionism with one antagonist or the other.

A

compromise solution was eventually engendered, with no true
central offices created or continued.

In accordance with the

compromise proposition the Organization office in Berlin
remained,

to handle the affairs of Central Europe;

a bureau

was created in a neutral zone— Copenhagen; Nahum Sokolow and
Dr. Yehiel Tschlpnow were transferred from Berlin to London
to create a bupeau for the allied countries;
ual,

and an individ

already in the United States, was designated as a repre-

sentative to handle affairs m
4

thp Western Hemisphere.

5

_,
William Yale, The Near East:
A Modern History (Ann
Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 262.
Hereafter cited as Yale, Near E a s t .
^Stein,

Balfour, p. 97.

Regardless of v.the compromise nature of the arrangements,
however,

the outbreak of the war witnessed the inevitable

transfer of the center of the Zionist movement from the
continent of Europe to Great Britain and the United States.
These two countries would provide the impetus for the solidi
fication of purpose and method to foster the creation of a
Jewish state.
World events soon determined that the bureau in
England would become the center of the movement.
and Sokolow went to England fgr two reasons:
British recognition of Zionism,
support of the English Jews.^

Tschlenow

to secure

and to gain the actual
London soon assumed the

responsibility for formulation of political policy and insti
gation of negotiations.
It was at once clear that England was destined to
play a most important part in Zionist politics.
London from the beginning was the . . . centre of
the Zionist Organization and the Meccatof political
Zionism.
Weizmann assumed the leading role in the negotiations
with Great Britain,

even though T s c h l e n o w and Sokolow offi

cially represented the Organization.

Weizmann had originally

emigrated from Russia in 1904 to work as a teacher at The
Victoria University in Manchester, where he eventually became
involved in important defense work.
1

0

I bi d. . p. 170.

V

8

Feeling that England

Sokolow,

Z i o n i s m , II, 43.

8
For the early aspects of Weizmann's life and activ
ities see Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (New York:
Harper

48
was the country most interested in, and, therefore, most
likely to support the Zionist cause, Weizmann wanted to begin
political negotiations with the Government immediately after
the war broke out.

9

As early as Sept,ember, 1914, he

requested permission of the Zionist leaders to initiate
negotiations with influential officials in the British
government.

The leaders of the movement, however,

more cautious approach,

favored, a

not wishing to commit themselves to

a losing power and thereby* forfeit all chances for recogni
tion of their program.

They preferred to wait for the propi

tious moment to arrive when they could safely select a power
with which to work.
When Turkey declared war on Great Britain Asher
Ginsburg— Ahad Ha'am— indicated to Weizmann that "the great
historic hour for the Jews and for Palestine ^had^ struck
.

and urged immediate action.

Ginsburg felt that

moderation must be the by-word in any and all talks,

and that

the immediate goal should be the right of colonization and
the freedom of cultural expression in Palestine— nothing more.

&c Bros., 1949).

Hereafter cited as Weizmann, Trial and
E r r o r . The defense project that he was concerned with
involved the search for a smokeless gunpowder.
He eventually
came up with the use of cordite to contain the amount of
visible smoke.
9
Sokolow, Z i o n i s m , II, 46.
Asher Ginsburg, Iqqrot Ahad H a 1am (6 v o l s . ; Tel
Aviv:
Yavne, 1923-1925), V, 204, as cited in Esco, P al es ti ne ,
I, 78.
cf. Weizmann, Trial and E r r o r , pp. 139-41, 215-16,
231-32, et p a s s i m .

In the event these goals were achieved it was hoped that
ultimately an autonomous state, under English control,
be secured.

11

could

The enumeration of these goals represented a

definite step,

a firm commitment; through it the Zionists

indicated their belief that the allies would be victorious
and recognized the fact that British support was essential
for the success of their program.

12

While working to secure government support, Weizmann,
already a good friend of Lord Rothschild,
British Jews,
Balfour,

a leader of the

approached former Prime Minister Arthur James

a Conservative leader.

Balfo”ur listened attentively

to his account of the plight of the Jews and asked Weizmann
to explain Zionist proposals regarding a solution to the
problem.

Weizmann gave no definite answer, but requested

that once the military situation stabilized,

the Zionists be

allowed to return to Balfour with the outlines of a program
for Jewish settlement in Palestine.

Balfour "enthusiastically"

replied that he would be more than willing to talk further
with the Organization representatives, as they worked for a
great cause, one m
C. P. Scott,

which he was deeply interested,

editor of the Manchester G u a r d i a n , also

came under the influence of Weizmann
11Ibld.

13

14

and,

in addition to

12Y a l e , Near E a s t , p.

266.

13

Blanch E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour' (2 v o l s . ;
London:
Hutchinson, 1936), II, 224.
Hereafter cited as
Dugdale, B a l f o u r .
14
Weizmann.

Scott acted as a "confessor" and confidant of
Weizmann, Trial and E r r o r , pp. 177-78.

50
his pro-Zionist editorials> further contributed to the move
ment by introducing Weizmann to Herbert Samuel and David
Lloyd George.

15

British Cabinet,

Samuel,

the first non-converted Jew in the

evidenced both sympathy and enthusiasm for

the idea of the restoration of the Jewish state,

and began

'broaching the subject after the Turkish declaration of war.
In November,

1914, he quickly suggested to Edward Grey that

the changing situation in the Middle East provided the ideal
1Q

opportunity to create a Jewish state in Palestine,

espe

cially since
Turkey had thrown herself into the European War and
that it was probable that her empire would be broken
up, the question of
future control of Palestine
was likely to arise.
Because of the difficulty which would arise from the division
of the area, due to European jealousies,

and with the disin

tegration of Turkey,

"

perhaps^ there might be an oppor-

tunity for the

restoration of a Jewish State."

18

Grey replied to this proposal in a trUely "political" manner,
stating that the idea of a Jewish state "had always had a
strong sentimental attraction for him
■^Stein,

."

19

and that he

B a l f o u r , p. 131.

"^Kedourie,

Chatham H o u s e , p. 52.

17

Viscount Herbert Samuel, Grooves jof Change:
A Book
of Memoirs (New York:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1946), pp. 139-42.
Hereafter cited as Samuel, G r o o v e s .
18

Herbert Samuel, Great Britain and Palestine
(London:- Cresset Press, 1935), pp. 12 ff.
Hereafter cited
as Samuel, Great Br it a i n . cf. Stein, B a l f o u r , p. 103.

19 Samuel, G r o o v e s , p. 141.

would be willing to work for the idea if the opportunity
should ever present itself.
In January,

20

still pursuing some form of official

commitment on the Cabinet's part,

Samuel sent a memorandum

to Lord Asquith, which, he in turn gave to the Cabinet.
it, Samuel argued "

In

that British imperial interests

required a British protectorate over Palestine and that this
might provide an opportunity for
into the area.

."

21

Jewish immigration

Samuel received instructions to present this

opinion in a formal memorandum,

to again be presented to the

Cabinet for their consideration and possible approval.
In March,

1915,

Samuel circulated the formal memo

randum among the members of the Cabinet.

He included five

possible solutions to the problem of the disposal of Pales
tine.

As he saw the situation,

France might annex Palestine;
Turkish control;

the possibilities were:

the area might remain under

an international commission might be created

to govern the territory;

an autonomous Jewish state might be

created; or, Great Britain might establish a protectorate
over the area and encourage unlimited Jewish immigration.
The memorandum received mixed reactions,

20
21
22

Samuel,

and failed to

G r o o v e s . p. 141.

Kedourie,

Chatham H o u s e , p. 52.

Samuel, G r o o v e s , p. 142.
c f ., Leonard Stein,
Zionism (London:
Keegan Paul, 1925), p. 81; and Halpern,
Jewish S t a t e , pp. 162-62.

22

acquire total acceptance by- the Cabinet members,

23

and no

action was taken on tljieir part.
The progress of*.the Eastern campaign inflate 1915,
the threat of a .iTurco-German attack on-, the- Suez Canal,

and

the increasing adamancy of French claims and demands for
Palestine,

convinced Samuel that Palestine had to become a

. .
.
24
British territory.

Although his proposals appeared to be

falling on barren soil, he remained persistent.
By the end ,of 1915 Zionism began to receive favorable
recognition and consideration in some areas of the* British
government.

25

The primary concept for the re-creation of a

Jewish state began to be associated with various strategies
concerned with strengthening England's military position in
the Middle East.

Herbert Si^lebotham,

in the Manchester

Guardian, pointed out. that with the loss of the Ottoman
Empire as an ally,

a void had been created in the British

defense of the East.

To fill this chasm he suggested the

creation of a buffer state in \Palestine, which would protect
the Suez ,area.

He .further proposed that the Jews^would be

23

Herbert Henry Asquith, Memoirs and R e f l e c t i o n s ,
18,5.2-1927 (2 vols. ; London:
19 28), II, 71 and 78.
!rT
confess JE am not attracted by this proposed addition to our
responsibilities, . . . . Curiously enough, the only other'
partisan of this proposal
besides Samuel
is Lloyds G e o r g e ,
who I need not say does not care a damn for the Jews or
their past or their future - - - ."
Ibid.
24
25

Stein,

B a l f o u r , p. 108.

Temperley,

Peace Co n f e r e n c e , VI, 172.

the most likely to succeed in building such a state, because
of their desire to return to the area.

26

After reading the article, Weizmann approached the
editor with the idea of elaborating upon his original articl
for possible submission to the Foreign Office as an official
memorandum from the Organization.

Sidebotham agreed and the

revised memorandum was submitted to Ronald Graham, head of
the Near and Middle Eastern division of the Foreign Office,
in April,

1916.

The Foreign Office, however, proved unfavor

able to the Jewish plan, for at that time they favored a pro
Arab alliance to counteract the vacuum created by Turkish
desertion.

27

.
The entire course of discussion on the

Sidebotham memorandum emphasized political realism— -the
illustration of how the British could benefit from a Jewish
alliance in this area.
Eastern policy,

With the collapse of the old Middle

a new stratagem was required if the Suez

Canal and Egypt were to be protected.

Sidebotham argued

that the Jews represented the only people who were truly
capable of forming a strong state capable of opposing the
enemy.

Even if this were not the case, the restoration of

the Jewish state definitely qualified as one of the basic
ideals that, the war was being fought over-^the maintenance
26

Manchester G u a r d i a n , November 22, 1915.
cf>,
Herbert Sidebotham, Great Britain and Palestine (London:
1937), pp. 24-27.
Hereafter cited as Sidebotham, Pa le stine;
and Kirk, History of the Middle E a s t , p. 150.
27

Sidebotham, Palestine, p. 33.

54
of- international law and justice,

and the protection of

. .
28
national minorities.
During the Sidebotham-Graham discussions,

the War

Office contemplated the possible advantages of supporting
Zionist desires in Palestine, not in preference to, but
rather in conjunction with,

the pan-Arab movement.

Would

open support of the restoration of Palestine to the Jews,
a Jewish state,

aid the war movement in any way?

as

It was the

general consensus of prominent non-Zionist English Jews,

that

there would be some benefit derived from such an alliance;
such an association might possibly lead to world-wide Jewish
support for the allied cause.

Even though this non-Zionist

element voiced regret at the formation of a nationalistic
Jewish organization,

they felt that if any wide-spread Jewish

support was to become a reality,

the Zionist program would

have to be included in any governmental program.
The British were correct in assuming the strength of
the Zionists in swaying public and governmental opinion,
especially in the United States,

and Great Britain was

especially interested in obtaining the support of the United
States for her war effort.

The Honorable Louis D. Brandeis,

Associate Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court,

and head of

the American Zionist Organization, was apparently responsible
for the success in "persuading President Wilson that a pledge
op
I b i d . , pp. 38-40.

of support to the Zionist organizations would be a good
thing

,"

29

and Wilson's neutrality slowly turned toward

support for England and France.
While the Zionist Organization was increasing it's
activities,

the Board of Deputies of British Jews, under the

leadership of Lucien Wolf,
Foreign Office in March,

submitted a memorandum to the

1916.

In this statement Palestine's

attraction to the Jews is referred to as an historic .interest
but any definitive terms which would officially recognize a
national character of Judaism was intentionally avoided.

30

Negotiations, had reached the point where England was
beginning to seek the opinions and advice of her allies in
reference to recognition of the Zionist program.
Buchanan,

British ambassador in Petrograd,

Sir George

informed Sazanov

in an aide-memoire. dated March 13, of England's proposed
intention of recognizing Jewish claims to Palestine.

The

29

Frank H. Epp, Whose Land is Palestine^
The Middle
East Problem in Historical Perspective (Grand Rapids,
Michigan:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing House, 1970),
p. 135.
Hereafter cited as Epp, Whose Land is Palestine.
Brandeis, two years before the Balfour Declaration, gave the
aims of Zionism as being " . . . to establish in Palestine,
for such Jews as chose to go and remain there, and for their
descendents, a legally secured home, where they may live
together and lead a Jewish life, where they may expect
ultimately to constitute a majority of the population, and
may look forward to what we should call home rule."
Book of
Documents. General Assembly of the United Nations Relating
to the Establishment of the National Home for the Jewish
People (New York:
The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1947),
p. 2 .
30

Great Britain, Foreign Office, Zionism Peace Hand
book . No* 162, 1920, p. 39.
Hereafter cited as. Great Britain
H a n d b o o k . c f ., Halpern, Jewish S t a t e , p. 166.

56
aide-memoire stated that despite the major split among worldJewry— Zionism vs. Assfmilationism— there appeared, to be a
uniform feeling among the Jews that a proposal concerning
their interest in Palestine was needed.

31

Because

. . . the most influential part of Jewry in all the
countries would very much appreciate an offer of
agreement concerning Palestine which would completely
satisfy the aspirations of the Jews. {^Favorable
results could be achieved by such action, such asj
. . . the conversion, in favour of the Allies, of
Jewish elements in the Orient, in the United States,
and in other places, elements w h o s g 2attitu^ e - - [was] opposed to the Allies cause.
G rea t Britain wanted an agreement which would ensure Jewish
support for their cause in the war.

Because of the political

and military results that might evolve out of such an action,
Great Britain was contemplating such a diplomatic move.

The,

possibility existed that countries or areas currently neutral
or hostile to the war might be swayed to the allied cause,

if

influential Jewish pressures to form some type of an alliance
31

Leonard Stein, Zionism (London:
Keegan Paul,
1925), p. 81.
Hereafter cited as Stein, Z io ni sm . "In the
event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of
Great Britain and France . . . the Governments of those
Powers will not fail to take account of the historic
interest that country possesses for the Jewish c o mmunity."
Ibid.
32
E. A. Adamow, e d . , Die Europaischen Machte und
die Turkei wahrend des Weltkrieqes:
Die Aufteilung der
asiatischen Turkei nach den Geheimdokumenten des ehem.
Ministeriums fur Auswartige Angelegenheiten (5 v o l s .;
D r e s d e n : C~. Reisner, 19 30-1932), V, 64-65, cited by Stein,
Z i o n i s m , pp. 138 f f ., and Halpern, Jewish S t a t e , p. 166.

with the Entente, were applied in key governmental
positions.

33

The French were not enthusiastic over this

plan, feeling it to be too restrictive to achieve any worth
while r e s u l t s . ^
By the middle of 1916 the Zionist program for coloni
zation in Palestine achieved positive consideration among
the. Entente members as a probable means of expanding their
war effort.

The time had arrived when the program, which

had originally been proposed in Basle at the first Zionist
Congress,

could no longer be thought of as the dream of a

few fanatics or idealists.

35

During the negotiations with the Grey Cabinet,
Zionists and Conjoint Foreign Committee,

the

still divided,

recognized that a united Jewish front would have more strength
with which to negotiate,

and made an attempt to form a work

ing coalition that would be representative of all Jews.

The

Foreign Committee, however, held far less interest in the
colonization of Palestine,

than did the British government.

33

36

"The only object of His Majesty's Government is to
devise some agreement which will be sufficiently attractive
to the majority of Jews to facilitate the conclusion of a
transaction securing Jewish support.
[With this in mindj,
it appears . . . that if the scheme provided for enabling
the Jews, . . . to take,in hand the administration of the
internal affairs of this region . . . , then the agreement
would be much more attractive for the majority of Jews."
Stein, Z i o n i s m . p. 81, as cited from Adamow, pp. 161 ff.
34

Dugdale,

^S t e i n ,

Balfour , II, 227.

Balfour, pp. 174-75.

Ibid.

58
Hoping to salvage some unity of action, Nahum Sokolow
proposed that the two organizations solidify their actions
by concentrating on the improvement of the civil rights of
the East European Jews.

He felt that the problem and

question of Palestine need have no bearing on any 30inti
action of the two organizations.

The Zionists would deal

with any formal negotiations concerning Palestine*

the

Conjoint Foreign Committee could remain aloof from any
involvement in this area.
Conjoint Committee,

Lucien Wolf,

on behalf of the

rejected the plan, on the grounds that

any activity involved with the colonization of Palestine
would endanger and infringe upon those freedoms and rights
that the assimilated Jew had already managed to obtain.
idea of any concerted action disappeared,

The

and the wealthy

English Jew, once again became openly opposed to Zionism.
This opposition came "from a small, well-placed group of
wealthy English Jews who were concerned lest Zionist propaganda expose Anglo-Jewry to the charge of

'dual loyalty'."

In spite of their attempts to abort the negotiations,

37

the

Zionist Organization had gained the ascendency in govern—
mental recognition of Jewish programs.
In October,

1916,

38

an official proposal stating the

37
Howard Morley Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish
History (New York:
Dell Publishing C o ., 1958), pi 373.
Hereafter cited as Sachar, H i s t o r y .
00
Dugdale, Balfour, II, 228.

Zionist program was submitted to the Foreign Office for
their consideration and possible approval.

39

The document

made no specific reference to a Jewish state, but adminis
trative powers were to be granted to a Jewish charter
company,

or the area would be granted autonomy.

This docu

ment represented the first official proposal by the Zionists,
and was based on the assumption that the area would come
under the influence of either Great Britain or France.
The British government,

40

deciding to open negotiations

with the Zionists, hoped to influence the United States.

In

fact, when Woodrow Wilson had rejected the terms of the
Sykes-Picot Treaty,

Sir Mark Sykes was advised by James A.

Malcom,

President of the Armenian National Committee in

London,

to influence Wilson through Justice Brandeis.

Malcolm believed that by guaranteeing Palestine to the
Zionists,

Brandeis,

as head of the American Zionist Organi

zation, might be induced to bring pressure upon Wilson to
give support to the British.

41

39

"Outline of a Programme for a New Administration of
Palestine for a Jewish Resettlement of Palestine in accord
ance with the Aspirations of the Zionist Movement."
cf.,
Appendix B, p. 154.
40

When this proposal was submitted the Zionists were
not aware of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, nor had Sykes been in
formed of the negotiations with the Zionists.
S. Landman,
"Balfour Declaration:
Secret Facts Revealed^, " World J e w r y ,
London, February 20, 19 35, p. 6 .
^^Times Literary Supplement (London) , Letter frorA
Malcolm Thomson, July 22, 1949, p. 473, citing Dr. Adolf
Boehm, Die Zionistische B e w e g u n , II, p. 556.
cf., Halpern,
Jewish S t a t e , p. 161, and Yale, Near E a s t , p. 268.

Sykes,

at some time during 1916, became enamored with

the Zionist cause®

In addition to the possibilities of

influencing the United States, he also saw the possibilities
of a cultural link between Europe and Asia with a Jewish
restoration,

and a definite improvement in the economic

situation in the Middle East,

if a joint Jewish-Arab effort

could be successfully organized.

42

When the Second Coalition

Government was formed under David Lloyd George,

Sykes acquired

the, authority to initiate negotiations with the Jews.

After

the establishment of initial contact between Sykes and W e i z 
mann,

Sykes agreed to meet with the Zionists at the home of

Dr. Moses Gas ter,

43

\
and official negotiations between the

two parties opened on February 7, 1917.

44

The British

finally appeared willing to declare their interest in,

and

intent to create a Zionist state in Palestine.
The Zionists adamantly demanded British sponsorship
of. the embryonic state and completely opposed any idea of a
condominium or internationalized control of the area.
Sykes pointed out,
42

Stein,

to the members of the meeting,

B a l f o u r , pp.

45

that the

234-35.

43

For information on Moses Gaster m the English
Zionist Organization, c f ., Stein, B a l f o u r , chap. xviii.
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Sokolow, Z i o n i s m . II, 52.
Those in attendance
were Sir Mark Sykes, Lord Rothschild, Mr. Herbert Bentwich,
Mr. Joseph Cowen, Dr. M o s e 3 Gaster, Mr. James de Rothschild,
Mr. Harry Sachar, Herbert Samuel, Chaim Weizmann, and Nahum
Sokolow.
Ibid.
45

Stein, Balfour. p. 278.

real obstacle to their proposed plan was France,
French demands for all of Syria,
was doubtful.

46

for with

Palestine's future status

Before any promises could be made,

French would have to be consulted,

the

and he recommemded that

,the Zionists select a representative to approach GeorgesPicot with the proposed plan for Palestine.

Nahum Sokolow

was chosen by the Gaster committee to carry out future
negotiations with France.
the British government,

47

No matter what the motives of

it appeared that the Zionist's goal

of reaching Palestine, with international approval, was
nearing fruition.

48

The interpretations of the members of

the government as to the reasons behind this movement toward
the Organization,

differed.

Some observers believed that the declaration would
win the support\of the powerful Jewish financial
interests in the United States and Europe; others
that it would be bait to the Jews of Russia, who
might be influential in keeping Russia in the war;
still others that it would add another to the dis
contented and aggiring minority groups among the
Central Powers.
^Halpern,

Jewish S t a t e , p. 273.

^Sokolow,

Z i o n i s m , II, 52, and Stein, B a l f o u r ,

374.
48

George Antonius suggests that Great Britain
supported the idea of a Jewish state because of their desire
to control Palestine, to the exclusion of France, and that
they chose the Zionist movement as their method for obtaining
this goal.
Antonius, Arab A w a k e n i n g , p. 263.
49

Sachar, H i s t o r y , p. 366.
Asquith reported in his
Memoirs that Lloyd George favored the Zionist cause in
Palestine because he thought it would "be anr outrage to let
the Holy Places pass into the possession or under the protec
torate of 'agnostic atheistic France.'"
Asquith, M e m o i r s ,
p. 71.

The propagandist impact of this type of declaration could
not be underestimated.
Preliminary conversations were held between Sokolow
and Picot on February 8 , 1917.

Sokolow pointed out the

possibilities of solving the Jewish question in Europe by
creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

When asked what

nation would sponsor a drive for this state,

Sokolow candidly

replied that the choice of the Organization was Great Britain
and that England had tentatively accepted such a sponsorship.
Picot voiced his support of the ideas of the Zionist cause,
i

but added that his country would not easily renounce its
claims to Palestine.

50

Sokolow returned ,to Weizmann and

Sykes with a report of his talks with Picot,

and with tenta

tive French approval, began drafting plans for the opening
of future international negotiations.

The three men p re 

pared a six-point program— the Bases de 1 1accord—— •
w hich
became the framework for these negotiations.
50
51

Stein,

51

B a l f o u r . p. 376.

Esco, P a l e s t i n e . I, 95.
Composed under the follow
ing headings:
1.
Recognition of Palestine as the Jewish
National Home; 2.
Regulations for Jewish Settlement in
Palestine; 3.
Immigration into Palestine; 4.
The establish
ment of a Chartered Company; 5.
Communal autonomy; 6 . L a n 
guage.
There appears to be some confusion as to the exist
ence of this document, although N. M. Gelber, Hazarat Balfour
ve-Toledoteha (Jerusalem:
Zionist Organization, 1939), does
refer to it and gives a file reference* where it can be found
in the Zionist Archives.
Paul L. Hanna, British Policy in
Palestine (Washington, D. C . : American Council on Public
Affairs, 1942), reports that h e ’was unable to find any trace
of such a document.
Ibid. '

In Marc^h, 1917,

Sokolow went t9 Paris to discuss the

program with the French gpvernmenti

Alexandre Ri^bot, head of

the Frenph Ministry,

informed him, on March 22• that Francq

favored the program,

and had infgrmed the Zionigt Organisa

tions in*. Russia and the United States of its position on:
the issue.

52

However, while the Organization succeeded with

the French government-,

they failed to gainr the endorsement or

support of the French Jews— the A l l i a n c e ‘Israelite Universelle 53 =
— although no open opposition emanated from them.
The silence of the French.Jews resulted primarily from the
work of Edmond- de Rothschild, who had insured their silence
during the Sokolow-Ribot talks,

and- this silence cannot, be

over-emphasized in determining*the favorable outcome, of these
talks.

54

Had the F r e n c h »Jews voiced their protest over the

Zionist's proposals,

i*tp is doubtfulj that thp French govern

ments would-have listened to Sokolow.
Sokolow iwent to Italy in thg month following the
relatively successful French *(
t a l k s , where he was even more
successful,

although,

again,

not totally so.

While not

receiving complete support from the Italian Jewsi he obtained
an endorsement from the Italian Federation of Jpwiph
^Sokolow,

Z i o n i s m , II, 52.
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George W. Robnett.j Conquest through Immigration
(Pasadena:
Institute for Special Research, 1968), p. 117.
Hereafter cited as Robnett, Co n qu es t.
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Sokolow, Zionism, I-

xvn.

64
Communities.

With the aid of Angelo Sereni,

Jewish community in Rome,
Prime. Minister Boselli.

leader of the

Sokolow presented the program to
Italy, through Boselli, gave the

complete support of its government to the Bases de 1 ‘acc or d."
Sokolow "was assured that the Italian Government in conjunc
tion with the Allied' Powers would support the Zionist pro56
gramme."

While m

Rome,

the Zionists contacted the Pope.

He also promised that the Church would not oppose the Zionist
program so long as the Holy Places were given special atten
tion and c o n s i d e r a t i o n . ^
Upon, returning to Paris after his Italian venture,
Sokolow and the Zionists received the official French state
ment concerning the Zionist program.

The French declared

their readiness to support the Zionist^plans in Palestine.

58

(A French veto to the proposal at this juncture would, have
aborted the as yet unborn Balfour Declaration.

59

)

With the success of these diplomatic negotiations,
the next logical move was to secure American- acquiescence to

55

Stem,

B a l f o u r . pp. 413-15.
*“7

Sokolow,

Z i o n i s m , II, 53.
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Ibid.

Sokolow, Zionism, II, 53.
c f ., Stein, B a l f o u r ,
p. 418.
"The French Government, which entered the present
war to defend people wrongfully attacked, and which continues
the struggle to assure the victory of right over might, can
but feel sympathy for your Cthe Zionist! cause, the triumph
of which is bound up with that of the allies."
Sokolow,
Z i o n i s m , II, 53.
"*^I b i d . , I, xvii.

the program.

This was accomplished shortly after the

entrance of the United States into the war in Aprils
and resulted from joint Anglo-Zionist activities.

60

1917,
Wilson's

response to the Zionist program appears to have been a fairly
rapid one.
House,

W hen asked by the British,

through Colonel Edward

for his feelings on the situation, Wilson gave a posi

tive response and declared his approval for the program as it
had been outlined to him..

Wilson's feelings on the subject

were not, however, universal among the members of his
Cabinet,

nor within the United States government.

British seemed satisfied with his acceptance,
Zionists, however,

The

as did the

and the negotiations between the Zionists

and His Majesty's Government continued.
Great Britain now felt able to issue an open statement
of policy concerning the Jews,
in Palestine.

and their interest and concern

All that remained to be settled were the terms

of the actual statement.

The government's decision to

support the Jews must have come prior to the official note
from France, which was released in June,

for on May 20, 1917,

Chaim Weizmann announced in London that he had received word
that "

His Majesty's Government

was

ready to support1!1

the Zionist p l a n s . ^
With the public acknowledgement of British support
^Yale,
61

Near E a s t , p. 269.

Sokolow,

Z i o n i s m , II, 56.

66
for the Zionists,

the non-Zionist e l e m e n t (in England voiced

its opposition to the program.
Jew,

Once again the assimilated

through the Conjoint iForeign Committee,

voiced his

concern over the promotion of the idea of a Jewish race,
whiqh was being indirectly inferred by t h e Lidea of a Jewish
state for the Jewish people.

62

supported the Zionigt program.
Despite this,

Public opinion,; however,.
63

the British government could not

completely* |gnore^ the opinions of the wealthytfassimilated
Jew,

and their objections eventna^lyi [Led to the modification

of the* terms of the Balfour Declaration.

Had the assipiila-

tionists not possessed the*, influence that they did,

the

Declaration would have been more definite i n <its terms.
The Political Committee of the Zionist Organization,
after manyitrial drafts, prepared a statement to be considered for endorsement by the government.
presented the draft on July 18, 1917,

64

Lord Rothschild

to the Lloyd George*.

/* o

The Times

(London), May 2 4 , 1 9 1 7 .

63
The Times (London), May 29, 1917, editorial, "The
Future of the Jews," showed th^t thp paper was convinced of
the^justice of the Zionist program; again on October 23 and
26, The Times, urged goyernmen-t-al support^for the Jewish
state; othgr favorable articles appeared in^New E u r o p e , tlie
Manchester ‘Guardian and the Yorkshire P o s t . For a complete
listing of those magazines and newspapers favoring the
Jewish state c f ., Sokolow, Z i o n i s m , II, 64-80.
64

This statement was written through the ]Oint efforts
of Weizmann,, Sokolow, Ginsberg, Jacob Unger, Sachar and
James de Rothschild; before s u b m i s s i o n i t was read and
approved by Sykes, Edmond de Rothschild, and President
W i l s o n t cf.., Appendix C, p. 155'.

Cabinet.

The members failed, however,

randum.

to agree on the memo

Although Balfour, Lloyd George, Milner,
hedged

and Cecil

were for acceptance,

Lord Curzon

on affixing his

approval, because of

a confusion of some of the terms,

the lack of an adequate definition of Zionism.

65

and

Adamant

refusal to accept the memorandum came from Edwin Montagu,
Secretary of State for India.

Montagu,

an assimilated Jew,

was afraid of the connotations that might be derived from
such a statement,

fearing that the political status of the

Jew might be q u e st io ne d.^
The Cabinet,
modified the Zionist

as a result of the disagreement,
draft and received

the Foreign Office on September 19, 1917.

approval for it from
While this formu

lation was being forwarded to Woodrow Wilson for his approval,
the anti-Zionist element was working for further modification
of the statement with some success.

The resulting statement

was then sent to Wilson for his consideration,

in October,

and after minor alterations by the American Zionist Organi
zation,

the draft was returned to London with Wilson's

approval.

67

This amended document was .then sent to the

Zionist Organization where Sokolow and Weizmann gave

65

Lloyd George,

Peace T r e a t i e s , II, 1122-32.
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Jacob de Haas, History of Palestine:
The last Two
Thousand Years (New York:
M a c M i 11a n , 1934), pp. 485 f f .
c f ., Appendix D, p. 156.

68
reluctant approval.

They approved the document,

proved not what they had expected,
would result.

although it

nor been led to believe

Despite their disappointment they regarded

the proposed declaration as a point of departure for future
considerations.

A launching pad had been created.

Upon receipt of the Z i o n i s t ’s approval,

68

Balfour pre

sented the final draft to the Cabinet for ratification.
Acknowledging the internal disunity of the Jews, Balfour
explained that,

in spite of this,

a Jewish majority in Russia

and the United States favored a statement regarding Pales
tine.^

The F r e n c h ^

and American governments also favored

such an announcement.

With the qualification that the term

"national home" meant some form of an allied protectorate
with Jewish autonomy,

and not an independent Jewish state,

the War Cabinet ratified the document on October 31, 1917.

71

On?November 2, 1917, Arthur James Balfour informed
Lord Rothschild,

by letter,

of the support of the British

government for the Zionist program in Palestine.
Britain had issued the Balfour Declaration.

Great

72
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Lloyd George', Peace T r e a t i e s , II, 1135 ff.
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Balfour read the French statement of June 4, 1917.
s u p r a , p. 64, f.n. 58.
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Stein,

Lloyd George,
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c f .,

From the British point of view, it was "less of a
political commitment" to issue the Balfour Declaration to
Rothschild, a philanthropist, as opposed to giving it to

69
The Zionist victory was,
triumph,

in reality,

only half a

for "the launching of the Balfour Declaration at

that time was due to propagandist reasons."

73

The allies

were in a serious situation— the Rumanians had been crushed.
The Russians were hovering on actual withdrawal from the war.
The French were bogged down on the Western Front.
Italians had been defeated at Caporetto.

The

And the United

States had not yet been able to send troops to the Western
zone.

British shipping was constantly threatened and lost

tonnage at tremendous rates.

In such critical times it was

hoped that by issuing the Declaration,
confirm American Jewish support,

Jewish sympathy would

thus making it difficult for

Germany "to reduce her military commitments and improve her
. .
economic position m

,
„
.
the Eastern front .

.

74

The issuance of the Balfour Declaration would also,
it was hoped,

influence the Russian Jews in exerting force

on the Russian government to remain in the war.

The major

evolutionary steps of the Declaration took place during the
interval between the Russian Revolution of March,

1917,

and

Chaim Weizmann who was a politician.
Charles Raddock,
Portrait of a People (3 v o l s . ; New York:
The Judaica Press,
Inc., 1967), III, 158.
Rothschild communicated the declara
tion to the English Zionist Organization on November 18,
1917.
c f ., Appendix E, p. 157.
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Great Britain, Report of the Palestine Royal
Commission:
The Peel R e p o r t , June 22, 1937, Cmnd. 5479,
(1946 r e p r i n t ), pp. 17-18.
Hereafter cited as Great Britain,
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the events immediately preceding the Bolshevik coup in
November,

1917.

Russian Jew,

England hoped to insure the loyalty of the

if not the government.

The Zionists realized fthat
Palestine was not being designated as the terri
tory to be set aside for the creation of a Jewish
majority leading to statehood; the final language
was that a Jewish national, home would be created
in Palestine, and the very imprecision of this
formula was to help leac^to all the troubles of
the next three decades.
Basically the Declaration marked the end of an era
and the beginning of another.
tion,

Four days after the" Declara

the Bolsheviks seized control in Russia.

ously with this revolution,

Simultane

came the increasing impact on

world affairs of the United States— acting as an anticolonial force.
In 1917 . . . the end of empire was already
visable; with Lenin's and Wilson's proclamations,
there began the vast popular upheaval wl^ch led
to Asian and African independence - * . "
and the end of nineteenth century imperialism.

The Jews,

and

Great Britain, had seized a moment: for action "which might
never have returned."

77

The idea at the time of its issuance was "
75
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a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace
Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of
the inhabitants
ever,

."

78

of the area.

It was assumed, ho w

that when it became necessary for "according represen

tative institutions to Palestine,

if the Jews had meanwhile

responded to the opportunity afforded them
become a definite majority

."

79

m

the area,

Palestine would become a Jewish Commonwealth.

78 Great Britain,

Peel Commis si on , p. 18.

and had
then

CHAPTER IV
MOTIVATIONS AND REACTIONS
While the direct responsibility for the
calamity that overtook the Palestinian Arabs
was on the heads of the Zionist Jews who
seized a Lebensraum for themselves . . . a
heavy load of indirect, yet irrepudiable,
responsibility was on the heads of the United
Kingdom.
..
— Arnold Toynbee
Great Britain,

through the issuance of the Balfour

Declaration, became more deeply involved in the struggle for
pre-eminence in the Middle East.
her ally, France,
*

She became involved with

in the matter of the Syrian and Lebanese

regions of Greater Axabia as well as in the contest between
Arab and Zionist for Palestine.

The world-wide reactions to

this declaration were not of the spontaneously positive
nature that Great Britain had originally expected,

nor that

she had been led to expect.
Jews throughout the world welcomed the Declaration
2
as a pseudo-Magna Carta — as a Jewish Declaration of Indepen
dence.

"The caution and ambivalence of its formulation could

^"Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (10 vols. ;
New York:
Oxford University Press, 1947), V I I I *
2
Abba Eban, My People:
The Story of the Jews (New
York:
Random House, 1968), p. 366.
Hereafter cited as Eban,
My P e o p l e .

3
not dim its inner glow, 11 and Jews,
ecstatic because of its issuance.
the Zionist Organization,
and Tschlenow,

internationally,

were

In a manifesto issued by

ancl signed by Weizmann,

Sokolow,

it was declared that the aspirations of the

Bas.le program had been achieved with the- Balfoup Declaration.
"The period which

began \]the movement] was Expectation
4

the period which npw begins is Fulfillment*. "
generaldy,

Jews,'

regarded the document as elaborating the founda

tion upon which t]ie Jewish state would arise.
The English people received the Declaration with
mixed emotions,

especially i n vthe Jewish cqmmunity.

The

Conjoint Foreign Committee— the group of wealthy English
Jews— failed to participate in the celebration of the
Zionists.

Several weeks after the Declaration,

the Conjoint

Committee was responsible for the formation of thp League of
British Jews, with the goal and intention of altering the
political implications of the Declaration.

Especially

important among t^ie Committee's conscience was the question
of citizenship of British Jews who ,| while professing the
Jewish faith, wished to remain*., >subj ects of the Crown.

5

Such

Jews feared
that the Declaration contained
the possible
I
i
recognition that the Jews pomposed a separate and distinpt
political nationality.

The anti-Zionist element in^Britain

^Ibid.
^Spkolow,
5
Stein,, Balfour, p. 565.

Z i o n i s m , II, 124-27.

remained irreconcilable,

at least until the end of the war,

after which the Anglo-Jewish community appeared to be more
g
united in support of the Zionist's aims.
A more favorable reaction met the Declaration on
December 2, 1917,

at a demonstration of appreciation and

celebration held at the London Opera House.
mental officials,

Zionist leaders,

of foreign powers,

There g overn

and several representatives

and members of various ethnic groups-,

voiced their approval of the Declaration.

Lord Robert Cecil,

reiterating the opinion of the British government,
that England's "

stated

wish [was] that Arabian countries

pshouldj| be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians and
7
Judea for the Jews."
Nevertheless, while seeming to suggest
a unity of purpose,

the meeting was not representative of the
3
whole British community..
In France and Italy the Balfour Declaration was not
received with any great enthusiasm.

Both countries felt that

they had a right to participate in arrangements involving
9
any future partition of the Middle East.
Neither of the
6

Ib id . , p. 566.

7

Sokolow,

Zionism,

II, 127.

3
Using the Jewish representatives as being illustra
tive of the "un-representative" nature of the meeting, the
situation can clearly be seen.
Those present were, Herbert
Samuel, Chaim Weizmann, Nahum Sokolow, James de Rothschild,
and Dr. Moses Gaster.
Not a representation of the Jewish
community, but of the higher echelons of the Zionist Organi
zation.
9

France by the Sykes-Picot Treaty,
the ‘Conference of St. Jean de Maurinne.

and Italy by

two had been consulted by Great Britain before the issuance
of the Declaration,

although brief unofficial contact had

•been made with both by the British branch of the Zionist
Organization,

regarding the matter.

10

Balfour, when asked

in the House of Commons if the Jewish national home in
Palestine was an allied war aim, or strictly a British goal,

admitted that no "

official communication Chad] been

made to the Allies on the subject,

.

but because of

the Zionist activities in the allied countries it was
believed to have been a common goal,

and that His Majesty's

Government understood that both President Wilson and the
Provisional Russian government were favorably inclined
towards such a Declaration.

12

Balfour was also aware that

Germany and the Turkish Empire were also -making overtures
to the Zionists at this time and, with this knowledge, urged
Great Britain to act when she did because delay would have
lessened the impact of the Declaration,

or rendered it

i e s s .13
usel
Pressure to secure the approval of Italy and France
for the Declaration was applied, but,
^Supra. , chap.

iii, pp.

once again,

the effort

63-64.

^ G r e a t Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of
Commons), 5th s e r . , Vol. XCIX (19 November 1917), col. 838.
Hereafter cited as Pari. D e b a t e s .
12

The only countries that had been contacted by
governmental representatives were the United States and
Russia.

13

Weisgal, W e i z m a n n , p. 161.

came from the Zionist O r g a ni za t io n.rather than the British
government.

In January,

1918, Nahum Sokolow went to Paris

to seek the French government's approval of the British
statement of policy.
Rothschild,

Sokolow,

Acting in conjunction with Baron de
on February 9, received from Minister

Pichon a statement of French support for the Balfour Declara
tion,

and official French approval was published in the form

✓
14
of a communique on February 14, 1918.
Italy objected to the possible English monopolization
of the Palestinian area, but since the Italian Jews,
had voiced their support of the Zionist program,

in 1917,

the Italian

government could not ignore the Balfour Declaration.

No

formal endorsement came from Rome until May 9, 1918, when
the Italian Ambassador in London,

the Marquis Imperiala,

acting on instructipns from Foreign Minister Sonnino,
a .statement of Italy's approval of the Declaration.

issued

15

14

February 9, 1918:
"Monsieur Sokolow, representing
the Zionist Organizations was this morning received at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Monsieur Stephen Pichon, who
was happy to confirm that there is complete agreement between
the French and British Governments in matters concerning the
questions of a Jewish establishment in Palestine."
Sokolow,
Z i o n i s m , II, 128.
February 14, 1918; note from Pichon to
Sokolow:
"As arranged at our meeting on Saturday, the 9th
of this month, the Government of the Republic, with a view
to defining its attitude towards Zionist aspirations looking
to the creation of a national home for the Jews in Palestine,
has published a communique 'in the press."
Ibid.
15

Sokolow, Z i o n i s m , II, 129.
" . . . H.i s Majesty's
Government are pleased to confirm the declarations already
made through their representatives . . . to the effect that
they will facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a
Hebrew national centre . - - ."
Ibid.

The United States,

like France and,. Italy, was hesi-

tant to identify itself with the D e c l a r a t i o n , although for
different/ reasons^

Whereas France and Italy were at war

with the Ottoman iEmpire and,

therefore,

concerned with the.

disposal of territory they regarded as wa^ spoils,

the

United States possessed no involvement^ in the Turkish con
flict.

Robert Lansing,

in recognition, of this non-combatant

status, urged thg President to not officially recognize thp
Declaration.

Wilson,

taking Lansing's advice,

"

dropped-

the idoa of making it publicly known that hLe approved the
Declaration.

As a result/, ten imon^hs elapsed before

Wilson yielded to Zionist pressures,

and issued a statement

concerning the,, Balfour Declaration.

This occurred after

Rabbi Stephen Wise,

B r a n d e i s 1 successor as the head of the

American Zionist Organization,jpointed ou£ th^t no mention
had been made of the war,

or post-war arrangements for

governing- the p r o t e ct or at e.

The questign of suzerainty

would- be determined at the peace talks,

andy hence,

the

United States should be vitally interested in the situation.
Accordingly, Wilson*. in a letter to Rabbi W i s e , tdated
August 31, 1918,
their program,

assured the Zionists of his good wishes for

although he stil^. withheld any formal state-

■^Stein, B a l f o u r , p. 594.
cf., Esco,, Palestine j, I,
240 ff., for an analysis of the Lansing-Wulson role in
reference to recognition oft. the Zionist program and Balfour
Declaration.

ment.concerning official American policy on the s u b j ec t.17
When the Balfour Declaration was communicated to
Husaig in^January,

1918,

"he took it, philosophically,

con

tending himself witfr an expression of goodwill towards a
kindred Semitig race, which he understood was to lodge in. a
house owned by the Arabs."

18

Britain's allies were confused b y the ambiguous
wording of the Balfour Declaration and it is proper to ask
the question,

"what had Britain actually meant?"

goyernment desire to establish a Jewish state,

Di£ the

or did t h e y v.

only me^n to create-in Palestipe^a refugee center for dis
placed Jews?

What had motivated Great Britain t o ttakej a step

so confusing to her allies without consulting them?
Lloyd George maintained that a Jewish state would,
at some time in ,thp futures, be established in ,,P al e s t i n e .
This "Jewish Commonwealth" would become a reality after the
Jews had demonstrated their ability tp handle the problems
attending such a state,

and when the Jews constituted a

majority of tl^e population in the area.

19

Although the

17

Sokolow, Z i o n i s m , II, 130-31.
The Congress did not
give recognition to^the Declaration until September, 1922.
18

Temperley, Peace Co n f e r e n c e , VI, 132.
Husain,
speaking on Jewish immigration:
"We saw the Jews . . .
streaming to Palestine from Russig., Germany, Spain, America
. . . , they knew that the country was/ for its .original sons,
for all their differences, a sacred and beloved homeland."
Misha Louvish, e d . , Facts About Israel (Israel, 1966), p. 14.
1^Lloyd George,

Peace T r e a t i e s , II, 113§-39.

Declaration was not explicit in its terms,

this represented

the Prime Minister's interpretation of it,

and his view

was received with almost universal approval of the
British press, fandj was nearly everywhere accepted
as a promise of a J e w i s ^ s t a t e to be created within
some measurable future.
Therefore,

the Declaration was "understood" to be an offer

of oppurtunity offered to the Jews for settlement and coloni
zation in Palestine.

Thus, while nothing definite was

intended in the matter of the immediate creation of a Jewish
state,

the development of such a commonwealth was expected

. 2 1
to come about in due time.

.

.

The British were seeking "to

reconstitute a new community and definitely building for
numerical majority in the f u t u r e . "

22

The motives behind the Declaration,
to,

23

already alluded

vary according to the individual and vary also m

spatial sense,

a

for over the years the need for reinterpre

tation and re-evaluation of the document became almost
mandatory.

Prior to the end of the war no definite answer

was given by any of the Cabinet members questioned by Parliament as to the meanings of the Balfour Declaration.

24

Lord

20

Paul L. Hanna, British Policy m Palestine
(Washington, D.C.:
American Council on Public Affairs,
p. 37.
Hereafter cited as Hanna, British P o l i c y .

1942),

21

Lloyd George, Peace T r e a t i e s . II, 1139.
Cf. C. R.
Ashbee, A Palestine1 Notebook:
1918-1923 (New York:
Doubleday, Page and Co *, 19 23), p. 6 7.
22
24

XCIX

Stein,

B a l f o u r , p. 625.

23

S u p r a . , chap.

,
v
Pari. Debates (House of Commons),
(19 November 1917), col. 99.

iii, pp.

5th s e r . , Vol.

55ff

80
.Curzon,

in the House of Lords during 1920,

reasons for its issuance;

cited strategic

it was nothing more than a war

..
25
policy.
Winston Churchill,

elaborating on this idea in 1922,

gave the motive for issuance as providing a method of obtain
ing both the moral and financial support of world Jewry for
the war effort.

26

Lord Harlech,

in 1937, however,

declared

that the motivation for the Declaration involved the restora
tion of the Jewish home in Palestine, with a secondary cause
of war support.

27

Lloyd George,

of course, maintained that

the Declaration represented a purely propaganda measure.
Great Britain,

according to him,

issued the document when

the Zionists promised "to rally to the Allied cause Jewish
sentiment and support throughout ,the world."

28

Balfour's

motivation stemmed from some strange sense of idealism,
having been converted early in his life to the Zionist cause
and having become "convinced that the revival
unity

."

29

had to become one of the allied war aims.

^ I b i d . . (House of Lords),
19 20), col. 10 28.

5th ser. , Vol. XL

Ibid., (House of Commons),
(4 July 1922), col. 3289.
27

Vol.

of Jewish

5th ser.. Vol. CLVI

Pari. Debates (House of Commons),
CCCXXVI (21 July 1937), col. 3289.

28

(29 June

5th ser..

Lloyd George. Peace T r e a t i e s , II, 1139.
Asquith's
interpretations of Lloyd George's motivations were quite
different from his own.
S u p r a . , chap. iii, p. 5 2 f f.n. 23..
29

Dugdale, Balfour, II,- 215.

The strategic consideration provided the essential
motive, however

30

— the protection and strengthening of Great

Britain's trade routes to the East,

and the impact.that such^

an announcement *would have Lon the Jewish communities in the
Central power countries.

In September,

1917, Germany,

realizing the impact Jewish support could have^ on their war
effort
ment."

m a d e ^ "serious efforts to capture the Zionist move31

It was also apparent tpat a declaration favoring

the Zionist program would strengthen England's position^in^
P a l e s t i n\e <"when
came to establish administration
x the,time
i■
*
<'
■
’
32
for tl^Lp Sykes-Pipot Brown Zope
."
Through’ careful
negotiations England gained the ascendency i n ,P a l e s t i n e ,
there-bytdisplacing tlje French.

The first diplomatic move

placed the area ^under international control in the SykesPi,coti Treaty.

Great Britain saw th^ possibilities of

eventually creating a British protectorate in the area.
tlje British army conquered Palestine,
conqjiest,

It

creating possession by

the necessary moral backing for a position^ip

Palestipescould be achieved by supporting tpe Zionists for a
Jewish national home in the area.

Lloyd George fe.ltl. that

England would be in Palestine byiconquest,
would remain entrenched in the-, area.;

and that she

Any problems that might

be created by her position tl^ere, could be handled in the
30

Temperley,

Peace C o n f e r e n c e , VI,

31I b i d . . VI, 173.^
32
kanna,

British P o l i c y , p. 37

171.

82
future.

33
Husain and the British had reached their agreement in

January,

1916, but Husain withheld action until June, when he
i

decided that a noncommittal policy was no longer b e n e f i c i a l . ^
On June, 5, 1918,

the, Sharif 's sons— Ali 'and Faisal— deplared

their father King of the Arabs,

35

after which they waged a

successful campaign against the Turks at Mecca.
received British support;

This revolt

the British ultimately provided

two British artillery companies from the Egyptian Ex pe di 
tionary Force to aid the insurgents.

With the fall of Mecca,

Husain was declared. King of the Arab countries by an assembly
of Arab leaders,

which hp had conyen^d,

Those Arab princes'

on November 2, i91f5.

and notables not at thetconvention,

Great Britain denipd recognition of the title,

and

although)

England finally accorded him recognition as King of the
Hejaz,

On January 3, 1917.
The main importance of the Sharifian troops, who

were trained and equipped by the*, British and led by
36
Lawrence. ‘ and other English officers,
^Stein,

to the campaign in

B a l f o u r . p. 628.

34

The "motivation" for Husain's action against the
Turks was the threat of invasion of the Hejaz b y a Turkish
contingent, which was being led by a German Military Mission.
35
36

Antomu§,

Arab^ A w a k e n i n g , pp.

194-95.

The military importance of Lawrence was not as
strategic as i-y might appear to be^ when compared with the
gigantic proportions of\the total war.
No other figure,
"carried sq mysterious a glamor of romance, enhanced as> much

the Middle, East outside the Hejaz.
prqgressed towards Palestine,

As the British forces

the importance of Arab troops

and, of the, Syrian rqvolt played nq apparently essential role
in thev determipatiqn of the^ outcome^ of the Palestine
operation.

37

With the cabinet change in^late^1916,

the Eastern

campaign wais stppped up with thq appointment of Sir Edwardt,
Allenby,

an extremefLy able c o m m a n d e r a s head of the Egyptian

Expeditionary Forces in June,

1917.

Allenby <
L"had immense

vitality and detgrmir^atio^i, and was popular withihj-s troops
."

38

having earned a good reputation in France.

The

British initiated the attack on^the Turkish-German forces in
October,

and captured Begrsheba. on Octojbe:^ 31st

39

day the Cabinet approyed the Balfour Declaration.

— thev same
On

December 9, Allenby accepted the surrender of Jerusalem.
Eastern campaign then slowed down for several mpnths,

40

Tl^e
but

of his aloofness and wilfulness as by superb^prose in\which
he has recounted his s to r y . " The so called Lawrence'of Arabig.
myth distorts the t r u t h • C. R. M. F. Crutwell^ A History of
the Great War:
1914-1918 (2nd e d . ; Oxford:
The Clarendon
Press, 1936), p. 613.
Hereafter cited as Crutwell, Great
War.
37
Temperley,^ Peace C o n f e r e n c e ,kVI,

130.

38

Llewelyn Woodward, Great Britain and the War:
1914-1918 (London:
Methuen and* Co., Ltd.,) 1967), p; 118.
Hereafter cited as Woodward, W a r .
39

The Tui^ks were generally outnumbered by nearly two
to one in infantry and ten tq one in ^cavalry. Crutwell,
Great W a r , p. 613.
40

This slow dgwn wag the result of the German offen
sive on the Western front,v and tl^e withdrawal, of 60,000

84
in September,

1918,

the British moved into the Jordan valley.

This tr.oop movement preceeded a rapid advance to the north
and the-capture of Damascus,

41

Beirut and Aleppo.

final days of Allenby's campaign in 1918,

In the

the Arab troops

assisted in conquering Syria and-in the capture of Horns and
Hama.

"The., Turkish armies,

of adequate reinforcements,

i]^l-supplied,

and with no hppe

were beginning to break up."

Consta nt in op le M by way of Thrace, was now accessible,
the Turkish g o v e r n m e n t .*possessed no alternative,
surrender.

42

andj.

but

On October 20, 1918, Turkey asked for an armi

stice, j and on October 30, 1918,^a truce was signed'aboard
43
the British battleship A g a m e m n o n .^
Because of the disorderly retreat of the Turkish
forces from Palestine and Syria,^ civil records were destroyed
or taken with the rapidly departing Ottoman officials.
troops from t^e Middle East to reinforce thoqe troops iFrance.
Woodward, W a r , p. 121.
41

Although Faisal "occupied" Damascus, it is believed
that he was merely allowed to occupy if, 'the- actual fighting
being done- by a company of Australians; Faisal was then
allowed .to claim Damascus for the Arabs, thereby g i v i n g an
incentive to otl^ier Arab troops in.the war.
Elie Kedourie,
England and the Middle East:
The Destruction of the Ottoman
Empire, 1914-1921 (London:
Bowes & B o w e s , 1956)", pp. 120 f f .
Hereafter cited as Kedourie, England and Middle E a s t .
42

Woodward, W a r , p. 122.
The Ottoman government
appeared to be more interested inv acquiring territory in the
Caucusus region,jbecause of Russia's collapse, than in saving
Palestine b y reinforcing her position there.
I b i d . , p. 402,

^ Ibid. , p. /-12.2.

85
During the last month of the Palestine campaign the political
problems of the area outweighed the military.

44

As a result

of the lack of civil administration and the increasingly
confused situation in the area,
tration was established.

a temporary military adminis

The newly established "government"

of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration hoped to solve
immediate civil problems* to implement the terms of the SykesPicot Treaty,
French;

in recognition of the adamant demands of the

and also to meet their obligations to the Arabs.

45

The administration of the area was divided into three zones:
Palestine,

46

north to Acre and east to Jordan, was placed under

English control; the coastal area of Syria was placed under
French administration,

and comprised the northern area of the

Territory; Trans-Jordan and non-coastal Syria was placed
under the control of Faisal,
of occupation.

Although not strictly satisfying the terms

of the Sykes-Picot Treaty,
nationalized,

and comprised the eastern zone

since Palestine was not inter

the arrangement tended to satisfy the French,

and the Arab zone was treated as had been stipulated in the
44

Crutwell,

Great W a r , p. 122.

45

Kedourie, England and Middle E a s t , pp. 117 f f .
The Occupied Enemy; Territory Administration consisted of the
Military governor, thirteen district military governors,
fifty-nine British assistants, and seventeen Arab officers.
Epp, Whose Land is P a l e s t i n e , p. 140.
For connection to the
Sykes-Picot Treaty cf., Kedourie
England, and Middle E a s t ,
pp. 128 ff.
46

Kedourie, England and Middle E a s t , p. 128.

86
secret treaty.

47

areas, however,

Conflict over the occupation of certain
developed.

Some means of modifying the terms

of the Sykes-Picot Treaty had to be devised,
abandoned completely.

or it had to be

The necessary modification came with

the joint Anglo-French resolution of November 8, 1918.

48

The Arabs, watching the French and British entrench
themselves in the Middle East and learning of the secret
Sykes-Picot Treaty and the Balfour Declaration,

began to

voice concern over their status and position in the Middle
East.
Husain,

upon learning of the Declaration,

asked for

a definition of its meaning and Great Britain's intentions
in Palestine.

Accordingly,

England sent David George Hogarth,

a member of the Arab Bureau in Cairo,

to offer explanations

of British intentions., on January 4, 1918.

49

The basic

intent of his mission was to reassure Husain that the allied
countries still desired the creation of an Arab state in the
Middle East,

and,

also,

to inform him of the future status of

Palestine as he understood the situation.

50

According to the

message, no nationality in Palestine would be subject to
47

S u p r a ., chap.

:4 8 —

—

ii, pp. 39-43.

0A

I n f r a ., p. 94.

4°)
'Antonius,
50

Arab A w a k e n i n g , p.

267.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great
Britain and Palestine:
1915-1939 (London:
Oxford University
Press, 1939), p. 115.
Hereafter cited as International
Affairs, Great B r i t a i n .

another.

Because of the multiplicity of religions, however,

there would have to be some type of "a special regime to
deal with"

51

the holy places.

The Mosque of Omar,.' however,

would not. be controlled by a non-Moslem authority.

52

Hogarth,

clearly stated that England had decided to aid the Zionist
cause in Palestine and
in so far as fit wasj compatible with the freedom
of the existing population, both economic and
political, no obstacle fwouldj be.^gut in the way
of the realization of this ideal.
Husain,

according to Hogarth,

been outlined,

agreed to the plan as it had

although the Sharif adamantly opposed any

independent Jewish state in the area.

54

Husain appeared to

understand that England was expecting to aid the development
of a Jewish home in Palestine,

and that Palestine,

because

of their commitment to the Zionists, was to be excluded from
any Arab state created in the Middle East.

The basic intent

in the Hogarth-.message was to reassure the Arabs that they
would not be dominated by the Jews,

and that all Jewish

settlement would be closely ^supervised by Great Britain.

51
52
53
55

Stein,

55

Balfour , p. 632.

International Affairs,
I b i d . , p. 117.

54

Great B r i t a i n , p. 116.
Stein,

B a l f o u r , p. 633.

The Hogarth message can be found in Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons and Command), 1939,
Vol. XXVII (R e p o r t s , vol. 881, misc. No. 4), Cmnd. 5964,
."Statements made on behalf of His Majesty's Government during
the year 1918 in regard to the Future States of certain parts
of the Ottoman Empire," p. 3.
Hereafter cited as Great
Britain, Hogarth R e p o r t .

88
Shortly after the Hogarth mission,

the Bolsheviks

published the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty, which further com
plicated the situation.
document,

Jamal Pasha,

With the public knowledge of this
the Ottoman governor of. Syria, made a

diplomatic attempt to regain Arab allegiance.

Jamal Pasha

attempted to convince Husain that Great Briatin was- using
the Arabs "to serve their own ends" by making "mendacious
promises" with no intention of keeping them.

He cited the

Sykes-Picot Treaty as positive evidence that England had
never contemplated an independent state,

and that the Entente

had made definite plans to divide the Arab area among them
selves.^^

Husain's motives in rejecting the approach remain

obscure— whether he rejected Jamal Pasha's plan because he
considered the terms unsatisfactory,

or if he felt unable to

"escape from his involvement with the Entente Powers," or if
England discovered the negotiations,
to placate the British,
Great Britain,
Ottoman statements,

and he put on a fajjade •

remains subject to conjecture.
acting rapidly to conteract the

and hoping to set Husain's, mind at ease

in reference to the Sykes-Picot Treaty,
through Wingate.

57

sent a telegram,

This telegram stated that the Sykes-Picot

Treaty had been drawn up by the three Entente members in
56
57

Antonius, Arab A w a k e n i n g , p.

255.

Kedourie, England and Middle E a s t r p. 10 7The
entire year of 1917 was disastrous for the allies, the climax
of which was the defection of Russia shortly after the
Bolshevik c o u p . I b i d .
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‘1916, but since Russia had withdrawn from the war,

its terms

;no longer were applicable to any future considerations in
the Middle East.

On February 8, 1918,

a formal,

though vague

and non-com m it al , note was sent to Husain by J. R. Bassett,
British Agent at Jedda,

reaffirming the terms of the previous

British pledges to the Arabs.

Great Britain regarded herself
CO
as firmly committed to the "liberation of the Arab peoples."
Early in 1918, Great Britain sent a Zionist commission

to Palestine to study the situation and evaluate the possibilities for future Jewish settlement in the area.

59

Upon

reaching Palestine, Weizmann, who headed the commission,
approached General Allenby with his credentials from the
government.

Allenby informed Weizmann that the mission was

useless— nothing could be done at that time.
The messianic hopes £that the Zionists]] had read
into the Balfour Declaration suffered a p e r c e p t i b l e ^
diminution when [they3 came into contact with . - .
General Headquarters.
The attitude of the British officers toward the Jews
was distinctly antagonistic and presented an atmosphere.
unfavorable for any concise action on the part of the
58

Antonius, Arab A w a k e n i n g . p. 432.
England and Middle E a s t , p. 109.
59

cf. Kedourie,

The delegation was composed of representatives of
the allied countries* Levi Bianchini, Italy* Sylvan Levi,,
France; and Joseph Cowen, Dr. David Ebcr, Mr. Leon Simon,
and Mr. I. M. Sieff, England.
60

Weizmann,

Trial and E r r o r , p.

218.

commission.^

The anti-semitic attitude of the military was

widely known among the Sharifians in Palestine,

and they

felt "encouraged to hope that their natural and long-standing
opposition to Zionism could
from a policy
area.

62

deflect the British

" favoring the Jewish settlement of the
*

Whether the Arabs got active encouragement from the

British officers to oppose the program or not,

"Arab

hostility gained in momentum as the days passed

."

63

Hoping to use the commission to allay growing Arab
restiveness,

Allenby suggested that Weizmann approach Faisal

and, hopefully,
Zionist program.

obtain tentative Arab agreement to the
64

The Zionists readily agreed to the

suggestion and proceeded to Faisal's encampment in June,

1918

Handling the situation in an extremely diplomatic
manner, Weizmann assured Faisal and the Arabs of the honorabl
intentions of the Zionists.
right to settle in Palestine,

The Zionists onlyvwanted the
and in no way would this

settlement "be to the detriment of any of the great communities already established m

the country

."

65

^ I b i d . . p. 221.
The Jews constantly complained
about the "lack of sympathy" of the military administration
in Palestine, until Samuel's appointment and "the official
records in the archives does bear out their complaints."
Kedourie, Chatham H o u s e , p. 57.
62
Kedourie,

Chatham H o u s e , pp. 5 7-58.

63
Weizmann, Trial and E r r o r , p. 224.
64

I b i d . , p. 232.

65

Stein,

B a l f o u r . p. 634..

Faisal informed Weizmann. of his agreement with what had been
said,

and promised to relate the convexsations to his f a t h e r . ^

Weizmann's explanation of the Zionist's goals appeared to
have had "a gratifying affect and. had produced a better
a tmosphere."

67

It soon became apparent to Weizmann and' the other
members of the commission that they could do little work or*
study in Palestine,
administration,

for the country was under Military

and. the army- was preparing for another offen

sive push in^ the Middle East.

The commission,

realizing- that

"the war was working up to its crisis" left- Palestine for
their respective countries.

68

Upon reaching London, Weizmann

made an^appointment to relate his findings to Lloyd George.
The appointment was set for November 11, 1918;
two men did meet,

although the

the tuppoil resulting from thje announcement

of the., armistice discounted any ftruely finite discussions of
the s u b j e g t . ^
In the spring of 1918,
exile i n 4Egypt,

seven Syrian leaders,

in

submitted a memorandum to the Foreign Office

in. Cairo,, in wljich they voiced their concern over the dis
posal of Arab territory ip the event of an allied
^Weizmann,
67

68

Stein,

Trial and E r r o r , p. 235.

B a l f o u r , p. 634.

Weizmann, Tri^l and E r r o r , p.

69Ibid. . p. 239.
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victory.

70

On. June 16, 1918, England answered the questions

of the seven nationals,

taking the opportunity to once again

attempt to reassure the Arabs.

71

The declaration made

specific reference to four territorial categories:

lands

that were free and independent before the war; Turkish terri
tory that had been liberated by the sole activity of the
Arabs; those areas that had been liberated through the con
certed action of the allies and Arabs;
were still under Turkish domination.
the first two categories,

72

and,

those areas that

Areas that came under

those that had been free prior to

the war and those liberated by the Arabs, would be recognized
by England as being completely independent -under Arab aegis.
Those areas that were liberated through concerted action
would be administered on the "principle of the consent of the
governed

."

73

The Turkish areas would have to be dealt

with after the war, but England would continue to work for
the freedom of the area,
in the area.

74

and the independence of the people

Great Britain pledged itself to the recognir-

tion of the independence of any Arab area that had been
liberated from Turkish control through independent^ Arab
70

The seven Syrian nationals were members of the
Party of Syrian Unity, which wanted the independence and
sovereignty of Syria.
Kedourie, England and Middle E a s t ,
p. 113.
71

I b i d ., pp. 113 ff.
The Declaration to the Seven
is printed in Great Britain, Hogarth R e p o r t , pp. 5-6.
72
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Klieman,
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British P o l i c y , p. 16.
Arab A w a k e n i n g , p. 434.
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Ibid.
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action.

75
The Declaration to the Seven, which was made to the

seven anonymous Syrians,

V6

basically represented a reaffir

mation of British policy in the Middle East,

and Arab troops

operated almost solely in those areas to which they had been
assigned in the Sykes-Picot Treaty.

Although the total

independence of these areas was inferred in the Declaration
to the Seven,

s u c h ,independence was not to become a reality

(with the exception of those areas designated in the Sykes^Picot Treaty).

Palestine,

as in past statements,

from the

Jordan to the Mediterranean was excluded from any commitments
m

the Declaration.

77

The motives prompting the British

statement were partially to counter the growing strength and
frequency of German and Ottoman propaganda,
again,

and to, once

reassure the Arabs of their good* intentions in the

area.
Arab restiveness,
1918,

in spite of the many statements of

tended to increase in* magnitu.de throughout the year.

By the end of 1918 Arab unrest had reached such a point of
t u r m o i l > that the War Cabinet received messages from the
Middle East emphasizing the seriousness of the situation.
75

Kedourie,

England and Middle E a s t , p. 116.

V6

I b i d . , p. 114.
The Seven remained anonymous
because when compared to Husain, they had little authority
and were afraid of retribution on the part of Husain.
Ibid.
77

T. E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of W i s d o m ,
(Garden City:
Random Housed 1935), pi 555.
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Lord Curzon,

addressing the Middle Eastern Committee of the

Cabinet, warned that the activities of the Zionists in
Palestine had antagonized and aroused the suspicions of the
Arabs.

There was "

two communities

. an! increasing friction between the
."

78

and something had to be done if a

peaceful solution was to be found for the situation in the
Middle East.

British strategy in the area had been dependent

upon fostering the national aspirations of the Arabs arid also
the Zionist goals in Palestine.

In carrying out these

strategems, England had created a vacuum in Palestine into
which both groups were rushing.
Hoping to finally reassure the Arabs, without
alienating the Jews,

and to also illustrate the "unanimity"

that existed between the allies,

a joint Anglo-French decla

ration was issued on November 8, 1918.

England and France

decided to assure the Arabs that they had no desire to annex
the territory which had been promised to the Arab state.
This declaration gave the formal, statement of

79

the allied war

aims in the East as being
the complete and definite emancipation of the
peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the
establishment of national Governments . . . from
the initiat^jje and free choice of the indigenous
population.
70
Lloyd George,

Peace T r e a t i e s , II, 1143.

^“^Kedourie, England and Middle E a s t , p. 132.
80

International. Affairs, Great B r i t a i n , p. 118.
"The object aimed, at by France and Great Britain in prosecut
ing in the East the War let loose by»' the ambition of Germany

Though

the tone of the joint^ declaration is one of general

ities,

the specific mentign of Syria and Mesopotamia,

the. failure to mention
Palestine are relevant.
•*

and

The. exclusion
i

of Palestine is indicatiye of England's intent to fulfill her
promises to±both the Arabs and the Ziopists.
The documents that succeeded
t h e iHogarth Message,
Seven,

Bassett Letter,

the Balfour Declaration—
the Declaration to the

and the Anglo-French Declaration— all represented

attempts to reassure the Arabs of ^British intent-to fulfill
the promise of Arab independence in Syria apd Iraq.
of increased self-interest,

Because

concern over Arab unrest,

rapid movement of the military campaigns,

and Woodrow

Wilson's twelfth point concerning self-determination,
Britain created a serigs of declarations which,

Great

intentionally

or u n i n t en ti on al ly , encouraged Arab hopes, while,
reality,

the

in all

they attempted to limit and define “that endorsement

of Arab independence fiyst extended

j.n 1 9 1 5 . “

81

These

is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so
long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of natipnal
governments and administrationsjderiving their authority from
the igitiatiye<, and free choice of the indigenous population.
“In opder to carry out,these intentions France and Great
Britain. aret at one in encouraging and assisting the estab
lishment of indigenous^ Governments and administrations in
Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the.. Allies, and in
the territories the liberation of which they are n^w engaged
in securing, and recognizing these as soon as they are
actually establi sh ed .“ Great Britain, Pari. Debates (House
of Commons), 5th s e r . , Vol. CXLV, col. 36.

81

Klieman,^ British P o l i c y , p. 17.

96
documents did not rescind the Balfour Declaration,

nor did

they alter thp special status of Palestine in the, future
post-war decisions,
the documents,

for b y (not including Palestine in any of

its *special status was emphasize^ in a d e t

facto manner.
Attempting to allay the cynical and contradictory
impact of the Sykps-Picot Treaty., and to usg Arab, nationalism
for tl^e promulgation of their own desires in the Middle Ea^t,
Great Britain,^ perhaps,
the results.
war>.

acted before carefully considering

Thijs, however, was, common sounder the stress of

The results of its diplomacy would have to be treated

after thq war at the peace conferences.

Thp primary problem

in ,tl}e Middle East remained one of handling the rampant
natipnalism that§ Great Britain h^d so eagerly^ encouraged.
The nationalism of the A rabs— aspipant nationalism— tended
tp be. more interested in thp spipit of the pledges made
during the wari( rather than the specifics of these promises.
Although the war with Turkey took less tiipe to fight
than thp Western aspects of the. conflict,
complete defeat,

and despite her

peace negotiations took longer than with^

the other members of ithe defeated forces.

The primary blame

for this lies in the dupligipy of agreement^ and arrangements
whiph concerned this area.

In 1919 the^battlefield and the

strategy were not military*, but irath^eri political and diplo
matic.

CHAPTER V
A FAILURE AT PARIS
Appetites, passions, hopes, revenge, starva
tion, and anarchy ruled the hour; and from
this simultaneous welter all eyes were turned
to Paris.
,
— Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis
The end of World Wa r I signaled the defeat of the
Central Powers by the. twenty-four allied powers.

The Peace

Conference, held in a vain attempt to create some stability
out of the chaos of war,
little,

if any,

commenced its deliberations with

true preparation or sentiment favoring a

negotiated peace.

The war had ended, but disruptive forces

now threatened the work of the Conference from within.
The various tasks of the Conference included consid
eration of the question of the possible creation of a Jewish
state.

Palestine existed as ah idea, rather than a reality,

until the boundaries had been determined and the mandate
awarded.

The essential problem of establishing a Jewish

state was complicated by self-interest on the part of the
powers at th»e Conference.

While the Paris Peace Conference

was attempting to re-structure a broken Europe,

there were

three groups working for national^ supremacy in the,Middle
^Kliem^n,

British P o l i c y , p. 33.

98
East:

the Franco-British group, which was involved in an

imperialistic contest for dominance of the region;

the

Zionists, who wanted the fullest implementation of the
Balfour Declaration;

and the Arabs,

represented by E m i r ;

Faisal and others, who wanted the assurance of independence
2
that they had been promised during the war.
The British,

after the Treaty of Mudros,

felt that

the Sykes-Picot Treaty* was no longer binding upon them and
felt it should be modified,

in order to safeguard His

Majesty's Government's interests in the region.

At the end

of military operations British troops were stationed through
out the Fertile Crescent,

exercising exclusive occupation and

control of the Palestine-Mesopotamia region,
joint occupation, with France and Faisal,
matters "of men and material,

and sharing

in Syria.

the overwhelming expenditure,"

in the Middle Eastern campaign had been British.
above all others,

In
3

This fact,

determined the thinking of the British in

enumerating peace claims at Paris.
Another complication at the Peace Conference concerned
the three diplomatic agreements arrived at during the war:
the McMahon-Husain Pledge to the Arabs;

the Sykes-Picot

Treaty arrived at with the "plenipotentiary of a sovereign
4
n a t i o n " ; and the Balfour Declaration,
2
Klieman,
3

a public statement of

British P o l i c y , p. 34.

Ibid., p. 20.

4

I b i d . , p. 21.

intent to thp, Zionist Organization.

These three agreements

were recognized by all of the signatories— thp Sharif Husain,
the French,

the Zionists,

and the British.

change in war aims, however,

5

Because of the

and the renewed and intensified

interest iipi the Middle East by members of the Entente,
revision of the agreements between France a n d ;Gre^t Britain
waSi necessary,*

if war commitments were to become a reality.

On November 30,

1918,^Clemenceau and Lloyd George met

in London to consider concessions th^t might be made to
achieve thgir national desires and*- determine what procedure
would be followed at Paris.

Lloyd Georg-e askedv for twp major

revisions to thp Syke^s-Picot Treaty:

the addition of the

Mogul ,to Great Britain's area of control ip. the Middle East,
and the removal of Palestine from the, area of international
supervision and its placement sin the British sphere.^

His

request, which wa,s based on an expanded concept of tljie
strategic importance of the Middle East apd stemmed from a
passion for possession thrgugh cpnquest,

was accepted by

Clemencqau.
q u o

The French acceptance was based op a qui,d pro
7
for eaqh concession,
and France agreed to the British

demands,

if it received certain,concessions on thp Rhing and
Q

also an appropriate share of the oil resources in the Mosul.
5
Williams,

Britain and F r a n c e , p. 18.

6
Woodward and Butler, D o c u m e n t s , IV., 340 and 483.
7
Temperley, Peace C o n f e r e n c e , VI, 182.
8
Williams,

Britain and France, p. ,19..
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France also solicited complete British support against any
possible American objections to her territorial demands,
\

>

if the

Mandate

i-

'

/

i

and,
t

system was^ adopted, British support of French

mandates that included Damascus, Aleppo,, A l e x a n d r e t t a ,, and
9
Beirut.
Although these t^lks were unofficial, they pre 
determined the fin^l negotiations c o n c e r n i n g the Middle East
and were in.keeping with t h e timperialistic temper of the
future

conference.^

Revisions of >
. the*. Sykps-Pipot Treaty u

w ere agreed to in Pari^ on January

30,^1919, w h e n ;iat thfs:

and subsequent ^meeting^, Lloyd George requested redugtiqns
of the^ French a^ea of control in the M i d d l e \ E a s t .
French Government-, however,
absolutely unacceptable,

"The

regarded thgse proposals as

and quite inqapable of being>

defended i n xlthe
i F r en'ch .C
\ ha mb e rs ."

11

The former allies neared

an^ impasse i n snegotiations and events in early|1919 soon
revealed that th^ Entente Cordiale of 1904 did not assure
agreement onfall matters.

The facade of Anglo-French unity,

while it^may have temporarily suppressed hfstoricaf differ
ences,, had not resolved .t^iem.

France still retained her'

interest in Syria and the Middle East,

and actively*,.voiced

concern over British attempts at dominance in the area,

12

g.
Temperley, Peace C o n f e r e n c e , VI, 182; cf. Williams,
Britain and F r a n c e , p. 19.
■^Temperley,

Peace C o n f e r e n c e , IV, 182.

1 1 I b i d . , p. 142.

12

Klieman, British Policy, p. 26.
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The French were determined to maintain a hold on
territory in the Middle East, partly as compensation for
losses in the European theatre, but primarily because of a
traditional position of economic interest in the Levant.
Clemenceau,

therefore,, demanded Syria— as agreed upon in the

Sykes-Picot Treaty— in the hope of limiting Great Britain's
pre-eminence in an area which promised to be of "great
economic potential and strategic importance."

13

France also

refused to be bound by any promises that Great Britain had
made to the Arabs during the course of the war.

14

The

British Prime Minister replied to Clemenceau with apparent
surprise at the F r e n c h attitude,

closing his message with

the hope that Anglo-French relations would not become so
strained as to. halt the Conference,

and-that the alliance

which had won the war would continue to be a viable force in
world affairs.

15

Despite these assurances, Lloyd George was

determined to get Palestine into a British sphere of influence.

16
With the rapid disintegration of mutual good faith

between the two countries,

little direct,

concise action

could be taken in reference to the Arab-Zionist question.

14

Woodward and Butler,

D o c u m e n t s , IV, 5 21.

15I b i d . . IV, 489.
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Lloyd George, Peace Treaties. I, 288.
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The breach, whi<ph had reopened in the final stages of the
•war, widened in the clash of ideas and personalities in
1919,

and persisted thereafter as an important irritant in

the rectangular relationship between the French,
Arabs,

and Jews.

17

British,

In spite of this difficult* and near-

explosive *s it ua t i o n , both the Arabs and the Zionists prepared
their delegations to present war claims and platforms to the
Peace Conferenge.
Realizing that some type of accord between the Arabs
and the ^Zionists was required,

if peace were to be successful

in the Middle East, Great Britain advised Faisal to come tp
England for consultation prior tp thp opening of the* Con7
ference.

Lloyd George was also interested in promoting a

meeting between Faisal and the French, hoping that Faisal
could be persuaded to accept the French claims to Syria,

and

that the French would then be .willing to make concessions in
Greater Syria toi. Great Britain.
of his, father,

Husain,

Acting as the representative

Faisal arrived in France on November 26,

1918.*, where he received a rather cool welcome,

and subse

quently went to London^on December 10.
His stay in England^ was marked by a display of g^reat
cordiality and good will which left hiiji ±n\ no doubt
of the sincere desire of the Government, . . . to
do what was possible in furtljigranpe of legitimate
Arab and Syrian aspirations.
17
18

Klieman,

British P o l i c y , P-

Temper ley, Peace Conference

28.

IV, 142.
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W hile in London,

the Emir was advised to accept the possibil

ity of French control in^Syria.

Faisal was beginning to

realize that the Arab position at the impending Conference
would be that of a supplicant,
"of the victorious coalition"

19

and not as an equal member
that had won the war.

Aware

of French opposition to the war claim of independence by the
Arabs,

and still uncertain as to British intent, Faisal

turned to the Zionists as a potential ally for the future
n e g o t i at io ns .
At the end of December,
Zionist leaders in London.

1918, Faisal met with

He entered these negotiations on

the hope that out of them would come an accord and unity of
action.

On December 12, he was quoted by The Times as

saying:
The two main branches of the Semitic family, Arabs
and Jews, understand one another, and I hope that
as a result of interchange of ideas at the Peace
Conference, which will be guided by ideals of selfdetermination and nationality, each nation will
make definite progress towards the realization of
its aspirations.
Arabs are not jealous of Zionist
Jews, and intend to give them fair play; and the
Zionist Jews have assured the Nationalist and
Arabs ofitheir intention to see t h at 2^hey too have
fair play ii^ their respective areas.
Faisal stated that no modern state could grow and
prosper in the Middle East without the aid of the heritage
19

20

Klieman,

British P o l i c y , p. 35.

Moshe Perlmann, "Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy,
1918-1922," Jewish Social S t u d i e s , vol. VI, No. 2, April,
1944, p. 133.
Hereafter cited as Perlmann, Arab-Jewish
Diplomacy.
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of Europe;

the Jews were the perfect intermediaries to trans

late this heritage into a formula that fit the Arab situation.
The Arabs,

through the Emir, promised to support Jewish

demands at P a n s .

21

Extending the terms of his meeting

with Weizmann in June,

1918, Faisal signed an agreement with

the Zionists to concert their actions in Paris,
January 3, 1919.

22

on

The nine articles of this agreement were

designed to promote the "good will and understanding"
between "the Arab State and Palestine."

23

The Balfour

Declaration of November 2, 1917, was to be implemented
any settlement,

24

in

and in return for Arab support the Zionist

Organization promised to use "its best efforts to assist the
Arab, State in providing the means for developing the national
21

"In Palestine the enormous majority of the people
are Arabs.
The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood,
and there is no conflict of character between the two races.
In principles we are absolutely at one.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the
Arabs cannot assume the responsibility of holding level the
scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in
this one province, so often involved the world in difficul
ties.
They would wish for the effective super-position of
a great trustee, so long as a representative local adminis
tration commended itself by actively promoting the material
prosperity of the co un t r y . " David Hunter Miller, My Diary
at the Conference of Paris, 1918-1919, (22 v o l s . ; New York:
Appeal Printing Co., 1924), IV, 298 ff.
Hereafter cited as
Miller, D i a r y .

22

A copy of the agreement can be found in Antonius,
Arab A w a k e n i n g , pp. 43 7-39.
23
24

Pearlmann,

Arab-Jewish D i p l o m a c y , pp.

135-36.

"In the establishment of the Constitution and
Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be
adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying
into effect the British Government's Declaration of
November 2, 1917."
Weizmann, Trial and E r r o r , p. 247.
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v
resources and economic' possibilities
Arab state.

."

25

of the natal

Both,, oarties' further stipulated that if a dis

pute should arise between(the two groups,

Great Britain

would be asked to act as the arbitrator.
In signing the agreement, Faisal incorporated a*
Dro-viso that the agreement would be "deemed void and of no
account or validity if the Arabs failed to obtain the inde
pendence which they sought through the good offices of Great
Britain."

26

The effectiveness of this Arab-Zionist accord,

then, would be determined by the treatment accorded the
Arabs by the Great Powers in Paris.

27

This agreement implied

Faisal's acknowledgement that Palestine would not be incor
porated ipto a larger Arab state,

and that the area^remained

outside the territorial limitations of the Husain-McMahbn
Correspondence.

While the Faisal-Weizmann agreement indi

cated an accord; between Arab and Zionists,
case,

this was not the

for the Arabs in Palestine were already beginning to

display open opposition to the Balfour Declaration and Jewish
immigration.
25
26

28

When tension increased between Arab and Jew,

Pearlmann,
Kliemann,

Arab-Jewish D i p l o m a c y , pp. 135-36.
British P o l i c y , p. 35.

27

"If the Arabs are established as I have asked in
my manifesto of January 4th addressed to the British Secre
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will carry out what is
written in this agreement.
If changes are made, I cannot be
answerable for failure to carry out this agreement."
Weizmann, Trial and E r r o r , p. 247.
28

The Zionist archives report the opposition included
widespread propaganda meetings, "gatherings in private homes
attended by officers serving Faisal's army, agitation \n ^
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Faisal ignored the January accord by implementing his post
script; since the Arab demands had not been met, he regarded
the agreement as null and void.

29

It soon became apparent

that Faisal's apprehensions and anxiety concerning the status,
of the Arabs at the Peace Conference were not unnecessary,

■)

for the Arabs were rapidly becoming a pawn in the imperialistically-oriented "games" that were taking place in Paris.
On January 1, 1919,

memorandum,

the Hejaz delegation submitted a

to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference,

which stated the aim of the Arab nationalist movement:
eventual unification of all Arabs into one nation,
independent* and sovereign state.
memorandum,

30

dated January 29, 1919,

the

as an

In a supplement to this
and implementing Woodrow

Wilson's principles as a defense for their demands, the Arabs
stated that the Hejaz peoples hoped that the European powers
would attach a greater degree of "importance to the bodies
and souls of the Arabib speaking peopljes than to their own
material interests."
Faisal,

31

accompanied by Colonel Lawrence,

appeared

cafes, the allocation of money for arms purchases, complaints
to the authorities against alleged pro-Jewish discrimination,
. . . and threats against Jewish Homes."
Aharon Cohen,
Israel and the Arab Worl d (New York:
Funk and Wagnails,
1970), pi 147.
Hereafter cited as Cohen, Israel.
3^ I b i d . , p. 143.
3^MillerJ D i a r y . Ill,

297.

3lMiller, D i a r y . IV; 199.

10 7
before -the Supreme Council on February 6 ^ 1919,

to present

the Arab, c a s e ,, which had previously been outlined in the two
memoranda of January 1 , and January 29, respectively.

32

His

remarks were in^keeping with his agreement with Weizmann and
the Zionists.

33

The presentation of the Arab case resulted

in avid discussion among thq delegates and it initially
appeared that the chief delegates were reacjy to make some
concrete proposals concerning the matter.
however,

England and France,

reversed the situation when they became enmeshed in

arguments
deriving from t]aeir persistent differences over the
s e c r e t >t r e a t i e s , apportioning responsibility for
them, and^Jhe degree to which they were? still bind^
ing .
uppn the signatories.
With the apparent abortion of the unanimity that was
needed between France and Great Britain;, the possibility of
finding a solution was remote.

President Wilson pointed out

to the Council that Russia had been a signatory to the .1916
agreement,

"but had now disappeared,

and the partnership of

interest had therefore been d is so l v e d , "
necessary.

35

making a new accord

To overcome the impasse, he suggested that those

^ L l o y d George,
^Cohen,

Peace T r e a t i e s , II, 1039-40.

I s ra el , p. 143.

34

IV,

Klicman, British P o l i c y , p. 36.
c f . Miller, D i a r y ,
2^7-99, and .Temperley, Peace C o n f e r e n c e , VI, 145-48.
35

Temperley,

Peace Conference, VI, 148.
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peoples directly concerned with the situation should be,
consulted on the question as to which power would become the
mandatory.

An international committee proposed by Wilson,

would ultimately be senti to the Middle East to ascertain the
wishes of the inhabitants.

36

Both Clemenceau and Lloyd George gave tentative^
approval to the idea of such a commissipn,

as did Faisal, who

placed great hope on thp outcome of the copmijssion's findings.
France soon ,changed her mind, however,

andi indicated that she

w ould not participate in a ny ti nvestigation, the sole intent of
which was to expose anti-French attitudes in* Syria.

With^ the

extension of the Committee's area of investigation to Pales
tine, Mesopotamia,
support.

and Armenia,

Great Britain also withdrew

Wilson, however, had already appointed the two

United States representatives^— Dr. Henry C. King and Charles R.
Crane— and they had left for the Middle Eaqt by May,
At the meeting of the Council of Four,
1919,

a compromise was reached with the French,

1919.

on March 20,
but-* a

betrayal of the Anglo-Arab promises of independence was the
cost of this rather tenuous solution.

Lloyd*George adamantly

maintained that Great Britain had no designs on Syria, but
the French remained wary,
the two countries.

and tension still continued between

37

36
Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), pp. 143-44.
Hereafter
cited as Nicolson, P ea ce ma ki ng .
37
Williams,

Britain and France, p. 20.
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In April,

1919, Faisal met with Clemenceau,

who

informed him that France expected to receive the mandate for
Syria.

Great Britain had abandoned its support of an Arab-

Zionist front to oppose French claims in the area,

apparently

having given in to some of the French demands and claims to
the area.

This reversal of policy left Faisal bereft of any

truly strong allies -to* back up hi^s claims.

38

Faisal left Paris in May, greatly discouraged,

but

still hanging onto the hope of a favorable finding on the
part of the King-Crane. Commission.

Attempting to prepare

his people for the investigation, he addressed an assemblage
of Syrian notables in Damascus,

on May 5.

Pledging himself

to continue the pursuit of a program for independence, he
asked the Syrian leaders to "depend and trust in Qthe^ Allies
who helped ^them^ and who wished £them} good success and
progress."
support,

39

After receiving verbal proof of their

the Emir proceeded to instruct the convocation on

the manner in which to answer any questions that might be
asked by the Commission.

He directed the people of the area

"to ask for complete independence for Syria,

and,

at the

same time to express a hope that it £would} be granted to
other Arab countries."
^Cohen,
39

40

This was, possibly, his last chance

I s r a e l , p. 151.

Woodw ar d and Butler, D o c u m e n t s , IV, 267-72.

40Ibid., IV. 264.
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to gain independence for Syria,

and by makipg such a demand,

Faisal hoped to unify the Arabs,

indicating a desire on his

part to fulfill his father's wish for a united Arab state.
If ■independence was not granted,

the Syrians w o u l d n o t be

willing to accept France as the mandatory power,

if neither

Great Britain nor the United States would accept thf
e trustee
ship,

then a joint commission of Great Britain and France

would be acceptable.

41

Even though the* other powers had pulled out of the
investigation,

there-by compromising the success and authority

of the fact-finding expedition,

thp King-Crane Commission,

which was already in the Middle East, received instructions
to carry out the investigatory inquiry from June until
August.

While their final reporb.confi-rmed the anti-French

attitude of the Syrians and their total rejection of a
French mandate,

the findings were not acted upon by the

Conference— possibly because of embarrassment at lack of
Conference participation,

and also because of a desire to

satisfy individualistic imperialist desires.

In the report

thp
majority of the Syrian population desired absolute
and unqualified independence; that failing such
independence America would be preferred as the
Mandatory Power, and, failing America, Great
Britain; but that strong ggposition to control by
F r a n c e ‘had been revealed.
4 1 I b i d . , IV,
42

265.

Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 149.
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The report also designated Palestine as an area that should'
be connected to Syria, under the leadership^of F a i s a l , and
not given to the Zionists under any conditions.

This aspect

of the report, had it been officially recognized by- the
Conference, would havetled to a great deal of difficulty
for the Jews.

The American inquiry, however,

produced no practical results’, for before-the
return of the Commission to Paris, the more
important treaties had begg;signedi and President
Wilson had left for home.
While Faisal and the Arabs had presented their cause
to the Conference,

and he had departed to prepare his people

for the, "Allied CommissiQn" of inquiry,

the Zionists fever

ishly prepared for their appearance before the Supreme Coun
cil and the statement of their demands.

Although it was

still impossible to convene a Zionist Congress,
the still chaotic post-war conditions,

a number of leading

Zionists gathered in London in January,
sion,

created out^ of this assemblage,

because of

1919.

44

A commis

set about drafting a

statement of official policy for thg Organ^Lzatign,

for

presentation to the Supreme Council.
This committee,

44

under the chairmanship of Herbert

Among those that assembled m London were:
Dr.
Shmarya Levin (New York), Victor Jacobson (Copenhagen),
I. L. Goldberg and Israel Rosoff (Russia), Mr., Jacobus
Kahn (Holland), Herbert Samuel, Chaim Weizmann, and
Nahum Sokolow (Great Britain).
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Samuel

45 prepared the draft of policy and Simon Marks

presented it to O r m s b y- Go re , who represented the British
Foreign Office.

The proposal was rejected by the Foreign

Office, however,

on the grounds that it was too impractical,

arid the Zionists were informed that it would not be accepted
.
46
unless the Organization came "down to earth,"
and eliminated
such outrageous demands as a Jewish governor and the require
ment that the majority of the governmental officials be
1.
47
Jewish.
All the same, the draft which Ormsby-GOre had con
sidered so fanciful formed the substantial basis of
the statement which was eventually submitted to the
Conference on February 23, 1919.
W hile the Actions Committee continued its sessions in
London,

discussing possible revisions of the statement,

a

summons came requesting the Zionists appearance before the
Supreme Council.

Weizmann left for Paris where he joined

Sokolow and the other members of the Zionist delegation
order to appear before the Council.

49

m

50

45

Other members of the committee were Meynard Keynes,
Lionel Abrahams, and James de Rothschild.
Weizmann, Trial
and E r r o r , p. 243.
4 6 t, .
Ibid.
48

4 7 t, . ,
Ibid.

I b i d ., I nfra. , Appendix F, pp.

158-59.

49

Nahum Sokolow, Zionist Organization; Jacob de Haas,
United States Zionist Organization; Andre Spire, French
Zionists; Sylvan'Levi, French Jews.
Miller, Diary, XV,
104-05.
50

The Council of the Ten was composed of, for the
Zionist presentation, Balfour and Lord Milner for Great
Britain; Tairdieu and Pichon ,for France; Lansing and White
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Appearing before the Council of Ten,

the Zionist

presentation was begun by Sokolow with a "short,
speech upon the first point,

namely,

the Jewish people to Palestine

concise

the historic claim of
."

51

In his statements

he referred to the "favorable declarations" which various
governments had made on the subject,

and also gave an

explanation of the "attachment of the Jewish people to Eretz
52
I s r ael."

The local Jewish questions in Europe,

in Eastern Europe,

especially

according to his presentation,

could be

solved by creating a national home in^Palestine.
Weizmann,

the next speaker for the Organization,

"dealt with the economic position of th^e Jewish people."
The war had displaced the East European Jew,
and Judaism"

53

leaving "Jewry

in a weakened condition never before seen,

creating "a problem very difficult of solution."

54

thus

The

solution— since the problem revolved around the homelessness
of the Jew— was to be found in the creation of a national
home.

55

The essence of the Zionist desires was that:

the

mandatory would promote Jewish immigration; cooperate with a
Jewish council or agency in the development of the Jewish
for the United States; Baron Sonnino for Italy; and
Clemenceau was present for the first few minutes of the
session.
Weizmann, Trial and E r r o r , p. 243.
^^Weizmann, Trial and E r r o r , p.
53

55

Ibid.

54

243.

^ Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1157-58.
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national home in Palestine;

and would offer priority to the

Jewish Agency in obtaining concessions for growth and devel
opment;, for natural resources which the mandatory government
. ,
.
56
might desire.
After comments by Ussishkim,
final speaker was Sylvan Levi.
into two parts:

and Andre Spire,

57

the

His remarks can be divided

"In the first he soared to heaven, H a n d 1

in the second he came plumb down to earth."

58

He began his

presentation by pointing out the great achievements of the
farming colonies established by Baron de Rothschild,
Palestine;

in

and made the point that the work of Choveve Z i o n .

and the significance of the Alliance Israelite Universelle
could hardly be ignored.

The only significance of the

Zionist movement, however,

according to Levi, was that "it

h a d uplifted the Jewish masses and oriented them to
Palestine."

59

/
Levi then proceeded to damn the entire future

of the Organization and its goals.

Palestine was too small

and too poor to absorb the millions of Jews that would w a n i
to migrate to the area.

The large influx of this "foreign"

population.would lead to the eventual displacement of the
600,000 Arabs already in the area.
56M i l l e r , D i a r y , XV,
57

60

He then continued in a

108.

Weizmann, Trial and E r r o r , p. 243.

58
Weizmann, Trial and E r r o r , p.
59 Ibid.

244.

60 Ibid.
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h i g h l y rhetorical manner stating his belief that the bulk of
the Jews who would flock to Palestine would come from Russia.
g?1

The Russians,

"who were of

'explosive'

create countless problems in the area.

tendencies,"

would.

Possibly the most

dangerous result of such a venture by the Zionists would be
the introduction of the dangerous idea of dual citizenship
among world Jewry, possibly consigning the Jew to the ghetto
as in the Middle Ages.
The Zionist representatives sat i^i shocked and
embarrassed silence,

regarding Levi's discourse as a "public

desecration" of their being.
w ant to degrade themselves,

62

The four Zionists did not

the Organization,

nor the

Council, by turning the meeting into a debate, which would
have been "an exceedingly undignified spectacle."
problem was resolved, however,

according to Weizmann,

"something in the nature of a miracle
American Secretary of State,
LeVi's discourse,

63

."

Robert Lansing,

64

Their
by

The

at the end of

interpolated a question which allowed

Weizmann a rebuttal to the "traitor's" remarks.

Lansing

asked Weizmann what was actually meant by the term "Jewish
National Home."

Did it mean an autonomous Jewish govern-

, 065
ment?

61

, .

Ibid.

^Weizmann,

62 -p, . ,
Ibid.
Trial and E r r o r , p. 244.

^5Miller, Diary, XV, 104-17.
Peace Treaties, II, 1158.

^ Ibid.

cf. Lloyd George,
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In answering the question, Weizmann replied in the
negative.^

The Jewish national home meant the creation of

an administration which would come from the natural condi
tions of the country— never to the detriment of the nonJewish community.

Through immigratipn it was hoped that

Palestine would eventually become Jewish as England was
English.

67

/

As to Levi's charge of dual allegience,t Weizmann

maintained that there was nothing in any o£ the Zionist proposals which could possibly raise such a problem.

68

charge against the Russians was without foundation,
although they lived in an "excitable atmosphere,"

The
for

the early
/

work in Palestine, which had been praised by Monsieur Levi,
had been done by Russian Jews.
this conversation.

69

The proceedings ended with

The Zignists had stated their case,

Weizmann had delivered his rebuttal,

and

according to Balfour,

with the sureness of "the swish of a s w ord."

70

"The Zionist Organization did not want an autono
mous Jewish G o v e r n m e n t b u t merely to establish in Palestine,
under a Mandatory Power, an administration, not necessarily
Jewish,t which would render it possible to send into Palestine
70,000 to 80,000 Jews annually.
The Zionist Association
would require to have permission at the same time to build
Jewish schools, where Hebrew would be taught, and in that
w a y to build up gradually a nationality which would be as
Jewish aq the French nation was French and the British
nation was( British.
Later onj when the Jews fopmed thq large
majority, they would be ripe to establish such a Government
as would answer to the state of the development! of the
country and to their ideals."
Miller,* D i a r y , XV, 104-17.
67
Weizmann^
69
70

I b i d . . p.

Trial and E r r o r , p. 144.

68

Ibid.

244.

I b i d . , p. .245.
Weizmann and the otjier members
were at a loss to understand Levi's motivations, for on the

117
The Zionists appeared to be receiving favorable
reception for their program in France,

and the night of the

Zionist hearing, Tardieu issued a statement that France
would not openly oppose Palestine as becoming a British
mandate,

nor would they oppose the creation of a Jewish

state.

This openly friendly reception apparently scared

Faisal,

for in an interview with Le M a t i n , he was openly

hostile toward the Jewish state.
surprising shift in position,

71

Although this was a

Faisal probably acted out of

pressure'from the Various Arab nationalist movements,
attempt to reinforce his own position at home.
secretary, when contacted by the Zionists,
attitude,

F a i s a l 's

disavowed the

and a meeting between Felix Frankfurter,

American Zionist,

in an

and the Emir was arranged.

an

After the

meeting Faisal sent Frankfurter a letter, which restated the
friendly attitude of the Arabs towards their ethnic brothers.
Faisal was not afraid of the Ziopist program in Palestine.

73

Apparently Faisal was straddling the diplomatic fence, hoping
to achieve western support and also to maintain supremacy
Palestine Commission in 1918 he had acted "correct e n o u g h " ;
there was also confusipn as to why Baron de Rothschild
"supported his candidacy for membership in the delegation
. .
to come before the Council.
Ibid.
71Ibid.
73

72I b i d . . pp.

245-46.

"Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted
with the proposals submitted by the Zionist Organization to
the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and
proper.
We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned,
to help them through; we will wish the Jews a most hearty
welcome home."
Ibid.

72
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at home.
Just as Faisal had prepared the Syrians for the
coming of the King-Crane Commission ip May and June,
the Zionists prepare the Palestinian Jews.
Friedenwald,

so did

In a letter t o r

a ^member of the Zionist Commission in Jaffa,

Weizmann asked that the Zionist cause be presented to the
Commission "with firmness, moderation and dignity on Cthe]
lines submitted

" to the Peace Conference.

In placing all their hopes on Faisal,

74

the Zignists

had acted in the belief that he would help them in negotiating an agreement with the Palestinian Arabs.

75

. .
With the

increase in Arab tensions in the Middle East, however, Faisal
was forced to change his position,

and from April onward

there was increased activity among the Arabs in Palestine
in an effort to insure the exclusion of the Zionists from
Palestine.

76

This attitude was expressed by the Palestinian

Arabs when they were questioned by the King-Crane Commission,
and was also evident in Faisal's statements at Damascus in
June.
At the time of the Arab and Zionist appearances in
74

W o odward and Butler, D o c u m e n t s , IV, 2 78.
The note
then continued:
"Inform them our cooperation with Feysal
and our desire to work harmoniously with Arab population for
the good of Palestine.
Draw their attention to achievements
Jewish colonization under difficult circumst/ances and great
possibilities now when greatest majority Jewish people all
over world resolutely, supports Zionist aims and considerable
numbers waiting first opportunity settle Palestine."
Ibid.

^Cohen,

Israel. p. 143.

^ Ibid. . p. 148.
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Paris,

an undeniable entente existed between Great Britain

and these two parties, with reference to the disposition of
Palestine in accord with the Balfour Declaration.

Although

each party must have had a different interpretation of the
Declaration there was unanimity on the main point— the Jews
would be allowed to settle in Palestine.
time,

The Arabs,

at this

agreed to the creation of Palestine as a separate unit

from the Arab state or states,

and also that a government,

safeguarded by Great Britain, would be instituted and would
work for the development of a Jewish national home.
only after Damascus that Faisal 1s attitude changed,

It was
for in

conjunction with the other statements there his remark on
Palestine was an uncompromising one:
We oppose the pretentions of Zionists to create a
Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria,
known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to
any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge
their title but consider them a rare peril to our
people from t h e ^ a t i o n a l , economical, and political
points of view.
The P^ris Conference did not immediately work on the
problem of the Middle East after the initial presentations
had been made.
ceased,

As soon as the hostilities of the war had.

the enthusiasm for the creation of the Arab and

Jewish states began to diminish.
At the Peace Conference, all ideals of national
self-determination and of making the world safe for

77

Hanna, British Policy, p. 43.

democracy withered away in the icy climate of
power politics anc^insatiable greed for terri
torial expansion.
Nothing cohesive could be accomplished in drafting or award
ing mandates until the petty squabbles between France and
Great Brifain had been resolved.
The Anglo-French disagreement was complete by March
but England and France still awaited a solution of their
t

difficulties.

They had, however,

no doubt that they would

eventually be able to bridge the chasm of differences that
was separating them./

The unpleasant consequences of their

quarrel fell on the
luckless countries of the Near East . . . .
They
were now to be made the sport of antagonistic
ambitions . . . and political and sectarian
passions were to be awakened and c o n t i n u a l l y
sustained among their restless populations.
F a i s a l 1s hope for Arab independence slowly disinte
grated over the months of 1919,
h a d employed,

and the safeguards that he

and had hoped would assure independence were

removed one at a tipie:

the principle of self-determination

was being ignored; multilateral negotiations, with the
influence of disinterested tjiird parties, ,had not worked;
attempts to use a European type of diplomacy had resulted
in failure;
promises,
78
79

thq reliance upon England to implement hier war

and to intervene,
Sokolow,

on the Arab's behalf, with the

Z i o n i s m . IX, 443.

Kedourie."England and Middle E/ast, p. 141.
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French,

did not materialize; direct bilateral conversations

with the French had come to no avail; and, ultimately,

the

King-Crane Commission— with its hope of an "impartial" report—
had been ignored.
However, whijle the Arabs faired quite badly,

the

Zionists were actually beginning to realize their dream of a
Jewish national home.

The implementation of the mandate,

however, had to be postponed for the resolution of the FrancoBritish rivalry in the Middle East.

The calming of this

altercatipn began to occur in September,

80

Klieman., British Policy, p. 39.

1919.

CHAPTER VI
THE CREATION OF CONFLICT
Indifference to the significance of the Near
East in the scheme of world affairs has been
carried so far that it is not appreciated
that almost irreparable harm is being done
to British interests.
1
— The Near East, 2 January 1920
Basking in the after-glow of victory,
France,

in the immediate post-war period,

Britain and

extended and inten

sified their activities in the Middle East.

The resultant

contest for supremacy led to serious international problems
and had grave results for all concerned.
Syria and Palestine were seeking Great

Elements in both
Britain as a mandatory

power and the joint Zionist and Arab requests for British
protection greatly aided Britain in the diplomatic struggle
with France for pre-eminence in the area.

2

This arrangement

also created some difficulties when the time came for a joint
3
Anglo-French accord at the Peace Conference.
To solve the many imperialistic rivalries evident at
Paris,

two solutions were introduced and,
^Klieman,
2

after discussion,

British P o l i c y , p. 45.

S u p r a , chap. v, pp.

99-100.

3
The Chronicles of the H a g a n a .
cited by Cohen, I s r a e l , p. 161.
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I, part 2, p. 542,

as
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combined:

Woodrow Wilson's idea for a League of Nations,

and Jan Christian Smuts'
Under the mandate plan,

suggestion for a system of mandates.
the principal

allies would become

trustees for new states to be carved out of the land confis
cated from the defeated Central Powers,

with supervision of

the administration of the areas to be. a responsibility of
the L e a g u e .

Though a compromise,

this system appeared to be

the only possible way of reconciling the differences that
existed between the imperialistic reality of the conference,
and the idealistic desire for self-determination,
so evident among the "submerged nationalities."

4

that was
The mandate

system was incorporated ipto the Covenant of the League of
Nations,
gram,

in Artigle 22.

Greater Syria,

Ottoman Empire,

In the implementation of this pro

as well as other areas of the defeated

came under the influence of Great Britain

and France.
Great Britain,

already having secured France's

approval of her policy towards the Zionists m

Palestine,

5

opened formal discussions with the Zionist representatives
at the Peace Conference in Paris,

for the primary, purpose of

determining the terms of the proposed mandate.^

The first

4

Quincy Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations
(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 591.
Hereafter cited as Wright, M a n d a t e s .
5
S u p r a , chap. iii, p. 62.
^The negotiations for drafting the mandate was under
the directions of Weizmann and Sokolow; auxilary aid came
from Felix Frankfurter.
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stage of the negotiations included a tentative draft of
mandate arrangements which w^s sent to David Hunter Miller,
,t

1
for his opinion,

on March 28, 1919.

contained in this draft,

7

The general suggestions

delivered by Felix F r a n k f u r t e r , were

designed to establish Palestine as a mandate under the.
auspices of the League,
to dominate.

but the League would not be allowed

The preamble of the draft spoke specifically

of establishing in Palestine a Jewish national home,
historic right,

and included the request that Great Britain

b e ;assigned the position of mandatory power.
conferences,

through

and. resultant revision,

After several

th^-s draft was submitted

to th^ members of the British delegation in Paris on July 15,
1919.

Its framers intended that the draft,

in its final f o r m r

would be included in the peace treaty^with Turkey as an
integral part of that document.
A later text of July 15, however, was inclined to
7

"Whereas the inhabitants of Palestine are unable at
the present time effectively to constitute and to maintain an
autonomous c o m m o n w e a l t h , and
"2.
Whereas the League of Nations and the Signatory
Powers recognize thie historic title of the Jewish people to
Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute Palestine
as their national home:
and there to establish the founda
tions of a Jewish Commonwealth, and
"3.
Whereas it is the wish of the inhabitants of
Palestine and of the Jews that governmental and administra
tive powers to be exercised over the territory and its inhabi
tants should be confined to Great Britain as the Mandatory
of the League and as trustee of the Signatory Powers,
"4.
Now therefore the Signatory Powers hereby con
stitute Great Britain the Mandatory of the League of Nations
for the Government and Administration of Palestine."
Miller, D i a r y , pp. 369 ff.
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favor French interests.

Negotiated by Weizmann and Sokolow,

as representatives of the Zipnist O r ganizatipn, it was con
structed in such a way as to cause the Zionists to think that
y
it would be acceptable to both the British and the French.
Amazingly enough, however,
from France or England,
in London.

the objections to i£ came, not

but from the Zionist Action Committee

They felt that the dr^ft was not specific enougli,

and said that it should be made more clear that the "historic

«
connection" was,

in fact,

an "historic right" of the Jewish

people to settle in Palestine.

Because of the internal fric-

tiqn among the Zionist leaders , a second text\ was prepared.
Generally,

Q

the moderatipn of Weizmann and Sokolpw wa$ carried

"1.
Recognition should be given to the 'historical
c o n n e c t i o n ' of the Jews with Palestine and the claim which
this gives them to found a national home in that country.
"2.
The proposed mandatory should be made respon
sible for placing Palestine under such political, administra
tive and economic conditions as would secure the establish
ment there of the Jewish national home.
"3.
The ultimate aim of the mandate should be the
creation in Palestine of a self-governing commonwealth.
"4.
A provisional— to be qhanged subsequently into
a permanent— Jewish Council should be formed representing
Jewish opinion in Palestine and in the world at large . . . .
"5.
The Palestine administration should be under a
Governor appointed by the Mandatory Power who would be
assisted by an Executive Council.
Not less than half of the
members of the Executive Council should be representative of
the Palestine population, Jewish and non-Jewish, and of the
Jewish Council.
Provision should also be made for a Repre
sentative Assembly of an advisory character, gradually to be
given wider powers as the Palestinian nation progressed
toward full self-government.
"6 . Jewish immigration >and colonization should be
facilitated by the British government.
"7.
Hebrew was to be recognized as an official
language."
Reports of the Executive to the Xllth Zionist
C o n g r e s s . I, p. 28.
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over* into the revised document.
completed by the end of 1919,

The revised document was

and apparently received the

approval of the British government.

Although the term

"historic connection" was not replaced by the stronger term
"historic right, " the revised draft did tend to be a'’more
generally worded document:

there was to be a wider concept

of self-government^and administration of the state,

and the

Zionist Organization appeared to have won certain necessary
conditions for the development of a Jewish national home.
The idea of a Jewish Commonwealth, however, was not favored
by Great Britain,

and the phrase was dropped from the draft.

9

The spring of 1920 witnessed a set-back for the
Zionists in negotiations with Great Britain with regard to
the terms for the mandate:

the Arabs were creating a great

deal of difficulty in the Middle East,
for his anti-Zionist attitude,
Secretary.

and Lord Curzon, known

replaced Balfour as Foreign

Curzon felt a need for a more lenient policy

towards the Arab groups, which proved to be detrimental to
the Z i o n i s t s 1 goals.

As a result,

in the drafted mandate,

basic changes were made

and a new proposal issued by the

government on June 10, 1920.

In this government prepared

draft— the first official draft from the British— reference,
to the "historic connection" of the Jews to Palestine was
deleted:

limits were placed on the authority of the Jewish
9

Reports of the Executive to the Xllth Zionist
C o n g r e s s . I, p. 30.
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Agency;

and the idea of a Jewish Commonwealth was completely

,
,10
dropped.
Finally realizing that Weizmann had been correct in
his moderation,

the Actions Committee concentrated on re-

obtaining a position which they had previously disfavored.
The members consolidated their efforts to work out a com
promise,

directing their attention to three essential areas:

the necessity for the inclusion of the idea of "historic
connection"; need for a "self-government" clause was neces
sary because of Palestine's status as a Class A Mandate;

and

the right for internal autonomy was necessary if the area
was to become self-supporting.
19 20,

11

Between June and November,

the Zionists were actively involved in attempts to

modify the "restrictive" governmental draft.

12

In spite of

the activities of the Organization and Lord Balfour, who had
once again come to the aid of the Zionist group,
change was allowed:
instated.

only one

the phrase "historic connection"was re

On December 6 , 1920,

Balfour submitted the approval

draft for the mandate to the League of Nations for its ratifi
cation.

One major triumph for the Zionists, which was incor

porated into the draft, was the replication of the Balfour
Declaration;

this statement,

therefore, would become part of

the formal mandate for Palestine.
"^Reports of the Executive to the Xllth Zionist
C o n g r e s s , I, p. 30.

11ibid. . p. 31.

12Ibid., p. 32.
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The draft, circulated in the Council of the League,
did not survive intact, however,
deemed necessary*.

Changes in the mandate were not concerned

with Palestine, however,
area.

for certain changes were

but rather with the Transjordan

With the addition of Article 25, Great Britain was

given the right to withhold implementation of the Balfour
Declaration in those territories that were located east Of
.

1

the Jordan River,

3

and the terms of the final draft awarded

Great Britain complete control over foreign,
administrative,

and defense policies.

legislative and

Because the mandatory

was bound "so far as circumstance fpermitted,
local autonomy"

14

and m

compliance to this,

tojf encourage
a Jewish Agency

was set up for the purpose of advising and jointly controlling the administration of Palestine.

15

The "final draft" was submitted to the British
Parliament in August,

1921,

and eventually ratified by the

League of Nations on July 24, 1922.

There were numerous

events which delayed its. final ratification and implementa
tion, however,

not the least of which was the still existent

Anglo-French rivalry.

France refused to give its consent to

13

The Transjordan was separated from Palestine in
19 22, and therefore not open to Jewish immigration as described
in the mandate.
Williams, Britain and F r a n c e , p. 27.
Infra,
chap. vi, p. 140.
14
15

Williams,

Britain and F r a n c e , p. 24.

I b i d . Text of the.mandate can be found in Wright,
Mandates, pp. 600 f f . , and Lloyd George, Peace Treaties. II.
1194-1201.
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British intent in the Middle East, until Britain had resolved
its differences with h e r concerning the Syrian question.
Also holding up the peace treaty with Turkey was the uncertain and "ambiguous attitude of the United States."

The*

assumption had been made that the United States would p a rti
cipate in the Turkish negotiations,
this was becoming doubtful,
an increase m

but by the fall of 1919,

and Amerigan delay was creating

the tension of an already irritable situation.

17

The French were in a very precarious position in the
Middle East at the end of the war.

After informal talks with

Lloyd George in November and December of 1918,

18

Clemenceau

returned to France confident that the problem had been solved.
Both he and Lloyd George had handled the situation in the
manner they were most familiar w i t h — the methods of nine
teenth century imperialism.

Neither of them had any

"experience with the green timber of Wilsonian idealism in
the construction of a 'new w o r l d 1

."

19

and out of thi£

confusion of method came the inevitable conflict.
As early as March,- 1919, Lloyd George and Clemenceau
were meeting in Paris to discuss allocation of the mandates
which they felt would be granted by the future League.
Stein,
17

B a l f o u r , p. 652.

Wood w a r d and Butler,

^ S u p r a , chap. v, pp.
19

D o c u m e n t s , IV, 826-27.
99-101.

Yale, The Near E a s t , p. 334.

On
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March 7, 1919,

the two leaders came to the understanding that

France would receive Syria,

and Great Britain would be alio-

cated both Palestine and Mesopotamia,

including the Mosul.

20

France was still suspicious of British activities in the
Syrian region,
m

due to the presence of a military force,

spite of constant reassurance from Great Britain

it would not accept a mandate for Syria,
remained.

’’French opinion

22

21

and

that

her suspicions

saw in the continued British

occupation only a sinister agency

23
. 11
for the implemen

tation of British desires.
This problem was slowly rectified,
August,

however,

and in

1920, Lord Curzon made the public statement that

a Mandate for Syria had been accepted by France and
a Mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia had been
accepted by Great Britain.
Each country had left
the other with a free hand to proceed with those
Mandates, and this decision ^<3 been pursued with
equal loyalty by both sides.
On September 15,

1919,

an agreement concerning the

mi litary aspects of the,problem wa$ reached,
made for withdrawal of British troops,
by French troops.

and plans were

and their replacement

The French military would garrison Syria,

west of the line agreed upon in the Sykes-Picot Treaty,

20

Lloyd George,

Peace T r e a t i e s , I, 288.

21 I b i d . . II, 1046.
22
23
24

Woodward and Butler,
Temperley,

D o c u m e n t s , IV,

Peace C o n f e r e n c e , VI,

298.

151.

Woodward and Butler, Documents, VIII, 109.
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Cilicia; Arab forces would occupy Damascus, Horns, H a m a ,and
Aleppo.

25

This agreement fulfilled,

in part, Great Britain's

undertakings with the F r e n c h vin the Sykes-Picot Treaty,

and

also the pledges that had been made to Hussain in the McM^honHusain Correspondence.
British, however,

The joint move by the French and

left the Arab regime in Damascus without

British aid in dealing with the French,

and the Syrian Arabs

were becoming desperate as a result of imminent French
occupation.
Faisal, upon hearing of the possibility of such an
Anglo-French arrangement, wrote Lloyd George on September 9,
1919,

that only a guarantee of Syrian unity could prevent

the collapse of hj.s regime,
the Middle East.

and,

therefore,

the "peace" of

The Emir left for London,

in a vain hope

to forestall any agreement that would endanger the unity of
his country,

and "before any decision [was*j taken in London

or disaster ^overtook thern^ both
Syria.

."

in London aand

He arrived too late to stop the agreement, however,

and November 1, 1919, was set as the date for British troop
withdrawal.

27

W hile in London, Faisal did participate in several
meetings where he attempted tp have troop withdrawals
25I b i d . , IV,

384-85.

26I b i d . , IV, 388.

27Ibid., IV* 395-400, 413-19, 458-63.
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cancelled,

or,

at the minimum, postponed,

in the area was not so tenuous.
the Syrian problem,

until the situation

Hoping to bring an end to

from the British standpoint at' least,

Lloyd George wrote Faisal,

on October 10,

British government had no recourse,

1919,

that the

but to implement the

•\

decision it had arrived at with France.
His Majesty's Government [bad*} made up their mind
that it Jwas] impossible . . . to contigue the
occupation of Syria by British troops.

Considering the domestic situation and the public statements
of March and August,
for Syria,

29

that Britain would not accept a mandate

they could no longer consider the occupation of

Syria and Cilicia as part of their duty,

at least until the

Peace Conference had settled the situation.
through this letter,

30

Great Britain,

illustrated its desire to withdraw from

the complicated and embarrassing Syrian situation,

and to

halt its role as mediator between; France and Faisal.
Desperate because of the situation at home,

and wary of the

severe criticism from his. father, Faisal, upon the advice of
Lloyd George,

left for Paris for direct negotiations with

31
Clemenceau.
British troops began their withdrawal from Syria on
November 1, and bye early December were completely out of the
28

Wood w a r d and Butler, D o c u m e n t s . IV, 451.

O Q

o n

I b i d .r XV. 449.

31Ibid. . IV, 475.

I b i d . . IV. 451.
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area.

As a result of British withdrawal the "French and

Arab troops now faced each other across the new zones of
occupation."
Gouraud,

32

To further complicate the situation,

French Commissioner for Syria,

Henri

arrived in Beirut bn

November 1, thereby illustrating F r a n c e 's determination to
secure and entrench itself in Syria.

All of these occurrences,

which Faisal had attempted to prevent,
in France,

occurred while he was

and his absence from the area tended to make the

situation in Damascus and Syria grow at a worsening rate.
His meetings and correspondence with Clemenceau proved u s e 
less,

for he was out of his element in these negotiations,

i
33
and Clemenceau had won the round.
unjustly,

The Emir felt, not

that he had been betrayed and "handed over,

by feet and hands,

to the French."

tied

34

With the French occupation of Syria,

the "hour of

grace" between the Zionists and Arabs came to an end,

for

the Arabs had not secured their "big Arab State," and therefore were not willing to concede Palestine to the Zionists.
"Savage disappointment gripped the Arab national movement
."

36

and with the expulsion of Faisal from Damascus,
32
33
34
35

Klieman,
Williams,

British P o l i c y , p. 41.
Britain and F r a n c e , p. 21,

K 1 i e m a n , British P o l i c y , p . 41.
S u p r a , chap.

v, pv 119.

^ E b a n , My People, p. 3 76.

by

35
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the(French,

the Arab nationalist movement made claim for

complete liberation of Syria, union with Palestine,

and

militant resistance to the creation of a Jewish national
home in, Palestine.

37

The distribution of the controversial mandate was
soon to be settled.

The proposal for

unqualified Syrian independence . . . stood no
chance of acceptance by*the Conference^ if only
for the reason that the granting of such indepen
dence would mean the ^gfinite end of French dreams
in the Levant - - .' ,
but with the events whiph preceded the Conference,

the Syrian

fate had been decided— there would be no independence.
the *Arabs acknowledgement of this fact,
the Middle East,

With

riots brokei.oub in

in which the Arabs made vain attempts to

overthrow the French and buying the plight of their situation
before the Conference.
Confronted with this situation,

Great Britain and

France condemned the activities of the rebels,

stating that

the mandate question had to be settled by the Peace Confer-en.ce, and not*.through violent revolution.

The Paris Confer

ence had adjourned without discussing the situation of the
mandates, however,

thereby^passing it on to the San Remo

Conference.
On April 24, 19 20, the Conference decided that both-*
Syria and Iraq would become independent states,
37

Ibid.

38

Temperley,

according to

Peace C o n f e r e n c e , VI,

156.

135.
Article 22, under the protective guidance of a mandatory
power.

The powers were to be the French in Syria,

English were to administer Iraq and Palestine.

39

and the
The m a n 

dates for Syria and Lebanon were conferred upon France by
the Supreme Council on April 4, 1920,
firmed on Ma y 5, 1920.

and consequently con

The mandate for Palestine was granted

at the same time as those for Syria and Lebanon-

The terms

of the mandates were drafted and "deposited with the Council
of the League m

December,

1920."

40

They were then approved,

as drafted, by the League on July 24, 1922,

and,

therefore,

ready for promulgation in the designated areas.
The basic guide lines for the division of the Ottoman
territory in Syria were those that had been drawn up in the
Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916,
1918.

4-1

in accordance to the revisions of

✓
In the Treaty of Sevres, August 10, 19 20, the man

date for Palestine and other areas in the Middle East were
described in specific and minute detail.
did not ratify the Treaty,

Turkey, however,

and the terms were not officially

in effect until September 28, 1923, with the signing of the
Treaty of Lausanne.
would be ratified,

On the premise that the Treaty of Sevres
the main principles of the mandate had

been used to direct the government in Palestine from July 1,
39I b i d . . VI, 157.
S u p r a , chap. v, pp.

4 0 Ibid. . VI, 169.
100-101.
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1920, when the military government was replaced by a civil
a d m i n i stration.
The basis for the Palestine government was incor
porated into the mandate in the form of- the Balfour Declara
tion.

Although there were originally many objections to its

inclusion,
. . . all the Powers could do was to concede the
substance of the Declaration— that is, to subscribe
to t h g2establishment °f a national home for the
Jews.
Because of this concession,

on the part of the other powers,

the Declaration became a corporate part of the mandate.
Looking for an administrator for Palestine,
Lord George,

Curzon,

and Balfour settled upon Herbert Samuel— a Jew

who was also a late convert to the Zionist cause.

When he

was offered the position on April 24, SamUel was hesitant.
about taking the post, but through the urgings of Zionist
leaders in San Remo, he accepted.

43

In, taking the 30b,

Samuel hoped to be representative of all Palestinians’.
Speaking
with regard to the non-Jewish population, the
desiredj not only to treat them with absolute
justice . . . but also to adggt active measures
to promote their well-being.
42

W oodward and Butler,

D o c u m e n t s , VIII,

43

168.

The appointment of a Zionist to. this post can be
interpreted to be an expression of Lloyd G e o r g e 's belief that
a Jewish Commission was to be created in Palestine.
This
Commission would work fop the eventual independence of the
Jewish state.

^Storrs,

Orientations, p. 458.

13 7
'To pursue this policy of equality,

after his arrival in

Jerusalem on July 1, 1920^ one of his first official acts
was to declare a general amnesty for all Arab participants
in the Jerusalem riots of May,
on the calm this created,

1920.

45

Hoping to capitalize

Samuel then began to translate

British proposals into actual programs.

The most important

move was the creation of an advisory council composed of
Jewish, Arab,

and British representatives— the "first step

46
in the development of self-governing institutions."
By the end of October,

the High Commissioner was able

to report some progress in Palestine:

travel restrictions,

because of the "calm" atmosphere, had been modified; pilgrim
ages were being allowed and even encouraged to be re-newed;
and the new Jewish immigrants, who were arriving daily, were
not creating any serious threat to the status-quo of the area.
Because of the easiness of the situation,

Samuel was very

optimistic about the ease of transition for Palestine to a
Jewish national home.^^
Samuel was definitely acting in a sincere attempt to
govern for all of the inhabitants of the country,

and

believed that a policy of good will towards the Arabs would
45

Eban, My P e o p l e , p. 3 78.

46

Foreign Office, "Confidential Prints, Eastern
Affairs, Iraq, 1920-22," Enclosure 2 in no. 83, 10 October
1920, Paper E 13008, file 85/44, volume 406/4.4; as cited by
Klieman, British P o l i c y , p. 65.
47

Klieman, British Policy, p. 65.
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serve the best interests of Palestine and the mandatory power.
Because of this apparent pro-Arab sentiment, he faced much
criticism.

In spite of this, he was of the general opinion

that the goal of the Balfour Declaration was the eventual
creation of a Jewish state m
from this contention.

Palestine,

48

and he never veered

His Arab policy was not to the detri

ment of the Palestinian, Jew, but rather was implemented t o *
promote the necessary conditions of peace that were required
for full independence of Palestine.

Because of this position

as a government official, hi,s main purpose was not immediate
implementation of the idea of a Jewish state, but rather "to.
subject that aim to the task of securing tranquility within
the Arab community."

49

Samuel was doing his job m

ment of his obligations to the British government,

fulfill
of whom

he was the official representative in Palestine.
The end of 1920 witnessed the strengthening of Great
Britain's position in the Middle East, primarily as a result
of Sir Herbert Samuel and Sir Percy Cox,

serving as High

Commissioners in Palestine and Mesopotamia,.: respectively.
Because of the capabilities of these two men,

Palestine and

Mesopotamia hac^ been able to avoid the violence of 1920 that
48

It was Samuel who was the first member of the War
Cabinet tp move for the establishment of a Jewish home in
Palestine, and he was also active in the eventual fulfillment
of this desire when the Balfour Declaration was issued.
S u p r a , chap. iii, p. 51.
49

Eban, My People, p. 379.
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had ravaged other regions in the Middle East.
maintain this status,

Hoping to

the Cairo Conference was convened on

March 12, 19 20, in an attempt to coordinate the policies
involved in the administration of the Middle East,
hopefully,

to end any potential threat of riot.

and,

This meeting

was one of Winston Churchill's first official acts in the
area of Middle Eastern affairs,

and set the stage for his

White Paper of 1 9 2 2 . ^
While enroute to Cairo,
an Arab Executive Committee,

Churchill was approached by

and asked to revise the govern

ment's policy towards Palestine— to recind the Balfour
Declaration.

Churchill informed the delegates that he

neither wished,

nor was able, to repudiate the Balfour

Declaration or to halt Jewish immigration.

51

Great Britain

had promised to aid the development of a national home for
the Jews and,

obviously,

into Palestine.

this involved Jewish immigration

It was also on the basis of the Balfour

Declaration that Britain had received and eventually accepted
the mandate for Palestine.

Therefore,

to be implemented on these grounds.

the mandate would have

52

Because of the increasing troubles in the area and
the violent riots of May,

1921,

it was finally realized that

50

Klieman, British P o l i c y , pp. 105ff.
The dis
cussions concerning Palestine at this conference were pr im
arily concerned with the. creation of a Palestinian defense
force, and not with territorial questions.
Ibid., pp. 118ff.

5 1Ibid. . p. 128.

5 ^Ibid.
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some conciliation with the Arabs would h a v e to b e s formulated,
and pressure was applied to force the Colonial Office to move
away from its apparently pro-Zionist position.

An offer was

made in 1921 to extend Arab representation in the government
of Palestine,

but"this was refused by the Arabs on the

grounds that it^ was only/a nominal gesture,

and that such a

council would not have any real function in governmental.
affairs.

53

The Arab delegation felt it useless to talk about
v

a constitution,

unless Britain denounced the Balfour Declara

tion, halted non-Arab immigration,
complete self-government.

54

and'-granted immediate and

Arab-Zionist discord in Palestine

continued to grow until May,i 1922,. when Samuel was forced to
go to London and ask for an official declaration from the
government"to aid in the conciliation of the Arabs.
Britaip was ready,, afte^* listening to -Samuel,
proposals for independence,

Great

to sponsor

which included recognition to the

existing Arab majority i n }Palestine,

and, because of this,

limit Jewish immigration into the area.

55

actions of the Arab delegation*in London,

As a result of the
and S a m u e l 's inter

pretation of the situation/ the "Churchill White Paper of
1922 was issued to explain and re-define the political situa
tion of Palestine.

As a preface to the White Paper,

Trans

jordan was excluded from the provisions of the Palestiine
I b i d . . p. 202.
54

Ibid.

55Ibid., pp. 200-02.
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mandate,

thereby limiting Jewish immigration into the area,

and partially fulfilling some of the demands made by the
Arab d e l e g a t i o n . ^
The White Paper was composed of nine major points:
1) the Balfour Declaration was reaffirmed,

and the British

declared that it was not susceptible to change or alteration;
2) a national home for the Jews would be established,

and

those people in residence were there "as of right and not on
suff.erence" ; 3) the British government did not contemplate
the "disappearance or subordination" of the Arab peoples,
language,

or culture; 4) all citizens would be regarded as

Palestinians;
gradually,

5) His Majesty's Government intended to foster,

a full measure of self-government; 6 ) the special

position of the Zionist Executive did not entitle it to share
in the government of the country; 8 ) immigration would be
regulated by the legislative assembly in consultation with
the administration;

and, 9) any religious community or "con

siderable section of population" which claimed that the
mandate's terms were not being met, had the right to appeal
to the League of Nations.

57

The Arab delegation,
^ ^ I b i d ., pp.

on June 17, 19 22, replied in the

230-34.

57
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (House of
Commons & Command), 1922, Vol. XXIII (R e p o r t s , vol. 8 ),
Cmnd. 1700, 26 June 1922, "Palestine:
Correspondence with
Palestine-Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization,"
pp. 17-21.
The outline of the White Paper may be found on
pp. 30-31 of the same report.
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negative,

still demanding that Britain sever her tie with the

Balfour Declaration;
tipn,

the Executive of the Zionist Organiza-

on June 18, 1922;

new statement of policy.

reluctantly agreed to conform to the
58

The Churchill statement, however,

failed to reconcile any of the differences in Palestine,
when the mandate was approved the following month,

and

the g o v 

ernment repeated this same mistake, when it emphasized that
i;t would implement the mandate along the lines of the
Churchill White Paper.
In 1921-1922 the Arabs,

Jews,

and High Commissioner

in Palestine could agree on only one item:
of policy had to come from London,
drastically needed.

and a definition was

This mood was indicative of the slowly

evolving crisis in Palestine.
however,

any definition

The Middle East Department,

showed little willingness to re-define the govern

ment' s position,

blindly believing that the Cairo Conference

and the Churchill White Paper had been sufficient,
iproblems no longer existed.

and the

The Palestine riots in May,

19 22, illustrated the failure of this policy.

With the

increase of tension in Palestine, Mesopotamia,

and Trans

jordan,

as these three areas attempted to catch u p with the

spirit of Arab nationalist riots in other areas of the Middle
East,

action had to be forced from the British government.

Churchill, however^ was more concerned with •yfre Irish problem,

58

Klieman, British Policy, p. 203.
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and appeared to have lost interest in the situation taking
place in the Middle East.

59

The government would not go

beyond th,e White Paper of 1922, which remained the official
policy until 1939.
Great Britain was not ready to use force to assist
its authority in Palestine,

and tended to favor a policy

which would ensure a mood of tranquility.

Another aspect of

British policy, which began in 1921 and continued throughout
the period of the mandate, was a tendency to accept the
responsibility for Palestinian affairs,

and yet this feeling

of obligation was "a strange air of resignation and even
cynicism."

60

Great Britain preferred to persist in maintain

ing a rather precarious status-quo,

instead of actually

dealing with the situation and attempt a solution.

The

apparent calm of Palestine, which experienced only minor
riots in comparison to other Middle Eastern areas, was decep
tive,

for the calm was only temporary— >only superficial.

to its indifference,

Due

Great Britain was doomed to failure in

Palestine and the Middle E a s t — resulting in catastrophe for
its inhabitants.

59

Klieman„ British Policy, p. 204.

CONCLUSIONS
As I sit in the Foreign Office and look out
on the scene I am reminded of one of those
lava-1 akes . . * observing
a great liquid
expanse, an uneasy movement troubling the
surface, a seething and bubbling going on.
From time to time a violent explosion o c c u r s ;
here the banks, slip down into the mud and are
engulfed, while there you see new landmarks
emerge.
That is the picture of what is going
on all over the world at the present moment.^
— Lord Curzon, 1st Marquess of Kedleston
Prior to W o rld W a r I British policy in the Middle
East was clear-cut:
Far East,

to defend the routes to India and the

and to protect the Suez Canal.

The war, however,,

brought greater responsibilities to B r i t a i n ■
, primarily
because of an extension of Imperial commitments *

Exhausted

by the war and confronted by hew Middle Eastern problems
following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,

Britain faced

unprecedented problems in"the area— a hot-bed of intrigue,
revolution,

and rebellion.

It is not surprising,

therefore,

that mistakes were made; what is surprising ^s the over
emphasis by some,

and under-emphasis by others,

of the facts

that led to the situation in Palestine.
The basic misunderstanding regarding Palestine during
this period was the failure to realize that it became the

^Klieman, British Policy, p. 77.
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"twice-promised land" as a result of the tangled and confus
ing obligations which sprang from the Husain-McMahon Corres
pondence

(1915),

the Sykes-Picot Treaty, (1916),

Balfour Declaration

(1917).

and the

Such failures, however,

do not

provide a valid excuse for many, of the actions of statesmen
and nations during this period.
The question of whether or not Palestine was included
in the terms of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence is easily
answered.
studied,

If the language of the Correspondence is carefully
and the geographical limits carefully noted,

Pales

tine was unmistakably excluded from the area that was reserved
2
for Arab independence.
If a'line is drawn in a north-south
direction through those cities that are mentioned— A l e p p o ,
Hama, Horns, and Damascus— and is then extended to the south
3
Palestine clearly falls outside the Arab area.
There can be
little doubt that McMahon intended to exclude both the
northern and southern areas of the Syrian coast,

the exclu

sion being based on his belief that the area was not "purely
Arab,"

4

and also that firm commitments regarding any area
5
could not be made without the consent of France.
To clarify the confusion regarding the interpretation

2
3
4
5

S u p r a , chap.

. .

n,

p.

33.

I n f r a , Appendix H, p. 162.
S u p r a , chap.
Supra*, chap.

n,

p.

33.

ii, p.

34.

. .
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of the Correspondence,
Times,

Sir Henry McMahon,

in a letter to The

dated July 23, 193 7, reiterated what governmental

committees had said in the past:
I feel it my duty to state, and I do so
definitely and emphatically, that it w^s not
intended by me in giving this pledge to King
Hussein to include Palestine in the area in
which Arab independence was promised.
I also had every reason to believe at the
time that the fact that Palestine was not includeg
in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein.
Whatever the true explanation— -whether there was a
misunderstanding between McMahon and Husain,

or whether the

tSharif temporarily agreed, hoping to alter the arrangement
,at a later time— is not the important problem,
not the major point of Arab claims at Paris.

for this was
Faisal was to

use the Correspondence at Paris only as an auxiliary rein
forcement to the primary claim of the Arabs— the right to
govern by possession.

In. fact he difl not refer to the

Correspondence when he presented their terms at Paris, but
rather based Arab claims on^the military contribution of the
Arabs; the raising of, the Arab flag over Damascus;

the recog

nition of the Syrians as b e l l i g e r a n t s ; and upon the basis of
the broad promises for independence which were made at the
end of the war.
guiltless,

7

therefore,

The Times

7

D. G. Hogarth feels that the
British "were
*■
of any betrayal of King Hussein.

(London), July 23, 193 7*

Supra, chap. v, p. 1 02.i r

The
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sole condition of his action— that he be freed from his
Ottoman overlords and recognized as an independent,, sovereign
had been fulfilled.
v
From the standpoint of international law the claim
to the area by the Arabs on the basis of the Correspondence,
was without validity,
countries,

since it was not endorsed by the allied

nor the League of Nations.

acted in a unilateral manner,

Great Britain had

but had backed up any pledges

with the proviso that they were subordinate to their
committments to France.

Husain had accepted this provision.

9

The Sykes-Picot Treaty was dictated by the imperial^
istic motives of the three signatory powers.
in negotiating this agreement,

The British,

did everything possible to

include considerations that would be beneficial to the
Arabs

Sykes insisted that Aleppo, Hamma, Horns, and

Damascus should be left in Arab hands,

and was seeking to

Q
D. G. Hogarth, "Wahabism and British Interests,"
'Journal of the British Institute of Internatipnal A f f a i r s ,
IV (1925), pp. 72-73.
"
~
9

..
S u p r a , chap. 1 1 , p. 35.
The argument that Palestine
was included in the Arab region— west .of the vilayet of
Damascus, Horns, Hamma, and Aleppo-— is unfounded since the
vilayet of Damascus went to the Gulf of Aqaba, and Palestine
was to the west of this region.
The invalidity of such an
argument rests on the fact that there were no such things as
vilayets of Horns and Hamma; they were included in the vilayet
of Damascus.
It follows, therefore, that the term v i l a y e t ,
which can have two meanings, was intended as "district" and
not "territory."
To argue in any other way is not logical,
nor is it profitable.
Kirk, Middle E a s t , p. 146.

1^Supra, chap* ii, p. 40.
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k eep the treaty as consistent as possible with Great Britain's
pledges to Husain.
With the publication of the Sykes-Picot terms by the
Bolsheviks,

Great Britain stated that the agreement had only

been a "provisional" treaty,

and had been compiled prior to

the Arab revolt against the Ottoman E m p i r e . ^

The problem

created by this document was that both France and Britain
had limited definitions of Arab sovereignty,

each consider

ing themselves the prgtectors of the Arab peoples.

Each

felt that only they could create adequate administrative
systems that could function in the area,

and out of this

attitude came the future problems of the Peace Conference.
Generally speaking, the Sykes-Picot Treaty did

12

place

Great Britain in a

position of seeming duplicity, and little

can be said in her

defense.

the Treaty is that

the Arabs were guaranteed more than they

The best that can be said about

had had prior to the w a r — which was practically nothi-ng.

The

only possible improvement in the Arab position could have
been if "the agreement could have been carried out faithfully
^forj the Sykes-Picot Agreement might have offered a
workable compromise of English,
the Levant."

13

It was not the Tr eaty, /that created the

■^Antonius,
p p . 38 f f .

12
13

French and Arab interests in

Arab A w a k e n i n g , p. 25 7.

-

S u p r a , chap. v, p. 107.

Hanna, British Policy, p. 30.

Supra,

chap.

id
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undesirable post-war situation, however, but the fact that it
was not followed in...its entirety.

It was the breakdown of

the Treaty, when it came time for its implementation and
enforcement,

not its contradiction with other agreements

that created the conflict.

14

The precise impact of the Balfour Declaration o n the
Arab peoples of the Middle East is not clear as there is no
clear evidence that Palestine was included in the negotiations
with Husain;

and as it was provided in the Sykes-Picot Treaty

that the region was to become an internationally controlled
area.

15

Likewise,

statements made by Faisal, prior to and

during the Peace Conference,

indicated that Palestine would

not be included in the area destined for Arab independence.

16

In addition, Faisal at this time often talked of friendship
between the Zionists and Arabs, based upon their ethnological
relationship.

17

Husain,

as well,

seems to have understood

that Palestine was to be opened to Jewish immigration and
settlement.

18

This quixotic gesture of the British to. the Zionist
Organization,

created nothing but controversy,

however.

general opinion as to the motivation for the Declaration
14
15

S u p r a , chap. v, pp. 98-105.
S u p r a , chap.

ii, p. 64.

^^S u p r a , chap. v, p. 105.
17
18

S u p r a , chap. v, p. 103.

Supra, chap. iv, p. 87.

The
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clearly indicates that it was a war measure designed to win
support after the collapse of Tsarist Russia.

It was only

intended that a home for the Jews would be established in
Palestine at some undetermined time in the future.

19

Lord

Balfour stated that the Declaration was
. . . inspired by sentiment, although I am free to
admit I think we owe the Jews something substantial
for the way . . . they have rallied to the support
of the Allies . . . I came out for a Jewish home
land in Palestine in so far as it could be estab
lished without infringing on the rights of the
Arab communities . . . I should think any person
would see that my pronouncement was not dictated
by sentiment, but was a war measure.
Because of the revisions in the Sykes-Picot Treaty,
and the unofficial status of the Husain-McMahon Correspond
ence,

the Balfour Declaration— a tenuous document,

at best,

which was open to wide and varied interpretation— became the
basis at San Remo for the mandate for Palestine..
which Palestine created,
of the Declaration.

The problem

arose out of the ambiguous nature

Nobody knew what a "national home" was,

or was not; the term "Jewish people" did not refer to a
recognized judicial entity, but rather a loose grouping of
peoples with different goals and varied backgrounds;
certainly there was no such country,
tion was issued,
19

20

at the time the Declara

as Palestine— it was merely a geographic

S u p r a , chap.

iv, pp.

78-82.

Stephen B o n s u l , Suitors and Supplicants:
The
Little Nations at Versailles (New York:
Kennikat Press,
I n c ., 1946), p. 61.
Hereafter cited as Bonsul, Suitors
and S u p p l i c a n t s .
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region in the southern area of Greater Syria.
basic problem of the Declaration:
Declaration,

This was the

What did it mean?

and its impact on the world, had,

The

in fact, been

underestimated by the British and its authors.
The resistance of the Arabs to Jewish nationalism
was intense throughout the entire period of this study, but
at no time did it present problems that defied solution.
The fact that no attempt was made by the mandatory power to
explain to the Arabs,

or define the idealogical basis of the

Jewish state is evidenced by the fact, that revisions were not
made to the Churchill White Paper of 19 22— even after future
disturbances broke out.

21
•

The rising tide of Arab nation

alism throughout the Middle East— a nationalism that seems
to have been nurtured,

in part,

in England,

been overlooked by the British government.

appears to have
Years later,

Israeli statesman Abba Eban said:
A clear support of Jewish adjudication in Palestine
in the 1920's and 1930's might:'have prevented the
'inevitable1 conflict that was evolving, but
Faisal's vision was allowed to perish.
Arab
nationalism a n ^ Z i o n i s m were locked in mortal
combat . . . .
He saw developments as, a clear result of the indifference of
Britain and the world powers to problems of the area.
Regardless of the interpretation of the three docu
ments,

and in spite of where the blame is laid for the Middle
21

22

S u p r a , chap. vi, pp.

142 f f .

Eban, My People, p. 3 77.
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Eastern problem,
Britain,

there is one undeniable fact:

for its own reasons and advancement,

Great
encouraged the

Zionist movement, while at the same time the London govern
ment was clearly encouraging Arab nationalism.

These two

movements created an explosive situation which was destined
to erupt in sharp conflict.
Responsibility for the Middle East cannot,

of course,.

be placed on the shoulders of the statesmen of any one
country,

rather it is a responsibility of all of the allied

p owers of the First W o r l d W a r for as Colonel Lawrence said
at the Paris Conference1:
The main trouble is . . . there have been too many
cooks out there ancj^between them they have certainly
spoiled the broth.

23

Bonsul,

Suitors and Supplicants, p. 50.
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Appendix A
Basle Program
The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish
people a home in Palestine secured by public law.
The Congress contemplates the following means to
the attainment of this end:
1.
The promotion, on suitable lines, of the coloni
zation of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial
workers.
2.
The organization and binding together of the
whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local
and international, in accordance with the laws o f each
country.
3.
The strengthening and fostering of Jewish
national sentiment and consciousness.
4.
Preparatory steps towards obtaining government
consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of
Zionism.

Sokolow, Zionism. I, 268.
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Appendix B
Outline of a Programme for a New Administration
of Palestine for a Jewish Resettlement of Palestine
in Accordance with the Aspirations
of the Zionist Movement
1.
The recognition of a separate Jewish nationality
or national unit in Palestine.
2.
The participation of the Jewish population of
Palestine in local self-government insofar as it affects all
the inhabitants without distinction.
3.
The protection of the rights of minority
nationalities.
4.
Autonomy in exclusively Jewish matters, such as
Jewish education, religious and communal organization.
5.
The recognition and legalization of the existing
Jewish institutions for the colonization of Palestine.
6 . The establishment of a Jewish chartered company
for the resettlement of Palestine by Jewish settlers.

Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization
to the Xllth Zionist Congress. Part IV (London:
National
Labour Press, 1921)^! p. 71.

Appendix C
Zionist Proposal Submitted to Balfour
by Lord Rothschild on July 18. 1917
His Majesty's Government, after considering the aims
of the Zionist Organization accepts the principle of recog
nizing Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people
and the right of the Jewish people to build up its national
life in Palestine under a protection to be established at
the conclusion of peace, following upon the successful issue
of the war.
His Majesty's Government regard as essential for the
realization of this principle the grant of internal autonomy
to the Jewish nationality in Palestine, freedom of immigration for Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish National
Colonizing Corporation for the re-establishment and economic
development of the country.
The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy
and a Charter for the Jewish National Colonizing Corporation
should, in the view of His Majesty's Government, be elaborated
in detail and determined with the representatives of the
Zionist Organization.

Report to the Xllth Zionist Congress, Part IV
(L o n d o n N a t i o n a l Labour Press, 1921) , pp. 71-72•
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Appendix D
Amended Draft of October 1 0 # 1917
His Majesty's Government view with favor the
establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish
race and will use its best endeavors to facilitate the
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed in any
other country by such Jews who are fully contented with
their existing nationality and citizenship.

Report to the XIIth Zionist Congress,
National Labour Press, 1921), pp. 12f f .

I (London:
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Appendix E
The Balfour Declaration
Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf
of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of
sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been sub
mitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by
Jews in any other country."
I should be grateful if you would bring this
declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Yours sincerely,
ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

Report to the Xllth Zionist Congress. Part IV, p. 72.
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Appendix F
Statement of the Zionist Organization
Regarding Palestine
(February 3, 1919)
1.
The High Contracting Parties recognize the
historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the
right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National
Home.
2.
The boundaries of Palestine shall be as declared
in the Schedule annexed hereto.
3.
The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be
vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted
to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.
4.
(Provision to be inserted relating to the appli
cation in Palestine of such of the general conditions attached
to mandates as are suitable to the c a s e . )
5.
The mandate shall be subject also to the follow
ing special conditions:
(I)
Palestine shall be placed under such politi
cal, administrative and economic conditions as will secure
the establishment there of the Jewish National Home, and
ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous
Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights
of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights
and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
(II)
To this end the Mandatory Power shall
inter a l i a :
(a)
Promote Jewish immigration and close
settlement on the land, the established rights of the present
non-Jewish population being equally safeguarded.
(b)
Accept the cooperation in such measures
of a Council representative of the Jews in Palestine and of
the world that may be established for the development of the
Jewish National Home in Palestine and entrust the organiza
tion of Jewish education to such Council.
(c)
On being satisfied that the constitution
of such Council precludes the making of private profit, offer
to the Council in priority any concession for public works or
for the development of natural resources which it may be
found desirable to grant.

1595
(III)
The Mandatory Power shall encourage the
widest measure of self-government for localities practicable
in the conditions of the country.
(IV)
There shall be forever the fullest freedom
of religious worship for all creeds in Palestine.
There
shall be no discrimination among the inhabitants with regard
to citizenship and civil rights, on the grounds of religion,
or of race.
(V)
(Provision to be inserted relating to the
control of the Holy Places.)

Miller, Diary. XV, pp. 15-29.
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Appendix G
Outline of P e r s o n a g e s t
Allenby, Field Marshal Sir Edmund, 1st Viscount of Megiddo
(1861-1936)
1917-1919
Commander-in-chief of Egyptian
Expeditionary Force
1919-1925
High Commissioner for Egypt
Asquith,

Herbert Henry, 1st Earl of Oxford and Asquith
(1852-1928)
1908-1916
Prime Minister and First Lord of the
Treasury
1920-1921
Leader of the Opposition

Balfour,

Arthur James, 1st Earl of Balfour (1840-1930)
1902-1905
Prime Minister
1916-1919
Foreign Secretary
1919-1922
President of the Council of State

Cambon,

Paul (1843-1924)
1898-1920
French Ambassador to London

Churchill, Winston Spencer (1874-1965)
1919-1921
Secretary of State for War and Air
1 9 2 1-October, 1922
Secretary of State for the
Colonies
1940-1945
Prime Minister, First Lord of the
Treasury, and Minister of Defense
Clemenceau, Georges (1841-1929)
1917-1920
Premier of France
Faisal ibn Husain
1916-1918

(1885-1933)
Commander of the Hejazi Army in Middle
Eastern Theatre
1919
Representative for the Hejaz at Paris
1918-1920
Head of British administration in Syria
Aug'ust 23, 19 21
Proclaimed King of Iraq

Georges-Picot, M. F.
1915-1916
Represented France in negotiations with
Great Britain on future disposal, of
Arab regions

1611
1917

Grey,

With General Allenby in Palestine to
upholid French claims in the area; High
Commissioner in Beirut until 1920

Sir'Edward, 1st Viscount of Fallodorioo (1862-1933)
1905-1916
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Hogarth,

David George (1862-1927)
1916
Director of Arab Bureau in Cairo
1919
Nominated as British member of InterAllied Commission (King-Crane)

Husain ibn Ali
Sons:
1908
1916

(1856-1931) Sharifian of the family of Hashim
Abdullah (Transjordan), Faisal (Iraq)
Emir of Mecca
Self-proclaimed "King of the Arab Countries"

Lloyd George, David (1863-1945)
1915-1916
Minister of Munitions
1916
Secretary of State for War
1916-19 22
Prime Minister and First Lord of the
Treasury
McMahon,

Colonel Sir Henry (1862-1949)
1914-1916
First High Commissioner for Egypt;
represented Great Britain in correspondence
with Husain
1919
Nominated as a member of the Inter-allied
Commission (King-Crane)

Samuel, Herbert, 1st Viscount of Mount Carmel and Toxteth
(1870-1963)
1914-1915
President of the Local Government Board
19 20-19 25 High Commissioner of Palestine
1931-1935
Leader of the Liberal Parliamentary Party
Sokolow* Nahum (1860-1936)
19 20-1931
Chairman of the Zionist Executive
Author of History of Zionism, 1600-1918
Sykes, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Mark (1879-1919)
1911
Elected to House of Commons
1915
Member of deBunsen Comifiittee
1916
British representative in negotiations
with France over partition of Arab regions
1916
Chief Advisor to the Foreign Office on
Near Eastern Policy
Weizmann, Dr. Chaim (1874-1952)
President, W o r l d Zionist Organization and Jewish
Agency for Palestine (1921-1931 and 19315-1946)
First President of Israel

Appendix H
Palestine and Syria in 1915
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Appendix J
Arab Territories and Palestine
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